/* * Copyright 2007-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020 * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */ #include "cmp_local.h" #include /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ #include #include #include #include #include /* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */ static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert) { OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part; EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL; BIO *bio; int res = 0; if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL)) return 0; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */ if (bio == NULL) return 0; /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */ if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE); goto sig_err; } pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert); if (pubkey == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY); goto sig_err; } prot_part.header = msg->header; prot_part.body = msg->body; if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection, &prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx, cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) { res = 1; goto end; } sig_err: res = ossl_x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE); if (res) ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio); res = 0; end: EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); BIO_free(bio); return res; } /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */ static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL; int valid = 0; /* generate expected protection for the message */ if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL) return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */ valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0 && msg->protection->type == protection->type && msg->protection->length == protection->length && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data, protection->length) == 0; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection); if (!valid) ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE); return valid; } /*- * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function) * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx. * * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise. */ int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert) { int valid = 0; X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL; int err; if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); return 0; } if (trusted_store == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE); return 0; } if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store, cert, ctx->untrusted)) goto err; valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0; /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */ err = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE) ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); err: /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); return valid; } /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */ static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success, const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name, const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name) { char *str; if (expect_name == NULL) return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ /* make sure that a matching name is there */ if (actual_name == NULL) { ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc); return 0; } str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0); if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) { if (log_success && str != NULL) ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc, str); OPENSSL_free(str); return 1; } if (str != NULL) ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str); OPENSSL_free(str); if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL) ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str); OPENSSL_free(str); return 0; } /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */ static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid) { char *str; if (skid == NULL) return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */ if (ckid == NULL) { ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate"); return 0; } str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, ckid); if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) { if (str != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str); OPENSSL_free(str); return 1; } if (str != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str); OPENSSL_free(str); if ((str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid)) != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str); OPENSSL_free(str); return 0; } static int already_checked(const X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked) { int i; for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--) if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0) return 1; return 0; } /*- * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message. * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg, * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL). * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(). * * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1. */ static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted; int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK; char *str; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL; int time_cmp; ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..", self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2); if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str); OPENSSL_free(str); if (!self_issued) { str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0); if (str != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str); OPENSSL_free(str); } if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1) || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) { ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked"); return 0; } time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert), X509_get0_notAfter(cert)); if (time_cmp != 0) { ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired" : "cert is not yet valid"); return 0; } if (!check_name(ctx, 1, "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert), "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName)) return 0; if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID)) return 0; /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) { ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid"); return 0; } if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) { ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed"); return 0; } /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */ ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable"); return 1; } static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *scrt) { if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) return 1; ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed"); return 0; } /* * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert - * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate */ static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt) { int valid = 0; X509_STORE *store; if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR) return 0; if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts, 1 /* self-issued only */)) goto err; /* store does not include CRLs */ valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt); if (!valid) { ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed"); } else { /* * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid == * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store */ EVP_PKEY *pkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1); OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID); X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(crep, ctx, pkey); /* * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches * errors */ valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt); X509_free(newcrt); } err: X509_STORE_free(store); return valid; } static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", cert, NULL, NULL, msg) && (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert) || check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)); } /*- * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode. * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts. * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(). */ static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs, const char *desc, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp) { int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL; int n_acceptable_certs = 0; int i; if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) { ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL)) return 0; if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert, already_checked1, already_checked2, msg)) continue; n_acceptable_certs++; if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert) : check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) { /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */ return ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert); } } if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0) ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts"); return 0; } /*- * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx. * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(). */ static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp) { int ret = 0; if (mode_3gpp && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR || OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP))) return 0; ossl_cmp_info(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts" : "trying first normal mode using trust store"); if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts", NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) return 1; if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs", msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) return 1; if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts" : "no trusted store"); } else { STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted); ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted, mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts" : "certs in trusted store", msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, msg, mode_3gpp); OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(trusted); } return ret; } static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line, OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg) { return 1; } /*- * Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert. * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(). */ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */ GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender; char *sname = NULL; char *skid_str = NULL; const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID; OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb; int res = 0; if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL) return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */ if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { /* So far, only X509_NAME is supported */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */ (void)ERR_set_mark(); ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */ /* * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction, * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out */ if (scrt != NULL) { if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) { ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); return 1; } /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */ (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL); /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */ ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert"); (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg); } res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */) || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; if (res) { /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */ (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); goto end; } /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */ (void)ERR_clear_last_mark(); sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0); skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL : i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid); if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) { ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that.."); if (sname != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname); if (skid_str != NULL) ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str); else ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID"); /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */ (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */); (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); } ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT); if (sname != NULL) { ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = "); ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname); } if (skid_str != NULL) { ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = "); ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str); } end: OPENSSL_free(sname); OPENSSL_free(skid_str); return res; } /*- * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password- * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm, * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert, * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted. * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(). * * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg, * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP. * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed. */ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { X509 *scrt; ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message"); if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); return 0; } if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */ || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); return 0; } switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) { /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */ case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC: if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) { ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection"); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET); return 0; } if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) { /* * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA * certificate by the initiator.' */ switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) { case -1: return 0; case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ return 0; } break; default: break; } ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "successfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection"); return 1; } ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed"); break; /* * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs * Not yet supported */ case NID_id_DHBasedMac: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC); break; /* * 5.1.3.3. Signature */ default: scrt = ctx->srvCert; if (scrt == NULL) { if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection"); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR); return 0; } if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection using trust store"); return 1; } } else { /* use pinned sender cert */ /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */ if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection using pinned server cert"); return ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, scrt); } ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed"); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG); } break; } return 0; } static int check_transactionID_or_nonce(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *expected, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *actual, int reason) { if (expected != NULL && (actual == NULL || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(expected, actual) != 0)) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION char *expected_str, *actual_str; expected_str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, expected); actual_str = actual == NULL ? NULL: i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, actual); ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, reason, "expected = %s, actual = %s", expected_str == NULL ? "?" : expected_str, actual == NULL ? "(none)" : actual_str == NULL ? "?" : actual_str); OPENSSL_free(expected_str); OPENSSL_free(actual_str); return 0; #endif } return 1; } /*- * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client) * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted. * * Ensures that: * its sender is of appropriate type (currently only X509_NAME) and * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx * it has a valid body type * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument) * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any) * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any) * * If everything is fine: * learns the senderNonce from the received message, * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx, * and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error. */ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg) { OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr; const X509_NAME *expected_sender; if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL)) return 0; hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg); /* validate sender name of received msg */ if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } /* * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name. * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy. */ expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender; if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL) expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert); if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName, "expected sender", expected_sender)) return 0; /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */ if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10) ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts"); /* * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() * and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. * Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the * extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway. * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. */ if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, /* this allows self-signed certs */ X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) return 0; /* validate message protection */ if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) { /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */ if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg) && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION); return 0; #endif } } else { /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */ if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); return 0; #endif } } /* check CMP version number in header */ if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO_2 && ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO_3) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO); return 0; #endif } if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); return 0; #endif } /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */ if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->transactionID, hdr->transactionID, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED)) return 0; /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */ if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->senderNonce, hdr->recipNonce, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED)) return 0; /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */ if (ctx->transactionID == NULL && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID)) return 0; /* * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction. * --> Store for setting in next message */ if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce)) return 0; /* * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use, * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. */ if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, /* this allows self-signed certs */ X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) return 0; if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) { /* * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA * certificate by the initiator.' */ switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) { case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ return 0; } break; default: break; } } return 1; } int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified) { if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL)) return 0; switch (msg->body->type) { case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR: { X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr; if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx, ctx->propq) <= 0) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED); return 0; #endif } } break; case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR: case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR: if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID, acceptRAVerified, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) { #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION return 0; #endif } break; default: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; }