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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7620)
(cherry picked from commit 65d2c16cbe0da8efed2f285f59930297326fb435)
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When libssl and libcrypto are compiled on Linux with "-rpath", but
not "--enable-new-dtags", the RPATH takes precedence over
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and we end up running with the wrong libraries.
This is resolved by using full (or at least relative, rather than
just the filename to be found on LD_LIBRARY_PATH) paths to the
shared objects.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7626)
(cherry picked from commit 18289399743da6c3db462f37fc8797738e8acf7c)
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Setting the SipHash hash size and setting its key is done with two
independent functions... and yet, the internals depend on both.
Unfortunately, the function to change the size wasn't adapted for the
possibility that the key was set first, with a different hash size.
This changes the hash setting function to fix the internal values
(which is easy, fortunately) according to the hash size.
evpmac.txt value for digestsize:8 is also corrected.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7613)
(cherry picked from commit 425036130dfb3cfbef5937772f7526ce60133264)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #7391
(cherry picked from commit 75b68c9e4e8591a4ebe083cb207aeb121baf549f)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7462)
(cherry picked from commit 1901516a4ba909fff12e0e7815aa2d499f4d6d67)
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pkey_test_ctrl() was designed for parsing values, not for using in
test runs. Relying on its returned value when it returned 1 even for
control errors made it particularly useless for mac_test_run().
Here, it gets replaced with a MAC specific control function, that
parses values the same way but is designed for use in a _run() rather
than a _parse() function.
This uncovers a SipHash test with an invalid control that wasn't
caught properly. After all, that stanza is supposed to test that
invalid control values do generate an error. Now we catch that.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7500)
(cherry picked from commit ce5d64c79c4d809ece8fe28a5b62915467a1c0e1)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)
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Confirms #7134
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7153)
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Confirms #7143
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7154)
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PR #3783 introduce coded to reset the server side SNI state in
SSL_do_handshake() to ensure any erroneous config time SNI changes are
cleared. Unfortunately SSL_do_handshake() can be called mid-handshake
multiple times so this is the wrong place to do this and can mean that
any SNI data is cleared later on in the handshake too.
Therefore move the code to a more appropriate place.
Fixes #7014
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7149)
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Added NIST test cases for these two as well.
Additionally deprecate the public definiton of HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK in 1.2.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6972)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7089)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7028)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7028)
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Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
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Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
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The EFD database does not state that the "ladd-2002-it-3" algorithm
assumes X1 != 0.
Consequently the current implementation, based on it, fails to compute
correctly if the affine x coordinate of the scalar multiplication input
point is 0.
We replace this implementation using the alternative algorithm based on
Eq. (9) and (10) from the same paper, which being derived from the
additive relation of (6) does not incur in this problem, but costs one
extra field multiplication.
The EFD entry for this algorithm is at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4
and the code to implement it was generated with tooling.
Regression tests add one positive test for each named curve that has
such a point. The `SharedSecret` was generated independently from the
OpenSSL codebase with sage.
This bug was originally reported by Dmitry Belyavsky on the
openssl-users maling list:
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008540.html
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7000)
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Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes #6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7001)
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The TLSv1.4 tolerance test wasn't testing what we thought it was.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6963)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6894)
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Test that a server can handle an unecrypted alert when normally the next
message is encrypted.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6749)
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The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.
Fixes #6600
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6732)
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The GOST ciphers are dynamically loaded via the GOST engine, so we must
be able to support that. The engine also uses DSA and CMS symbols, so we
skip the test on no-dsa or no-cms.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6730)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6699)
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Test that we never negotiate TLSv1.3 using GOST
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6650)
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Also fixed a memory leak found by the test.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6681)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6636)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6642)
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1. For every named curve, two "golden" keypair positive tests.
2. Also two "golden" stock ECDH positive tests.
3. For named curves with non-trivial cofactors, additionally two "golden"
ECC CDH positive tests.
4. For named curves with non-trivial cofactors, additionally two negative
tests.
There is some overlap with existing EVP tests, especially for the NIST
curves (for example, positive testing ECC CDH KATs for NIST curves).
"Golden" here means all the values are independent from OpenSSL's ECC
code. I used sage to calculate them. What comes from OpenSSL is:
1. The OIDs (parsed by tooling)
2. The curve parameters (parsing ecparam output with tooling)
The values inside the PEMs (private keys, public keys) and shared keys
are from sage. The PEMs themselves are the output of asn1parse, with
input taken from sage.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6608)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6487)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6535)
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Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6443)
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Also general clean up of those tests
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6386)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6386)
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Under a mingw shell, the command line path conversion either mangles
file: URIs to something useless (file;C:\...) or not at all (which
can't be opened by the Windows C RTL unless we're really lucky), so we
simply skip testing them in that environment.
Fixes #6369
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6376)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6371)
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TlsGetValue clears the last error even on success, so that callers may
distinguish it successfully returning NULL or failing. This error-mangling
behavior interferes with the caller's use of GetLastError. In particular
SSL_get_error queries the error queue to determine whether the caller should
look at the OS's errors. To avoid destroying state, save and restore the
Windows error.
Fixes #6299.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6316)
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Don't apply DNS name constraints to the subject CN when there's a
least one DNS-ID subjectAlternativeName.
Don't apply DNS name constraints to subject CN's that are sufficiently
unlike DNS names. Checked name must have at least two labels, with
all labels non-empty, no trailing '.' and all hyphens must be
internal in each label. In addition to the usual LDH characters,
we also allow "_", since some sites use these for hostnames despite
all the standards.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Also retains support for drafts 27 and 26
Fixes #6257
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6258)
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Previous tests only invoked CMS via the command line app. This test uses
the CMS API directly to do and encrypt and decrypt operation. This test
would have caught the memory leak fixed by the previous commit (when
building with enable-crypto-mdebug).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6142)
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To my surprise, it turns out that on OpenVMS, opening './' (which
is translated to '[]') for writing actually creates a file, '[].'.
On OpenVMS, this is a perfectly valid file with no name or extension,
just the delimiter between the two.
Because of the mess the exception would generate in the test recipe,
it gets refactored again, to clearly separate each test inside it,
and use skips to avoid some of them (that makes it clear that they are
skipped and why, when running the recipe).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6100)
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Test writing to the null device. This should be successful.
Also, refactor so the planned number of tests is calculated.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6033)
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The actual functionality of generating signatures through the `EVP_PKEY`
API is completely untested.
Current tests under the `EVP_PKEY` API
(`test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt`) only cover `Verify` and
`Decrypt`, while encryption and signature generation are tested with
ad-hoc clients (`test/sm2crypttest.c`, `test/sm2signtest.c`) that do not
call the `EVP_PKEY` interface at all but soon-to-be private functions
that bypass it (cf. PR#5895 ).
It is my opinion that an ideal solution for the future would consist on
enhancing the `test/evp_pkey` facility and syntax to allow tests to take
control of the PRNG to inject known nonces and validate the results of
`EVP_PKEY` implementations against deterministic known answer tests, but
it is probably too late to work on this feature in time for next release.
Given that commit b5a85f70d8 highlights some critical bugs in the hook
between the `EVP_PKEY` interface and SM2 signature generation and that
these defects escaped testing and code review, I think that at least for
now it is beneficial to at least add the kind of "bogus" testing
provided by this patch:
this is a "fake" test as it does only verify that the SM2 `EVP_PKEY`
interface is capable of creating a signature without failing, but it
does not say anything about the generated signature being valid, nor
does it test the functional correctness of the cryptosystem.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6066)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6059)
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