From eb952088f0d5da59e569ae2aa33e9b96bc3b586d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ulf=20M=C3=B6ller?= <ulf@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2000 20:59:17 +0000
Subject: Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
 returns int (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). New function RAND_add() is the same as
 RAND_seed() but takes an estimate of the entropy as an additional argument.

---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c')

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index f0ae51f234..b35eb62682 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -155,12 +155,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 	/* pad out with non-zero random data */
 	j=tlen-3-flen;
 
-	RAND_bytes(p,j);
+	if (RAND_bytes(p,j) <= 0)
+		return(0);
 	for (i=0; i<j; i++)
 		{
 		if (*p == '\0')
 			do	{
-				RAND_bytes(p,1);
+				if (RAND_bytes(p,1) <= 0)
+					return(0);
 				} while (*p == '\0');
 		p++;
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3