diff options
author | Nora Widdecke <nora@sequoia-pgp.org> | 2021-11-22 12:58:47 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nora Widdecke <nora@sequoia-pgp.org> | 2021-11-29 11:53:55 +0100 |
commit | 049055e3ff5ffe86700b668e924fbff96e82be94 (patch) | |
tree | 30dfd63e4d1c3016210b698813e99b70787890e8 /openpgp/src/crypto | |
parent | 97ce753fefae770ee0b5b02a611d75e29a7cd01d (diff) |
Remove unnecessary borrows.
- Fixed with the help of clippy::needless_borrow.
Diffstat (limited to 'openpgp/src/crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/crypto/backend/nettle/ecdh.rs | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/crypto/mem.rs | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/crypto/s2k.rs | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/crypto/symmetric.rs | 8 |
5 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/openpgp/src/crypto/backend/nettle/ecdh.rs b/openpgp/src/crypto/backend/nettle/ecdh.rs index fbad33a5..75e86133 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/crypto/backend/nettle/ecdh.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/crypto/backend/nettle/ecdh.rs @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ pub fn decrypt<R>(recipient: &Key<key::PublicParts, R>, let (V, r, field_sz) = match curve { Curve::NistP256 => { let V = - ecc::Point::new::<ecc::Secp256r1>(&Vx, &Vy)?; + ecc::Point::new::<ecc::Secp256r1>(Vx, Vy)?; let r = ecc::Scalar::new::<ecc::Secp256r1>(scalar.value())?; @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ pub fn decrypt<R>(recipient: &Key<key::PublicParts, R>, } Curve::NistP384 => { let V = - ecc::Point::new::<ecc::Secp384r1>(&Vx, &Vy)?; + ecc::Point::new::<ecc::Secp384r1>(Vx, Vy)?; let r = ecc::Scalar::new::<ecc::Secp384r1>(scalar.value())?; @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ pub fn decrypt<R>(recipient: &Key<key::PublicParts, R>, } Curve::NistP521 => { let V = - ecc::Point::new::<ecc::Secp521r1>(&Vx, &Vy)?; + ecc::Point::new::<ecc::Secp521r1>(Vx, Vy)?; let r = ecc::Scalar::new::<ecc::Secp521r1>(scalar.value())?; diff --git a/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs b/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs index 3407e8a3..1c3e600b 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ pub fn decrypt_unwrap<R>(recipient: &Key<key::PublicParts, R>, // Z_len = the key size for the KEK_alg_ID used with AESKeyWrap // Compute Z = KDF( S, Z_len, Param ); #[allow(non_snake_case)] - let Z = kdf(&S, sym.key_size()?, *hash, ¶m)?; + let Z = kdf(S, sym.key_size()?, *hash, ¶m)?; // Compute m = AESKeyUnwrap( Z, C ) as per [RFC3394] let m = aes_key_unwrap(*sym, &Z, key)?; diff --git a/openpgp/src/crypto/mem.rs b/openpgp/src/crypto/mem.rs index 1fa6266b..8342aa8e 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/crypto/mem.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/crypto/mem.rs @@ -65,14 +65,14 @@ impl Clone for Protected { // Make a vector with the correct size to avoid potential // reallocations when turning it into a `Protected`. let mut p = Vec::with_capacity(self.len()); - p.extend_from_slice(&self); + p.extend_from_slice(self); p.into_boxed_slice().into() } } impl PartialEq for Protected { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - secure_cmp(&self, &other) == Ordering::Equal + secure_cmp(self, other) == Ordering::Equal } } diff --git a/openpgp/src/crypto/s2k.rs b/openpgp/src/crypto/s2k.rs index d64fde60..98895b5f 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/crypto/s2k.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/crypto/s2k.rs @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ impl S2K { // Independent of what the hash count is, we // always hash the whole salt and password once. hash.update(&salt[..]); - hash.update(&string); + hash.update(string); }, &S2K::Iterated { ref salt, hash_bytes, .. } => { // Unroll the processing loop N times. diff --git a/openpgp/src/crypto/symmetric.rs b/openpgp/src/crypto/symmetric.rs index d2bec940..fcfd1d23 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/crypto/symmetric.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/crypto/symmetric.rs @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ mod tests { // Ensure we use CFB128 by default let iv = hex::decode("000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F").unwrap(); - let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(&key, iv).unwrap(); + let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(key, iv).unwrap(); let msg = hex::decode("6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a").unwrap(); let mut dst = vec![0; msg.len()]; cfb.encrypt(&mut dst, &*msg).unwrap(); @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ mod tests { // 32-byte long message let iv = hex::decode("000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F").unwrap(); - let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(&key, iv).unwrap(); + let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(key, iv).unwrap(); let msg = b"This is a very important message"; let mut dst = vec![0; msg.len()]; cfb.encrypt(&mut dst, &*msg).unwrap(); @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ mod tests { // 33-byte (uneven) long message let iv = hex::decode("000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F").unwrap(); - let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(&key, iv).unwrap(); + let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(key, iv).unwrap(); let msg = b"This is a very important message!"; let mut dst = vec![0; msg.len()]; cfb.encrypt(&mut dst, &*msg).unwrap(); @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ mod tests { // 33-byte (uneven) long message, chunked let iv = hex::decode("000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F").unwrap(); - let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(&key, iv).unwrap(); + let mut cfb = algo.make_encrypt_cfb(key, iv).unwrap(); let mut dst = vec![0; msg.len()]; for (mut dst, msg) in dst.chunks_mut(16).zip(msg.chunks(16)) { cfb.encrypt(&mut dst, msg).unwrap(); |