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Based on the description in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757,
this re-implements the "allow NULL to be passed" behavior of a number of
xxx_free routines. I also fixed up some egregious formatting errors
that were nearby.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5761)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5729)
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This removes some code because we cannot trace the original contributor
to get their agreement for the licence change (original commit e03ddfae).
After this change there will be numerous failures in the test cases until
someone rewrites the missing code.
All *_free functions should accept a NULL parameter. After this change
the following *_free functions will fail if a NULL parameter is passed:
BIO_ACCEPT_free()
BIO_CONNECT_free()
BN_BLINDING_free()
BN_CTX_free()
BN_MONT_CTX_free()
BN_RECP_CTX_free()
BUF_MEM_free()
COMP_CTX_free()
ERR_STATE_free()
TXT_DB_free()
X509_STORE_free()
ssl3_free()
ssl_cert_free()
SSL_SESSION_free()
SSL_free()
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757)
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The alpn_selected value in the session should be NULL before we first
populate it if this is a new session. We assert to make sure it is.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5715)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5675)
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Add missing guards around STRP-related fields
Remove two unneeded global variables: my 2'cents to #4679
Merge definition and instantiation of srpsrvparm global.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4908)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5706)
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For DTLS/SCTP we were waiting for a dry event during the call to
tls_finish_handshake(). This function just tidies up various internal
things, and after it completes the handshake is over. I can find no good
reason for waiting for a dry event here, and nothing in RFC6083 suggests
to me that we should need to. More importantly though it seems to be
wrong. It is perfectly possible for a peer to send app data/alerts/new
handshake while we are still cleaning up our handshake. If this happens
then we will never get the dry event and so we cannot continue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)
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At a couple of points in a DTLS/SCTP handshake we need to wait for a dry
event before continuing. However if an alert has been sent by the peer
then we will never receive that dry event and an infinite loop results.
This commit changes things so that we attempt to read a message if we
are waiting for a dry event but haven't got one yet. This should never
succeed, but any alerts will be processed.
Fixes #4763
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)
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Fixes regression from #5667.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5701)
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The sid_ctx is something of a "certificate request context" or a
"session ID context" -- something from the application that gives
extra indication of what sort of thing this session is/was for/from.
Without a sid_ctx, we only know that there is a session that we
issued, but it could have come from a number of things, especially
with an external (shared) session cache. Accordingly, when resuming,
we will hard-error the handshake when presented with a session with
zero-length sid_ctx and SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set -- we simply have no
information about the peer to verify, so the verification must fail.
In order to prevent these future handshake failures, proactively
decline to add the problematic sessions to the session cache.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5175)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5689)
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Place the session ticket AES and HMAC keys into secure memory.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2351)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5667)
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When SSL_CTX is created preinitialize it with system default
configuration from system_default section.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4848)
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Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5645)
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If the server is configured to allow early data then we check if the PSK
session presented by the client is available in the cache or not. If it
isn't then this may be a replay and we disallow it. If it is then we allow
it and remove the session from the cache. Note: the anti-replay protection
is not used for externally established PSKs.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
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We should only update the session cache when we issue a NewSessionTicket.
These are issued automatically after processing a client certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
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Conceptually in TLSv1.3 there can be multiple sessions associated with a
single connection. Each NewSessionTicket issued can be considered a
separate session. We can end up issuing multiple NewSessionTickets on a
single connection at the moment (e.g. in a post-handshake auth scenario).
Each of those issued tickets should have the new_session_cb called, it
should go into the session cache separately and it should have a unique
id associated with it (so that they can be found individually in the
cache).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
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- d2i_PKC8PrivateKey -> d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey
- bechmark -> benchmark
- ciperhsuite -> ciphersuite
- EncyptedPreMasterSecret -> EncryptedPreMasterSecret
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5570)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5650)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5648)
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This commit adds a new api RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() which sets the
default type and flags for new DRBG instances. See also #5576.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5632)
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Fixes #4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
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Renamed to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()/EVP_new_raw_public_key() as per
feedback.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
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In TLSv1.3 the session is not ready until after the end of the handshake
when we are constructing the NewSessionTicket.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5621)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5392)
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With the current mechanism, old cipher strings that used to work in 1.1.0,
may inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites causing connections to
fail. This is confusing for users.
In reality TLSv1.3 are quite different to older ciphers. They are much
simpler and there are only a small number of them so, arguably, they don't
need the same level of control that the older ciphers have.
This change splits the configuration of TLSv1.3 ciphers from older ones.
By default the TLSv1.3 ciphers are on, so you cannot inadvertently disable
them through your existing config.
