From 31bc51c8cf4784f31732e5822d6fae894123a4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Bodo=20M=C3=B6ller?= Date: Fri, 1 Jun 2001 09:41:25 +0000 Subject: Fix Bleichenbacher PKCS #1 1.5 countermeasure. (The attack against SSL 3.1 and TLS 1.0 is impractical anyway, otherwise this would be a security relevant patch.) --- ssl/s2_srvr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'ssl/s2_srvr.c') diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 10de5ec3db..cc9f591427 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) /* bad decrypt */ #if 1 /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a - * dud master secret */ + * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) { + ERR_clear_error(); if (is_export) i=ek; else -- cgit v1.2.3