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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
(cherry picked from commit 3993bb0c0c87e3ed0ab4274e4688aa814e164cfc)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21272)
(cherry picked from commit 810f7dc1c7cc5441097b398f753e33652848a4cc)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21197)
(cherry picked from commit 1a27cc3626bd15f8fd9a26a2dbc59a681d505321)
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Test that if the client sends a key share for a group in the server's
supported_group list but is otherwise invalid, that we don't select it
in the HRR.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21163)
(cherry picked from commit adf33f9e268b17ec1b4739707abb40b03b21ea6a)
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Refer SP 800-131Ar2 table 2:
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-131a/rev-2/final
Fixes #21185
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21186)
(cherry picked from commit 71cf587ea21c1422640847e358019a51806d2811)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20832)
(cherry picked from commit 2d6585986f3b754750b25e7a296a08e7129a5320)
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Signed-off-by: Liu-ErMeng <liuermeng2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20797)
(cherry picked from commit 4df13d1054e143f1cbf13fa347491807289f87b7)
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The logic for handling inconsistent use of -rspin etc., -port, -server,
and -use_mock_srv options proved faulty. This is fixed here, updating and
correcting also the documentation and diagnostics of the involved options.
In particular, the case that -rspin (or -rspout. reqin, -reqout) does not
provide enough message file names was not properly described and handled.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20295)
(cherry picked from commit 1f757df1f3de0c18cc22a4992d66e9a7b113f61d)
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Fixes #20693
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20708)
(cherry picked from commit efbff4de3e259cee71a4e1bbd86b30ebd86bbdae)
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Test that a valid certificate policy is accepted and that an invalid
certificate policy is rejected. Specifically we are checking that a
leaf certificate with an invalid policy is detected.
Related-to: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20204)
(cherry picked from commit f1e144f277fd98a0fde73b884aae541fdc73d063)
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If there is no EC specified, the test won't pass.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20572)
(cherry picked from commit f5935fcf8e4bc2191ac4a32e5b7ec32817642f1e)
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These trees have pathological properties with respect to building. The small
tree stays within the imposed limit, the large tree doesn't.
The large tree would consume over 150Gb of RAM to process.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20568)
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20341)
(cherry picked from commit 0aa7d7f42bc757a0993739b6cfdc8819a70d22ef)
(cherry picked from commit ed8d2c9948f25988feb854e805b3403f592d7359)
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The test tries to use DES but that may not be available.
But for the purpose of regression testing CVE-2023-0215
the cipher is not relevant, so we use AES-128 instead.
Fixes #20249
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20276)
(cherry picked from commit c400a1fe477b44a5eacbad2be8d50f2eaa92925c)
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Also add corresponding tests and to this end update credentials
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20160)
(cherry picked from commit 6b58f498b3f5d8e4c9197c3c5228fb450e33aaaf)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
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Fixes #20084
In the 3.0 provider implementation the generic code that handles IV's
only allows a 12 byte IV. Older code intentionally added the ability for
the IV to be truncated.
As this truncation is unsafe, the documentation has been updated to
state that this in no longer allowed. The code has been updated to
produce an error when the iv length is set to any value other than 12.
NOTE: It appears that this additional padding may have originated from the code
which uses a 12 byte IV, that is then passed to CHACHA which zero pads it to 16 bytes.
Note that legacy behaviour in e_chacha20_poly1305.c has not been
updated.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20151)
(cherry picked from commit a01152370676e7e11fb461cff8628eb50fa41b81)
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Fixes openssl#17422
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fcff5bd43c85418cc4aa8052e3dc3dba344d763e)
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19958)
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Fixes #19907
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19957)
(cherry picked from commit 55e2dd8c3162d7313d9408cb20fca8a4fe6e6f5a)
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Fixes #19909
I have enforced a maximum bound still but it is much higher.
