From fd7138ddeed4b577c1a37cc58fef6e715753698d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Percival Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 10:28:21 +0100 Subject: Reword documentation for {SCT_CTX/CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX}_set_time Do not call the time "current", as a different time can be provided. For example, a time slightly in the future, to provide tolerance for CT logs with a clock that is running fast. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni Reviewed-by: Rich Salz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1554) (cherry picked from commit 1871a5aa8a538c2b8ac3d302c1e9e72867f5ee0f) --- crypto/ct/ct_locl.h | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'crypto/ct') diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h b/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h index 4b5e344191..9f983c91be 100644 --- a/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h +++ b/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h @@ -155,10 +155,11 @@ __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey); __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey); /* - * Sets the current time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch. - * The timestamp of the SCT will be compared to this, to check that it was not - * issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs whose - * timestamp is in the future", so SCT verification will fail in this case. + * Sets the time to evaluate the SCT against, in milliseconds since the Unix + * epoch. If the SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as + * having been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST + * reject SCTs whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate + * in this case. */ void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms); -- cgit v1.2.3