/* * Copyright 2015-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "testutil.h" static const char *certs_dir; static char *roots_f = NULL; static char *untrusted_f = NULL; static char *bad_f = NULL; static char *good_f = NULL; static char *sroot_cert = NULL; static char *ca_cert = NULL; static char *ee_cert = NULL; static X509 *load_cert_pem(const char *file) { X509 *cert = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; if (!TEST_ptr(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()))) return NULL; if (TEST_int_gt(BIO_read_filename(bio, file), 0)) (void)TEST_ptr(cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)); BIO_free(bio); return cert; } static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; BIO *bio; X509 *x; bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); if (bio == NULL) { return NULL; } certs = sk_X509_new_null(); if (certs == NULL) { BIO_free(bio); return NULL; } ERR_set_mark(); do { x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) { sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); BIO_free(bio); return NULL; } else if (x == NULL) { /* * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors * generated */ ERR_pop_to_mark(); } } while (x != NULL); BIO_free(bio); return certs; } /*- * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery) * * Chain is as follows: * * rootCA (self-signed) * | * interCA * | * subinterCA subinterCA (self-signed) * | | * leaf ------------------ * | * bad * * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE * * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys * * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store * (roots.pem) * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem) * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem) * * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad * */ static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void) { int ret = 0; int i; X509 *x = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; store = X509_STORE_new(); if (store == NULL) goto err; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, roots_f, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) goto err; untrusted = load_certs_from_file(untrusted_f); if ((bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r")) == NULL) goto err; if ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL) goto err; sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (sctx == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted)) goto err; i = X509_verify_cert(sctx); if (i != 0 || X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) != X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) goto err; /* repeat with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT */ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(sctx); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted)) goto err; i = X509_verify_cert(sctx); if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */ ret = 1; err: X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx); X509_free(x); BIO_free(bio); sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free); X509_STORE_free(store); return ret; } static int test_store_ctx(void) { X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; int testresult = 0, ret; bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r"); if (bio == NULL) goto err; x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (x == NULL) goto err; sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (sctx == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, NULL, x, NULL)) goto err; /* Verifying a cert where we have no trusted certs should fail */ ret = X509_verify_cert(sctx); if (ret == 0) { /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */ testresult = 1; } err: X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx); X509_free(x); BIO_free(bio); return testresult; } static int test_self_signed(const char *filename, int expected) { X509 *cert = load_cert_pem(filename); STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = sk_X509_new_null(); X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); int ret; ret = TEST_ptr(cert) && TEST_true(sk_X509_push(trusted, cert)) && TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, cert, NULL)); X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted); ret = ret && TEST_int_eq(X509_verify_cert(ctx), expected); X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); sk_X509_free(trusted); X509_free(cert); return ret; } static int test_self_signed_good(void) { return test_self_signed(good_f, 1); } static int test_self_signed_bad(void) { return test_self_signed(bad_f, 0); } static int do_test_purpose(int purpose, int expected) { X509 *eecert = load_cert_pem(ee_cert); /* may result in NULL */ X509 *untrcert = load_cert_pem(ca_cert); X509 *trcert = load_cert_pem(sroot_cert); STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = sk_X509_new_null(); STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = sk_X509_new_null(); X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); int testresult = 0; if (!TEST_ptr(eecert) || !TEST_ptr(untrcert) || !TEST_ptr(trcert) || !TEST_ptr(trusted) || !TEST_ptr(untrusted) || !TEST_ptr(ctx)) goto err; if (!TEST_true(sk_X509_push(trusted, trcert))) goto err; trcert = NULL; if (!TEST_true(sk_X509_push(untrusted, untrcert))) goto err; untrcert = NULL; if (!TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, eecert, untrusted))) goto err; if (!TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, purpose))) goto err; /* * X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() is bady named. Despite the set0 name * we are still responsible for freeing trusted after we have finished with * it. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted); if (!TEST_int_eq(X509_verify_cert(ctx), expected)) goto err; testresult = 1; err: sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free); X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); X509_free(eecert); X509_free(untrcert); X509_free(trcert); return testresult; } static int test_purpose_ssl_client(void) { return do_test_purpose(X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, 0); } static int test_purpose_ssl_server(void) { return do_test_purpose(X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, 1); } static int test_purpose_any(void) { return do_test_purpose(X509_PURPOSE_ANY, 1); } int setup_tests(void) { if (!TEST_ptr(certs_dir = test_get_argument(0))) { TEST_error("usage: verify_extra_test certs-dir\n"); return 0; } if (!TEST_ptr(roots_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "roots.pem")) || !TEST_ptr(untrusted_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "untrusted.pem")) || !TEST_ptr(bad_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "bad.pem")) || !TEST_ptr(good_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "rootCA.pem")) || !TEST_ptr(sroot_cert = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "sroot-cert.pem")) || !TEST_ptr(ca_cert = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "ca-cert.pem")) || !TEST_ptr(ee_cert = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "ee-cert.pem"))) goto err; ADD_TEST(test_alt_chains_cert_forgery); ADD_TEST(test_store_ctx); ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_good); ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_bad); ADD_TEST(test_purpose_ssl_client); ADD_TEST(test_purpose_ssl_server); ADD_TEST(test_purpose_any); return 1; err: cleanup_tests(); return 0; } void cleanup_tests(void) { OPENSSL_free(roots_f); OPENSSL_free(untrusted_f); OPENSSL_free(bad_f); OPENSSL_free(good_f); OPENSSL_free(sroot_cert); OPENSSL_free(ca_cert); OPENSSL_free(ee_cert); }