diff options
| author | Justus Winter <justus@sequoia-pgp.org> | 2020-01-21 15:32:00 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Justus Winter <justus@sequoia-pgp.org> | 2020-01-21 15:32:00 +0100 |
| commit | 1b82b84298cedc59e0d66e1a6b549854efd924f0 (patch) | |
| tree | 9b2f6e9954ffa752cf0b2331f488daee30edba19 | |
| parent | 25636524f825634dea803b35e0dba91d84750bd5 (diff) | |
openpgp: Avoid trivial uses of Cert::primary_key.
| -rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/autocrypt.rs | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/cert/mod.rs | 4 |
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/openpgp/src/autocrypt.rs b/openpgp/src/autocrypt.rs index 4993d028..20c91524 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/autocrypt.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/autocrypt.rs @@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ In the light of the Efail vulnerability I am asking myself if it's let cert = ac.headers[0].key.as_ref() .expect("Failed to parse key material."); - assert_eq!(cert.primary_key().fingerprint(), + assert_eq!(cert.fingerprint(), Fingerprint::from_hex( &"4F9F89F5505AC1D1A260631CDB1187B9DD5F693B"[..]).unwrap()); assert_eq!(cert.userids().next().unwrap().value(), diff --git a/openpgp/src/cert/mod.rs b/openpgp/src/cert/mod.rs index 0af68787..3f702e0f 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/cert/mod.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/cert/mod.rs @@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ impl Cert { if self.bad.len() > 0 { t!("{}: ignoring {} bad self-signatures", - self.primary_key().keyid(), self.bad.len()); + self.keyid(), self.bad.len()); } // Only keep user ids / user attributes / subkeys with at @@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ mod test { .build(&mut keypair, &cert, None) .unwrap(); assert_eq!(sig.typ(), SignatureType::KeyRevocation); - assert_eq!(sig.issuer(), Some(&cert.primary_key().keyid())); + assert_eq!(sig.issuer(), Some(&cert.keyid())); assert_eq!(sig.issuer_fingerprint(), Some(&cert.fingerprint())); |