Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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- Release buffered-reader 1.0.0, sequoia-openpgp 1.0.0, and
sequoia-sqv 1.0.0.
- Also release sequoia-sop 0.22.0.
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- Fixes build on architectures with unsigned chars.
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- Fixes #630.
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- January 1st is a holiday in much of the world.
- When we disable an algorithm, things will almost certainly break
somewhere.
- Reduce the chance that things break when people are on vacation by
using February 1st as the cutoff day instead of January 1st.
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- A `Policy` now knows whether the use of a hash requires collision
resistance or only second pre-image resistance.
- Extend `StandardPolicy`'s hash policy API to allow a user to
express a more nuanced policy that takes this information into
account.
- See #595.
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- This uses calculated hash algorithm security instead of a hard-coded
value.
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- Adjust `self_signatures`, `certifications`, `self_revocations` and
`other_revocations` to return `impl Iterator` over the signatures.
- Adjust all call-sites including doc tests.
- Adjust downstream projects (sq, autocrypt).
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- The standard policy currently has two policies related to hash
algorithms: when a hash algorithm should be rejected for normal
signatures, and when a hash algorithm should be rejected for
revocation sigantures.
- If we distinguish two security contexts, then we'll have four
policies (the cross product).
- If the currently state is not already unmanageable, then this
certainly is.
- Simplify this by using a single scalar to represent how long a
revocation certificate using a broken hash should continue to be
accepted.
- This is probably sufficiently expressive in practice as this is a
largely inexact science. And, if a more nuanced policy is
required, it is always possible to wrap `StandardPolicy`.
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- Add `Duration::years`.
- This function assumes that there are 365.2425 days in a year,
which is the average number of days in a year in the Gregorian
calendar.
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- Make `Duration::seconds` a const fn.
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- Certificates with a primary key that is not signing capable, and a
subkey that is, are strictly more secure than ones that combine
signing and certification capabilities in the primary key.
- If the owner of a certificate with a signing-capable primary key
can be tricked into creating a binary signature over carefully
chosen attacker-controlled data, this signature can be repurposed
to bind arbitrary attacker-controlled components to the
certificate using a chosen-prefix collision attack on the hash
function (see e.g. "SHA-1 is a Shambles" for a similar attack).
- Having a separate signing-subkey mitigates the attack, because
signatures by the signing subkey cannot bind components to the
certificate.
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- If no data has been read, that may indicate an error. In this
case, even requesting no data may fail.
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- Remove the function.
- Remove associated tests.
- Cert::revocation_keys does examine all live self-signatures.
- Fixes #629.
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- Avoid the additional `fn f()`.
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- See #480.
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- Fixes #473.
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- Fixes #622.
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- Relaxes those dependencies that were unnecessarily strict and
patched by debian.
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- Versions required by feature or API usage:
- anyhow 1.0.18.
- policy::test::reject_seip_packet and
policy::test::reject_cipher' fail
- We use `impl From<anyhow::Error> for Box<dyn std::error::Error +
Send + Sync + 'static>`, introduced in 1.0.5.
- tokio 0.2.19
- We use `tokio::net::tcp::OwnedReadHalf`, introduced in 0.2.19.
- chrono 0.4.10
- We use the `std` feature, introduced in 0.4.10.
- thiserror 1.0.2
- futures and futures-util 0.3.5
- tempfile 3.1
- c_doctests require the same version of rand both as direct
dependency and through tempfile.
- Yanked versions:
- structopt 0.3.11. 0.3.8 to 0.3.10 were yanked.
- socket2 0.3.16. 0.3.0 to 0.3.15 were yanked.
- Update our dependencies to the package versions required by other
dependencies, e.g. structopt requires lazy_static 1.4.0.
- clap 2.33
- lazy_static to 1.4.0
- libc to 0.2.66
- proc-macro2 to 1.0.7
- syn to 1.0.5.
- winapi 0.3.8
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- If the signer controls the data that is being signed, then the
hash algorithm only needs second pre-image resistance.
- This observation can be used to extend the life of hash algorithms
that have been weakened, as is the case for SHA-1.
- Introduces a new `enum HashAlgoSecurity`, which is now passed to
`Policy::signature`.
- See #595.
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- See #615.
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- See #615.
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- This way the entire `BufferedReader<C>` will be `Send` and `Sync`.
- Modify all other crates accordingly.
- See #615.
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- Fixes #389.
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- Fixes #614.
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- See #615.
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- This makes file_unix::File Send and Sync.
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- Declare trait bounds using a where clause. It looks a bit odd if
there is no bound, but not worse than before.
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- See #615.
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- See #615.
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- All types that are `Send` and `Sync` are checked now.
- Fixes #627.
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