diff options
| author | Neal H. Walfield <neal@pep.foundation> | 2020-04-27 13:41:48 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Neal H. Walfield <neal@pep.foundation> | 2020-04-28 08:32:40 +0200 |
| commit | 22a777c7c5db1d35642bfb9d2ab44b4833937956 (patch) | |
| tree | 2f6ff41f3034ac48b642ed3280b1b2d5f02ebcf6 /openpgp/src/policy.rs | |
| parent | 313c9ef9774c20d6e3dfe1f53ad3fdc7181c60dd (diff) | |
openpgp: Rename Cert::revoked, etc. to revocation_status
- Rename `Cert::revoked`, `ValidCert::revoked`,
`ValidAmalgamation::revoked`, and `ComponentBundle::revoked` to
revocation_status to more accurately match what it does.
- Don't rename `ValidComponentAmalgamationIter::revoked` or
`ValidKeyAmalgamationIter::revoked`. They don't return the
revocation status; they check whether the key is revoked.
Diffstat (limited to 'openpgp/src/policy.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/policy.rs | 16 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/openpgp/src/policy.rs b/openpgp/src/policy.rs index 884cc702..0de62f51 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/policy.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/policy.rs @@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ mod test { ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised, b"It was the maid :/")?; - match cert_revoked.revoked(&DEFAULT, None) { + match cert_revoked.revocation_status(&DEFAULT, None) { RevocationStatus::Revoked(sigs) => { assert_eq!(sigs.len(), 1); assert_eq!(sigs[0].hash_algo(), algo); @@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ mod test { assert!(cert.primary_key() .binding_signature(&reject, None).is_err()); assert_match!(RevocationStatus::NotAsFarAsWeKnow - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); // Reject the hash algorithm next year. let mut reject : StandardPolicy = StandardPolicy::new(); @@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@ mod test { SystemTime::now() + Duration::from_secs(SECS_IN_YEAR)); cert.primary_key().binding_signature(&reject, None)?; assert_match!(RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); // Reject the hash algorithm last year. let mut reject : StandardPolicy = StandardPolicy::new(); @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ mod test { assert!(cert.primary_key() .binding_signature(&reject, None).is_err()); assert_match!(RevocationStatus::NotAsFarAsWeKnow - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); // Reject the hash algorithm for normal signatures last year, // and revocations next year. @@ -1443,7 +1443,7 @@ mod test { assert!(cert.primary_key() .binding_signature(&reject, None).is_err()); assert_match!(RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); // Accept algo, but reject the algos with id - 1 and id + 1. let mut reject : StandardPolicy = StandardPolicy::new(); @@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ mod test { SystemTime::now() - Duration::from_secs(SECS_IN_YEAR)); cert.primary_key().binding_signature(&reject, None)?; assert_match!(RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); // Reject the hash algorithm since before the Unix epoch. // Since the earliest representable time using a Timestamp is @@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ mod test { assert!(cert.primary_key() .binding_signature(&reject, None).is_err()); assert_match!(RevocationStatus::NotAsFarAsWeKnow - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); // Reject the hash algorithm after the end of time that is // representable by a Timestamp (2106). This should accept @@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ mod test { SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(500 * SECS_IN_YEAR)); cert.primary_key().binding_signature(&reject, None)?; assert_match!(RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) - = cert_revoked.revoked(&reject, None)); + = cert_revoked.revocation_status(&reject, None)); Ok(()) } |