From 9e6b2f54e449009c6dc11e8860d125d967f3a3ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Polyakov Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 23:34:51 +0100 Subject: crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte --- crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c | 23 ++++++++ crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'crypto/pkcs12') diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c index 4f1d29bb6d..9c13a451e0 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c @@ -50,6 +50,29 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, return ret; } +int PKCS12_key_gen_utf8(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, + int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, + unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *unipass; + int uniplen; + + if (!pass) { + unipass = NULL; + uniplen = 0; + } else if (!OPENSSL_utf82uni(pass, passlen, &unipass, &uniplen)) { + PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen, + id, iter, n, out, md_type); + if (ret <= 0) + return 0; + OPENSSL_clear_free(unipass, uniplen); + return ret; +} + int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type) diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c index c4feb90b9e..7d471f5c0d 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ unsigned char *OPENSSL_asc2uni(const char *asc, int asclen, return unitmp; } -char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(unsigned char *uni, int unilen) +char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen) { int asclen, i; char *asctmp; @@ -58,6 +58,155 @@ char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(unsigned char *uni, int unilen) return asctmp; } +/* + * OPENSSL_{utf82uni|uni2utf8} perform conversion between UTF-8 and + * PKCS#12 BMPString format, which is specified as big-endian UTF-16. + * One should keep in mind that even though BMPString is passed as + * unsigned char *, it's not the kind of string you can exercise e.g. + * strlen on. Caller also has to keep in mind that its length is + * expressed not in number of UTF-16 characters, but in number of + * bytes the string occupies, and treat it, the length, accordingly. + */ +unsigned char *OPENSSL_utf82uni(const char *asc, int asclen, + unsigned char **uni, int *unilen) +{ + int ulen, i, j; + unsigned char *unitmp, *ret; + unsigned long utf32chr = 0; + + if (asclen == -1) + asclen = strlen(asc); + + for (ulen = 0, i = 0; i < asclen; i += j) { + j = UTF8_getc((const unsigned char *)asc+i, asclen-i, &utf32chr); + + /* + * Following condition is somewhat opportunistic is sense that + * decoding failure is used as *indirect* indication that input + * string might in fact be extended ASCII/ANSI/ISO-8859-X. The + * fallback is taken in hope that it would allow to process + * files created with previous OpenSSL version, which used the + * naive OPENSSL_asc2uni all along. It might be worth noting + * that probability of false positive depends on language. In + * cases covered by ISO Latin 1 probability is very low, because + * any printable non-ASCII alphabet letter followed by another + * or any ASCII character will trigger failure and fallback. + * In other cases situation can be intensified by the fact that + * English letters are not part of alternative keyboard layout, + * but even then there should be plenty of pairs that trigger + * decoding failure... + */ + if (j < 0) + return OPENSSL_asc2uni(asc, asclen, uni, unilen); + + if (utf32chr > 0x10FFFF) /* UTF-16 cap */ + return NULL; + + if (utf32chr >= 0x10000) /* pair of UTF-16 characters */ + ulen += 2*2; + else /* or just one */ + ulen += 2; + } + + ulen += 2; /* for trailing UTF16 zero */ + + if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(ulen)) == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* re-run the loop writing down UTF-16 characters in big-endian order */ + for (unitmp = ret, i = 0; i < asclen; i += j) { + j = UTF8_getc((const unsigned char *)asc+i, asclen-i, &utf32chr); + if (utf32chr >= 0x10000) { /* pair if UTF-16 characters */ + unsigned int hi, lo; + + utf32chr -= 0x10000; + hi = 0xD800 + (utf32chr>>10); + lo = 0xDC00 + (utf32chr&0x3ff); + *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(hi>>8); + *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(hi); + *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(lo>>8); + *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(lo); + } else { /* or just one */ + *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(utf32chr>>8); + *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(utf32chr); + } + } + /* Make result double null terminated */ + *unitmp++ = 0; + *unitmp++ = 0; + if (unilen) + *unilen = ulen; + if (uni) + *uni = ret; + return ret; +} + +static int bmp_to_utf8(char *str, const unsigned char *utf16, int len) +{ + unsigned long utf32chr; + + if (len == 0) return 0; + + if (len < 2) return -1; + + /* pull UTF-16 character in big-endian order */ + utf32chr = (utf16[0]<<8) | utf16[1]; + + if (utf32chr >= 0xD800 && utf32chr < 0xE000) { /* two chars */ + unsigned int lo; + + if (len < 4) return -1; + + utf32chr -= 0xD800; + utf32chr <<= 10; + lo = (utf16[2]<<8) | utf16[3]; + if (lo < 0xDC00 || lo >= 0xE000) return -1; + utf32chr |= lo-0xDC00; + utf32chr += 0x10000; + } + + return UTF8_putc((unsigned char *)str, len > 4 ? 4 : len, utf32chr); +} + +char *OPENSSL_uni2utf8(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen) +{ + int asclen, i, j; + char *asctmp; + + for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) { + j = bmp_to_utf8(NULL, uni+i, unilen-i); + /* + * falling back to OPENSSL_uni2asc makes lesser sense, it's + * done rather to maintain symmetry... + */ + if (j < 0) return OPENSSL_uni2asc(uni, unilen); + if (j == 4) i += 4; + else i += 2; + asclen += j; + } + + /* If no terminating zero allow for one */ + if (!unilen || (uni[unilen-2]||uni[unilen - 1])) + asclen++; + + if ((asctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(asclen)) == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* re-run the loop emitting UTF-8 string */ + for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) { + j = bmp_to_utf8(asctmp+asclen, uni+i, unilen-i); + if (j == 4) i += 4; + else i += 2; + asclen += j; + } + + /* If no terminating zero write one */ + if (!unilen || (uni[unilen-2]||uni[unilen - 1])) + asctmp[asclen] = '\0'; + + return asctmp; +} + int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 *p12) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), bp, p12); diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c b/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c index f15a6951a2..f705084a2a 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS12_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG), "PKCS12_item_pack_safebag"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC), "PKCS12_key_gen_asc"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI), "PKCS12_key_gen_uni"}, + {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8), "PKCS12_key_gen_utf8"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS), "PKCS12_newpass"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7data"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7encdata"}, -- cgit v1.2.3