Note also that TLS13 still uses the 2048 buffer size.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19923)
(cherry picked from commit e8115bd1654d5cd7718109679b2047ca573083a8)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19919)
(cherry picked from commit 0c5fe6e4e740e7150ecb9f0a1954ef085f1fcf10)
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This is necessary to pass new ACVP tests and to
fix the CI failure in FIPS provider compat CI
Partial cherry pick of 211c47ca1b1ac129dcee59d383cae44e36532bb9
Original-author: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19937)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19904)
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Rather than computing the PSS salt length again in core using
ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string, which calls rsa_ctx_to_pss and computes the
salt length, obtain it from the provider using the
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID param to handle the case where the
interpretation of the magic constants in the provider differs from that
of OpenSSL core.
Add tests that verify that the rsa_pss_saltlen:max,
rsa_pss_saltlen:<integer> and rsa_pss_saltlen:digest options work and
put the computed digest length into the CMS_ContentInfo struct when
using CMS. Do not add a test for the salt length generated by a provider
when no specific rsa_pss_saltlen option is defined, since that number
could change between providers and provider versions, and we want to
preserve compatibility with older providers.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5a3bbe1712435d577bbc5ec046906979e8471d8b)
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19863)
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19652)
(cherry picked from commit 61203c2c59df5d0022e316a4fe614e5d18907715)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19739)
(cherry picked from commit d5e1fe9c04c7eb28e21070e3dfe0d2242504a9bc)
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The providers indication should always indicate that this is not a
legacy request.
This makes a check for engines redundant as the default return is that
legacy is ok if there are no explicit providers.
Fixes #19662
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19671)
(cherry picked from commit 2fea56832780248af2aba2e4433ece2d18428515)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19665)
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Implement the AES-256-CTR cipher in the dasync engine.
Use that to reproduce the reported problems with the
devcrypto engine in our normal test environment.
See #17995 and #17532 for details.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19390)
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19606)
(cherry picked from commit e9e6827445528caf1d9d6647953fbe67a0c78716)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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These tests verify basic functionality and specifically test for
CVE-2022-3602.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19439)
(cherry picked from commit 097752da99d9c27702e9e9d51609efedd3a4d0cf)
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Including RIPEMD160 in both the default and legacy providers shouldn't break
anyone and makes the algorithm available more readily.
Fixes #17722
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19375)
(cherry picked from commit ecd831469919215b0a45693b00ec0fd7d42d5d61)
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This should not happen but we should tolerate and send an HRR
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19404)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19382)
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Adding extensions is fragile, with the TLSEXT_TYPE entry needing to be
located at TLSEXT_IDX in the array.
This adds a test to ensure extensions are in the correct order.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19269)
(cherry picked from commit ac44deaf00ad24fd18b9d74de4a23d98a2b75c8d)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18918)
(cherry picked from commit 8b3ccf1cd590c3f9f63d4665106fa4defbffa51f)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19201)
(cherry picked from commit e1289d90d0069ea1c3ea8ae80bfc3916077ec24e)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19201)
(cherry picked from commit 9684335839fcdeac06d21b06628c4c37117b5478)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19201)
(cherry picked from commit 4d0249c2d1d0f81c211354d8a36738595936fad8)
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Fixes #18586
In order to not break existing applications the OpenSSL documentation
related to SHAKE has been updated.
Background:
All digests algorithms (including XOF's) use the bitlen as the default output length.
This results in a security strength of bitlen / 2.
This means that SHAKE128 will by default have an output length of 16
bytes and a security strength of 64 bits.
For SHAKE256 the default output length is 32 bytes and has a security
strength of 128 bits.
This behaviour was present in 1.1.1 and has been duplicated in the
provider SHAKE algorithms for 3.0.
The SHAKE XOF algorithms have a security strength of
min(bitlen, output xof length in bits / 2).
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18622)
(cherry picked from commit b7cf9dd2393de8e90a15e83466d9b8b781b18385)
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