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Test what happens if the same session gets resumed multiple times at the
same time - and one of them gets marked as not_resumable.
Related to CVE-2024-2511
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
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Repeatedly create sessions to be added to the cache and ensure we never
exceed the expected size.
Related to CVE-2024-2511
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
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The problem is, that it almost works to pass sig=NULL to the
ECDSA_sign, ECDSA_sign_ex and DSA_sign, to compute the necessary
space for the resulting signature.
But since the ECDSA signature is non-deterministic
(except when ECDSA_sign_setup/ECDSA_sign_ex are used)
the resulting length may be different when the API is called again.
This can easily cause random memory corruption.
Several internal APIs had the same issue, but since they are
never called with sig=NULL, it is better to make them return an
error in that case, instead of making the code more complex.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23529)
(cherry picked from commit 1fa2bf9b1885d2e87524421fea5041d40149cffa)
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The syntax check of the -addext fails because the
X509V3_CTX is used to lookup the referenced section,
but the wrong configuration file is used, where only
a default section with all passed in -addext lines is available.
Thus it was not possible to use the subjectAltName=dirName:section
as an -addext parameter. Probably other extensions as well.
This change affects only the syntax check, the real extension
was already created with correct parameters.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23669)
(cherry picked from commit 387418893e45e588d1cbd4222549b5113437c9ab)
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Printing content of an invalid test certificate causes application crash, because of NULL dereference:
user@user:~/openssl$ openssl pkcs12 -in test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12 -passin pass: -info
MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048
MAC length: 32, salt length: 8
PKCS7 Encrypted data: Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Added test cases for pkcs12 bad certificates
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23632)
(cherry picked from commit a4cbffcd8998180b98bb9f7ce6065ed37d079d8b)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23774)
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Fixes #23624
The calculation of the size for gid_arr reallocation was wrong.
A multiplication by gid_arr array item size was missing.
Testcase is added.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23659)
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Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23642)
(cherry picked from commit 66e6f72c3e4221580a7f456ddeaa5027f0bbb8b7)
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This fixes an issue with a mix of atexit() usage in DLL and statically linked
libcrypto that came out in the test suite on NonStop, which has slightly
different DLL unload processing semantics compared to Linux. The change
allows a build configuration to select whether to register OPENSSL_cleanup()
with atexit() or not, so avoid situations where atexit() registration causes
SIGSEGV.
INSTALL.md and CHANGES.md have been modified to include and describe this
option.
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23642)
(cherry picked from commit 0e1989d4c7435809b60f614c23ba8c9a7c0373e8)
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The existing loop pattern did not really run the expected
tests on the duplicated keys.
Fixes #23129
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23292)
(cherry picked from commit 387b93e14907cd8203d6f2c9d78e49df01cb6e1f)
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Coverity issue 1453632 noted a missing null check in kdf_test_ctrl
recently. If a malformed value is passed in from the test file that
does not contain a ':' character, the p variable will be NULL, leading
to a NULL derefence prepare_from_text
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23398)
(cherry picked from commit 6ca1d3ee81b61bc973e4e1079ec68ac73331c159)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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The failure would be caught later on, so this went unnoticed, until someone
tried with just one hex digit, which was simply ignored.
Fixes #23373
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23374)
(cherry picked from commit ea6268cfceaba24328d66bd14bfc97c4fac14a58)
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PKCS7 ContentInfo fields held within a PKCS12 file can be NULL, even if the
type has been set to a valid value. CVE-2024-0727 is a result of OpenSSL
attempting to dereference the NULL pointer as a result of this.
