/* * Copyright 2020-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for * internal use. */ #include "internal/deprecated.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef FIPS_MODULE # include # include "crypto/asn1.h" #endif #include "internal/sizes.h" #include "internal/param_build_set.h" #include "crypto/rsa.h" #include "rsa_local.h" /* * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider * implementations alike. */ DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers, const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[]) { const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL; int i; if (numbers == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++) { p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]); if (p != NULL) { BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp)) return 0; if (sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) { BN_clear_free(tmp); return 0; } } } return 1; } int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private) { const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL; const OSSL_PARAM *param_p, *param_q = NULL; const OSSL_PARAM *param_derive = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL; STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL; int is_private = 0; int derive_from_pq = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (rsa == NULL) return 0; param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N); param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E); if ((param_n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n)) || (param_e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (include_private) { param_derive = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ); if ((param_derive != NULL) && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_derive, &derive_from_pq)) goto err; param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D); if (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (derive_from_pq) { ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; /* we need at minimum p, q */ param_p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1); param_q = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2); if ((param_p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_p, &p)) || (param_q == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_q, &q))) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } } } is_private = (d != NULL); if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)) goto err; n = e = d = NULL; if (is_private) { if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names) || !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names) || !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names)) goto err; if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0 && sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) { /* * If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we * need to have at least 2 factors */ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } /* * if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have * been provided */ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2 && (param_n == NULL || param_d == NULL)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } /* build our exponents and coefficients here */ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) { /* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0), sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack * so we don't free them below */ sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors); sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors); /* * Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no * additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and * since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip * the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params */ if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa), NULL, ctx)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else { #ifndef FIPS_MODULE /* * in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here * for each additional prime */ if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa), sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), rsa->e, factors, exps, coeffs)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * Now we should have all our factors, exponents and * coefficients */ if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #else /* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED); goto err; #endif } } else { /* * It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d * but only if we're not using derive_from_pq */ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) goto err; } /* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 || sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0 || sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) { ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, "There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n", sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps), sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs)); goto err; } } BN_clear_free(p); BN_clear_free(q); sk_BIGNUM_free(factors); sk_BIGNUM_free(exps); sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return 1; err: BN_free(n); BN_free(e); BN_free(d); sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free); sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free); sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; } DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private) { int ret = 0; const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) goto err; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs); if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n) || !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e)) goto err; /* Check private key data integrity */ if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) { if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, rsa_d) || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names, factors) || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps) || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names, coeffs)) goto err; } #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */ if (bld == NULL) ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params); #endif ret = 1; err: sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors); sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps); sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs); return ret; } int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]) { if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss); int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL); int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); int default_maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL); const char *mdname = (hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid)); const char *mgfname = (maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid)); const char *mgf1mdname = (maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid)); const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST; const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC; const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST; const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN; /* * To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient, * we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even * if it has a default value; saltlen. */ if ((mdname != NULL && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname)) || (mgfname != NULL && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_mgf, mgfname)) || (mgf1mdname != NULL && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname)) || (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen))) return 0; } return 1; } int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params, int *defaults_set, const OSSL_PARAM params[], OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) { const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen; const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq; const char *propq = NULL; EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; int saltlen; int ret = 0; if (pss_params == NULL) return 0; param_propq = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS); param_md = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST); param_mgf = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC); param_mgf1md = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST); param_saltlen = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN); if (param_propq != NULL) { if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) propq = param_propq->data; } /* * If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some * restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each * parameter override their specific restriction data. */ if (!*defaults_set && (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL || param_saltlen != NULL)) { if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params)) return 0; *defaults_set = 1; } if (param_mgf != NULL) { int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); const char *mgfname = NULL; if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) mgfname = param_mgf->data; else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname)) return 0; if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(param_mgf->data, ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0) return 0; } /* * We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the * exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below. */ if (param_md != NULL) { const char *mdname = NULL; if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) mdname = param_md->data; else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname)) goto err; if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md))) goto err; } if (param_mgf1md != NULL) { const char *mgf1mdname = NULL; if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data; else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname)) goto err; if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg( pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md))) goto err; } if (param_saltlen != NULL) { if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen) || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_free(md); EVP_MD_free(mgf1md); return ret; } int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa) { #ifndef FIPS_MODULE if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) return 1; #endif return 0; } static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f) { if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL) return 0; return 1; } RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection) { RSA *dupkey = NULL; #ifndef FIPS_MODULE int pnum, i; #endif /* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */ if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa)) return NULL; if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL) return NULL; /* public key */ if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) { if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e)) goto err; } if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) { /* private key */ if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d)) goto err; /* factors and crt params */ if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp)) goto err; } dupkey->version = rsa->version; dupkey->flags = rsa->flags; /* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */ dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params; #ifndef FIPS_MODULE /* multiprime */ if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0 && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) { dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL; if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL) goto err; /* push first so cleanup in error case works */ (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo); pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i); if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d)) goto err; if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t)) goto err; } if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey)) goto err; } if (rsa->pss != NULL) { dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss); if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL && dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) { dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm); if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL) goto err; } } if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, &dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data)) goto err; #endif return dupkey; err: RSA_free(dupkey); return NULL; } #ifndef FIPS_MODULE RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg) { RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), alg->parameter); if (pss == NULL) return NULL; if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) { pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); if (pss->maskHash == NULL) { RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); return NULL; } } return pss; } static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa) { const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL; RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL; if (rsa != NULL && (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL && (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) { const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField; RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; /* * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test * a bad situation. * * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will * be checked, eventually. */ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen, &trailerField)) return 0; md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md); if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params) || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid) || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, mgf1md_nid) || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen) || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params, trailerField)) return 0; *pss = pss_params; } return 1; } int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField) { RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */ (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params); if (pss == NULL) return 0; *pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); if (*pmd == NULL) return 0; *pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash); if (*pmgf1md == NULL) return 0; if (pss->saltLength) *psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); else *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params); if (pss->trailerField) *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField); else *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params); return 1; } int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg) { RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; const void *algp; int algptype; X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) return 1; if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) return 1; if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL || !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) { RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); return 0; } if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa)) return 0; return 1; } RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) { const unsigned char *p; RSA *rsa; int pklen; const X509_ALGOR *alg; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf)) return 0; rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen); if (rsa == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return NULL; } if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { RSA_free(rsa); return NULL; } RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK); switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA); break; case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS: RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS); break; default: /* Leave the type bits zero */ break; } return rsa; } #endif