From 6ce6ad39fe85cf8b5c84ded9885329bf703ee649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Levitte Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 08:01:59 +0200 Subject: RSA: Be less strict on PSS parameters when exporting to provider We have a key in test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt with bad PSS parameters (RSA-PSS-BAD), which is supposed to trigger signature computation faults. However, if this key needs to be exported to the RSA provider implementation, the result would be an earlier error, giving the computation that's supposed to be checked n chance to even be reached. Either way, the legacy to provider export is no place to validate the values of the key. We also ensure that the provider implementation can handle and detect signed (negative) saltlen values. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12583) --- include/crypto/rsa.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/crypto/rsa.h') diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h index 9469ec9233..97cbfa1d7e 100644 --- a/include/crypto/rsa.h +++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h @@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ typedef struct rsa_pss_params_30_st { int algorithm_nid; /* Currently always NID_mgf1 */ int hash_algorithm_nid; } mask_gen; - unsigned int salt_len; - unsigned int trailer_field; + int salt_len; + int trailer_field; } RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30; RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r); -- cgit v1.2.3