We add test for various instances of this problem.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23362)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23342)
(cherry picked from commit 15f479e25f9591a2749fabb436dcdfb9304c5c7b)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23342)
(cherry picked from commit 825b7cb16e0624d81421441949e843e9876c81f9)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23342)
(cherry picked from commit 150b3b18dfde317621a6bf26acfe0d06193e52fd)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23342)
(cherry picked from commit 017c7cf2bb5f5461071d9e992eb3206c34a69c2c)
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array"key" is uninitialized and it is being read directly in function SipHash_Init() as per the below statements making a way for the garbage values :
uint64_t k0 = U8TO64_LE(k);
uint64_t k1 = U8TO64_LE(k + 8);
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23298)
(cherry picked from commit a0826b184eed2dccc56cdf80e3e0bc061cc89ddc)
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Signed-off-by: lan1120 <lanming@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22984)
(cherry picked from commit aac531e5daa2edec5d47e702a7f115cf77fe07f9)
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Fixes CVE-2023-6237
If a large and incorrect RSA public key is checked with
EVP_PKEY_public_check() the computation could take very long time
due to no limit being applied to the RSA public key size and
unnecessarily high number of Miller-Rabin algorithm rounds
used for non-primality check of the modulus.
Now the keys larger than 16384 bits (OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
will fail the check with RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE error reason.
Also the number of Miller-Rabin rounds was set to 5.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23243)
(cherry picked from commit e09fc1d746a4fd15bb5c3d7bbbab950aadd005db)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22529)
(cherry picked from commit d4d9b57530b2ecdca6b4263b5841b42c820e5275)
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When parsing the stable section of a config such as this:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
stbl_section = mstbl
[mstbl]
id-tc26 = min
Can lead to a SIGSEGV, as the parsing code doesnt recognize min as a
proper section name without a trailing colon to associate it with a
value. As a result the stack of configuration values has an entry with
a null value in it, which leads to the SIGSEGV in do_tcreate when we
attempt to pass NULL to strtoul.
Fix it by skipping any entry in the config name/value list that has a
null value, prior to passing it to stroul
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22988)
(cherry picked from commit 0981c20f8efa68bf9d68d7715280f83812c19a7e)
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Add test case for re-using a cipher context with the same key, iv and
cipher. It detects, if the hardware-specific cipher context is reset
correctly, like reported in issue #23175.
This test has encrypt and decrypt iterations for cfb128 and
ofb128. All iteations use the same key, iv and plaintext.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23201)
(cherry picked from commit 3cb1b51dddf4deaf5e3886b827f3245d81670bc7)
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Even in the good case there was memory leak here.
Add a simple test case to have at least some test coverage.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23234)
(cherry picked from commit 398011848468c7e8e481b295f7904afc30934217)
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There are several points during x509 extension creation which rely on
configuration options which may have been incorrectly parsed due to
invalid settings. Preform a value check for null in those locations to
avoid various crashes/undefined behaviors
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23183)
(cherry picked from commit bac7e687d71b124b09ad6ad3e15be9b38c08a1ba)
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There should be no reason that a cipher can't be duplicated
Fixes #21887
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23102)
(cherry picked from commit 58a6aa0c9fe6abad996f45c6b452983035db7105)
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When using pbkdf1 key deriviation, it is possible to request a key
length larger than the maximum digest size a given digest can produce,
leading to a read of random stack memory.
fix it by returning an error if the requested key size n is larger than
the EVP_MD_size of the digest
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23174)
(cherry picked from commit 8d89050f0f676b429043fd5445e5a570d54ad225)
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If a name is passed to EVP_<OBJ>_fetch of the form:
name1:name2:name3
The names are parsed on the separator ':' and added to the store, but
during the lookup in inner_evp_generic_fetch, the subsequent search of
the store uses the full name1:name2:name3 string, which fails lookup,
and causes subsequent assertion failures in evp_method_id.
instead catch the failure in inner_evp_generic_fetch and return an error
code if the name_id against a colon separated list of names fails. This
provides a graceful error return path without asserts, and leaves room
for a future feature in which such formatted names can be parsed and
searched for iteratively
Add a simple test to verify that providing a colon separated name
results in an error indicating an invalid lookup.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23110)
(cherry picked from commit 94be985cbcc1f0a5cf4f172d4a8d06c5c623122b)
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If a malformed config file is provided such as the following:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
providers = provider_sect
[provider_sect]
= provider_sect
The config parsing library will crash overflowing the stack, as it
recursively parses the same provider_sect ad nauseum.