Fixes #5359
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5392)
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As per the latest text in TLSv1.3 draft-26
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5604)
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As of TLSv1.3 draft-25 the record header data must be used as AAD
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5604)
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As per discussion with Peter Sylvester
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5603)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5600)
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These functions are similar to SSL_CTX_set_cookie_{generate,verify}_cb,
but used for the application-controlled portion of TLS1.3 stateless
handshake cookies rather than entire DTLSv1 cookies.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5463)
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Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
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At the core of things is the concept that each extension is only
defined in certain context(s) -- the ClientHello, EncryptedExtensions,
etc., and sometimes only for a specific protocol or protocol range;
we want to enforce that we only parse or generate extensions in the
context(s) for which they are defined. There is some subtlety here,
in that the protocol version in use is not known when generating the
ClientHello (but it is known when the ClientHello extensions are
being parsed!), so the SSL_IS_TLS13() macro must be used with caution.
Nonetheless, by making assertions about whether we are acting in a
server role and whether the current context is (not) a ClientHello,
we can consolidate almost all of the logic for determining whether
an extension is permitted in a given protocol message, whether we
are generating or parsing that message.
The only logic that remains separate relates to generating the ClientHello,
as it depends on an external factor (the maximum permitted TLS version) that
is not defined in the parsing context.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2945)
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Add functions that will do the work of assigning certificate, privatekey
and chain certs to an SSL or SSL_CTX. If no privatekey is given, use the
publickey. This will permit the keys to pass validation for both ECDSA
and RSA. If a private key has already been set for the certificate, it
is discarded. A real private key can be set later.
This is an all-or-nothing setting of these parameters. Unlike the
SSL/SSL_CTX_use_certificate() and SSL/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() functions,
the existing cert or privatekey is not modified (i.e. parameters copied).
This permits the existing cert/privatekey to be replaced.
It replaces the sequence of:
* SSL_use_certificate()
* SSL_use_privatekey()
* SSL_set1_chain()
And may actually be faster, as multiple checks are consolidated.
The private key can be NULL, if so an ENGINE module needs to contain the
actual private key that is to be used.
Note that ECDH (using the certificate's ECDSA key) ciphers do not work
without the private key being present, based on how the private key is
used in ECDH. ECDH does not offer PFS; ECDHE ciphers should be used instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1130)
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Allow users to distinguish between an error occurring and an HRR being
issued.
Fixes #5549
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5562)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5554)
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We also default to SHA256 as per the spec if we do not have an explicit
digest defined.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5554)
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... and add some missing known values.
Sort ssl/tls extension array list
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5304)
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This fixes an issue raised in PR #4964 by kaduk.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5491)
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They are valid for use in a CertificateRequest message, but we did not
allow it. If a server sent such a message using either of those two
extensions then the handshake would abort.
This corrects that error, but does not add support for actually processing
the extensions. They are simply ignored, and a TODO is inserted to add
support at a later time.
This was found during interoperability testing with btls:
https://gitlab.com/ilari_l/btls
Prompted by these errors I reviewed the complete list of extensions and
compared them with the latest table in draft-24 to confirm there were no
other errors of a similar type. I did not find any.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5490)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5470)
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When early data support was first added, this seemed like a good
idea, as it would allow applications to just add SSL_read_early_data()
calls as needed and have things "Just Work". However, for applications
that do not use TLS 1.3 early data, there is a negative side effect.
Having a nonzero max_early_data in a SSL_CTX (and thus, SSL objects
derived from it) means that when generating a session ticket,
tls_construct_stoc_early_data() will indicate to the client that
the server supports early data. This is true, in that the implementation
of TLS 1.3 (i.e., OpenSSL) does support early data, but does not
necessarily indicate that the server application supports early data,
when the default value is nonzero. In this case a well-intentioned
client would send early data along with its resumption attempt, which
would then be ignored by the server application, a waste of network
bandwidth.
Since, in order to successfully use TLS 1.3 early data, the application
must introduce calls to SSL_read_early_data(), it is not much additional
burden to require that the application also calls
SSL_{CTX_,}set_max_early_data() in order to enable the feature; doing
so closes this scenario where early data packets would be sent on
the wire but ignored.
Update SSL_read_early_data.pod accordingly, and make s_server and
our test programs into applications that are compliant with the new
requirements on applications that use early data.
Fixes #4725
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5483)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #4672
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This commit adds SSL_export_keying_material_early() which exports
keying material using early exporter master secret.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5252)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5439)
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The return at the end isn't reachable.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5442)
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