From 1871a5aa8a538c2b8ac3d302c1e9e72867f5ee0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Percival Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 10:28:21 +0100 Subject: Reword documentation for {SCT_CTX/CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX}_set_time Do not call the time "current", as a different time can be provided. For example, a time slightly in the future, to provide tolerance for CT logs with a clock that is running fast. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni Reviewed-by: Rich Salz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1554) --- include/openssl/ct.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/openssl/ct.h b/include/openssl/ct.h index d001fc9b49..bf29fbabe0 100644 --- a/include/openssl/ct.h +++ b/include/openssl/ct.h @@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* - * Sets the current time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch. - * The timestamps of the SCTs will be compared to this, to check that they were - * not issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs + * Sets the time to evaluate SCTs against, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch. + * If an SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as having + * been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs * whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate in this case. */ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms); -- cgit v1.2.3