Prevent this by maintaing a list of visited nodes as we recurse through
referenced sections, and erroring out in the event we visit any given
section node more than once.
Note, adding the test for this revealed that our diagnostic code
inadvertently pops recorded errors off the error stack because
provider_conf_load returns success even in the event that a
configuration parse failed. The call path to provider_conf_load has been
updated in this commit to address that shortcoming, allowing recorded
errors to be visibile to calling applications.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22898)
(cherry picked from commit 682fd21afb5428b5716e62eaefb09a7419f9cfd7)
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EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size() cannot be called on older
unfixed versions before EVP_MAC_init().
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23008)
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The newly introduced test case do not work
when configured with no-des, fix that by
choosing -aes128 as cipher.
Fixes ffed597882ba ("cms: avoid intermittent test failure")
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23086)
(cherry picked from commit 5b4f4474b2562c4422193e1719461a0ef5cbc3e5)
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The following entries should be still applied.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23048)
(cherry picked from commit 17b4277d9ac6665e9b53a6270949418154cab2dc)
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If you decrypt a random input using RSAES-PKCS-v1_5, then there is a
non-negligible chance that the result will look like a valid plaintext
(that is why RSAES-PKCS-v1_5 shouldn't be used anymore). This was the
cause of an intermittent failure in a test that did a cms-encrypt
operation targetting multiple recipients.
The failure happened during key-only decrypt. The recipient decrypts
every RSA ciphertext -- only one is supposed to decrypt successfully,
which would reveal the right content-key. Occassionally, more than
one decrypted successfully.
Update the test by specifying the recipient cert in the decrypt op
(this avoids looping over all RSA ciphertexts).
Add a new test to get coverage for key-only decrypt, but use RSA-OAEP
during the encrypt op.
Fixes https://github.com/openssl/project/issues/380
Testing:
$ make TESTS='test_cms' test
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23055)
(cherry picked from commit ffed597882baf2f07274e7eaa8f3c4fa9fa74ac1)
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In the command `nmake TEST='foo' test`, on Windows the runner
will look for test `'foo'` and complain about the test not being found
(due to the extraneous single quotes), whereas with `nmake TEST="foo" test`,
the test `foo` will be correctly found.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23059)
(cherry picked from commit cf424d1da05b3cd928c97596af08e260429b308c)
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In the event that a config file contains this sequence:
=======
openssl_conf = openssl_init
config_diagnostics = 1
[openssl_init]
oid_section = oids
[oids]
testoid1 = 1.2.3.4.1
testoid2 = A Very Long OID Name, 1.2.3.4.2
testoid3 = ,1.2.3.4.3
======
The leading comma in testoid3 can cause a heap buffer overflow, as the
parsing code will move the string pointer back 1 character, thereby
pointing to an invalid memory space
correct the parser to detect this condition and handle it by treating it
as if the comma doesn't exist (i.e. an empty long oid name)
(cherry picked from commit a552c23c6502592c1b3c67d93dd7e5ffbe958aa4)
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23034)
(cherry picked from commit d802bfbf80bab00123a4a6209f255852b3a10207)
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Confirm that using an ENGINE works as expected with TLS even if it is
loaded late (after construction of the SSL_CTX).
(cherry picked from commit a9c97da4910648790387d035afb12963158778fb)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22865)
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Ensure we test the case where the port value is empty in the URL.
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22961)
(cherry picked from commit a36d10dfb7e77614c8d3da602ff3800a2e9f4989)
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Test that input value of 1 for p is treated as an error
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22960)
(cherry picked from commit b83c719ecb884f609ade7ad7f52bd5e09737585b)
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Since the gen->type will not be set in a2i_GENERAL_NAME
the gen->d.otherName will not be automatically
cleaned up by GENERAL_NAME_free.
