QtPass is a multi-platform GUI for pass, the standard unix password manager.
View the Project on GitHub IJHack/qtpass
All passwords generated with QtPass' built-in password generator prior to 1.2.1 are possibly predictable and enumerable by hackers.
The generator used libc's random(), seeded with srand(msecs), where msecs is not the
msecs since 1970 (not that that'd be secure anyway), but rather the
msecs since the last second. This means there are only 1000 different
sequences of generated passwords.
Read more about this issue on Github.
Please note that this is an issue with the QtPass GUI and not in pass or the greater password-store ecosystem.
We advice to update to 1.2.1 as soon as possible and change any password you may have generated with the QtPass' password generator.
The current master branch has a proposed fix.
As soon as a new release is available, we'll update the information on this page.
Read the changelog for the latest features and fixes.
pacman -S qtpass
yum install qtpass
dnf install qtpass
apt-get install qtpass
emerge -atv qtpass
pkg install qtpass
cd /usr/ports/sysutils/qtpass/ && make install clean
Latest stable on the releases page, latest build via AppVeyor.
Via Chocolateychoco install qtpass
Latest stable on the releases page, latest build via AnneJan.
Via Homebrew Caskbrew cask install qtpass
On most *nix systems all you need is:
qmake && make && make install
On Mac OS X:
brew install qt5
brew link --overwrite --force qt5
xcode-select --install
qmake && make && macdeployqt QtPass.app
Currently seems to only work with MacGPG2
Using this program will not magically keep your passwords secure against compromised computers even if you use it in combination with a smartcard.
It does protect future and changed passwords though against anyone with access to your password store only but not your keys. Used with a smartcard it also protects against anyone just monitoring/copying all files/keystrokes on that machine and such an attacker would only gain access to the passwords you actually use. Once you plug in your smartcard and enter your PIN (or due to CVE-2015-3298 even without your PIN) all your passwords available to the machine can be decrypted by it, if there is malicious software targeted specifically against it installed (or at least one that knows how to use a smartcard).
To get better protection out of use with a smartcard even against a targeted attack I can think of at least two options:
~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
containing:enable-ssh-support
write-env-file
use-standard-socket
default-cache-ttl 600
max-cache-ttl 7200
Also, the following is useful to add to your .bashrc if you are using Yubikey NEO on Ubuntu:
# OpenPGP applet support for YubiKey NEO
if [ ! -f /tmp/gpg-agent.env ]; then
killall gpg-agent;
eval $(gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support > /tmp/gpg-agent.env);
fi
. /tmp/gpg-agent.env