From 36dd4cba3dfa87aebd59d10c844fdda3a31b89db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 14:33:11 +0000 Subject: Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) --- ssl/d1_enc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'ssl') diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c index bb96c8a20c..baa75f9186 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) } /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ - if (i > (int)rec->length) + if (i + bs > (int)rec->length) { /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is -- cgit v1.2.3