Also fixed a similar leak in a2i_GENERAL_NAME,
where ASN1_STRING_set may fail but gen->d.ia5
will not be automatically cleaned up.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22996)
(cherry picked from commit 1c078212f1548d7f647a1f0f12ed6df257c85cc3)
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Common symbols (type 'C' in the 'nm' output) are allowed to be defined more
than once. This makes test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t reflect that.
(backport of commit 4ff5137ff5fb896e0273d274110517e3c7adb8cf)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22929)
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On some platforms, the compiler may add symbols that aren't ours and that we
should ignore.
They are generally expected to start with a double underscore, and thereby
easy to detect.
(backport of commit 6c63b7e861819db439551b52ea5594faec04b65c)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22929)
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Test the next arithmetic operation to safely determine if adding the
next digit in the passed property string will overflow
Also, noted a bug in the parse_hex code. When parsing non-digit
characters (i.e. a-f and A-F), we do a tolower conversion (which is
fine), and then subtract 'a' to get the hex value from the ascii (which
is definately wrong). We should subtract 'W' to convert tolower
converted hex digits in the range a-f to their hex value counterparts
Add tests to test_property_parse_error to ensure overflow checks work
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22874)
(cherry picked from commit 986c48c4eb26861f25bc68ea252d8f2aad592735)
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Like in #17345, evp_extra_test links libcrypto statically, but also has
a dynamic/shared load via the legacy provider, which leads to ambiguous
behavior in evp_extra_test on some platforms, usually a crash (SIGSEGV)
on exit via the atexit handlers. Statically link the legacy provider to
avoid this.
Fixes #22819
Helped-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Helped-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22904)
(cherry picked from commit 426d34fc1302eb0d2f5a6152621c105ea2d198b6)
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We test its validity by trying to load it.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22866)
(cherry picked from commit 31c2c12f2dada75c334f6a9aa60c8424cf4fd040)
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Coverity recorded issues 1551739 and 1551737, a potential double free in the
tests. It occurs when the DUP operation fails in such a way val3_read is
returned as the same pointer as val2_read. Ideally it should never
happen, but resetting val3_read to 0 should satisfy coverity that there
is no issue here
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22800)
(cherry picked from commit c8ca810da9c47d8cb6988fd14e1cb4e20b0877e8)
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Add null check to cmac_size(). This avoids a seg-fault encountered
with cmac when EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size() is called before init.
Extend mac testing in evp_test.c to check that the sizes returned by
EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size() before and after init make sense (this also
ensures that we no longer seg-fault).
Fixes #22842
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22858)
(cherry picked from commit ff181969e28c1503b077b47a9ded3683524b3fd8)
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There were no PKIX-TA(0) SPKI(1) Full(0) (i.e. "0 1 0") test cases in
"danetest.in".
There is now at least a success case, which will exercise freeing the public
key after it is sanity checked, since with PKIX-TA(0) there's nothing we can do
with just the raw public key, a full chain to a local trust anchor is in any
case required.
The failure (to match) code path is already well oiled, but failure to decode
while adding malfored TLSA records could still use some additional tests...
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22821)
(cherry picked from commit c8fe4b5948486e792016208f7c8ccea9c380f354)
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We don't need the decoded X.509 Full(0) certificate for the EE usages 1 and 3,
because the leaf certificate is always part of the presented chain, so the
certificate is only validated as well-formed, and then discarded, but the
TLSA record is of course still used after the validation step.
Added DANE test cases for: 3 0 0, 3 1 0, 1 0 0, and 1 1 0
Reported by Claus Assmann.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22821)
(cherry picked from commit f636e7e6bd8e06c6d84e42729b4131b4f5df488f)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1aa08644ecd4005c0f55276b2e8dabd8a2a758f0)
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22613)
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