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Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
crypto/dsa/dsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c
crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c
crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
crypto/modes/gcm128.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Conflicts:
apps/apps.c
crypto/crypto.h
crypto/rand/md_rand.c
ssl/d1_pkt.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_enc.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
ssl/tls1.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bss_file.c
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/evp/evp.h
crypto/store/str_mem.c
crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
ssl/tls1.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
apps/ciphers.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
ssl/s3_clnt.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_sess.c
Conflicts:
apps/ciphers.c
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
ssl/t1_enc.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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(cherry picked from commit 4a7fa26ffd65bf36beb8d1cb8f29fc0ae203f5c5)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
Conflicts:
apps/apps.c
ssl/ssltest.c
Conflicts:
apps/apps.c
crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
ssl/s3_cbc.c
ssl/ssl_sess.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/b_sock.c
crypto/pem/pem.h
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
ssl/s3_both.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c8435171a7af575f73c526d79e1ef0ee5960)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
crypto/bn/bn_div.c
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c
crypto/modes/gcm128.c
crypto/opensslv.h
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/heartbeat_test.c
ssl/s3_clnt.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_sess.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
test/testutil.h
Conflicts:
apps/openssl.c
apps/ts.c
apps/vms_decc_init.c
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
crypto/objects/objects.h
crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
crypto/stack/safestack.h
crypto/ts/ts.h
crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
e_os2.h
engines/ccgost/gost89.c
engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
engines/ccgost/gost_keywrap.c
engines/ccgost/gost_keywrap.h
engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Fix typo in ssl3_get_cert_verify: we can only skip certificate verify
message if certificate is absent.
NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8 is NOT vulnerable to CVE-2015-0205 as it doesn't
support DH certificates and this typo prohibits skipping of
certificate verify message for sign only certificates anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_pkt.c
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_pkt.c
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d4158572fd8b3dc641851b8378e791df7972d)
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OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc88aec8c9e001b0a0077d3cd4de1ed0e6)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
ssl/d1_srvr.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
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Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b15f8769644b00ef7283521593360b7b2135cb63)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
ssl/s3_clnt.c
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d07187b59551e4fad3db4e52ea73f2c. Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.
CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952e97d82eac6958c81ed1e256e6b8ca5)
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CVE-2014-3568
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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CVE-2014-3567
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 90e53055939db40cf0fac1ad0c59630280aeee86)
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Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openss.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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(Original commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801)
Conflicts:
ssl/Makefile
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that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.
(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
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that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff90124c6fd53bbb49dae5edb4e821e0a)
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Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 73729e4cf3961e36b5534d270c11ff7cd811aa43)
Conflicts:
ssl/Makefile
test/Makefile
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Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.
Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aac17a82fbaf2bc23ee62f24611e5883d3e7b97)
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PR#3450
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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CVE-2014-3510
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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CVE-2014-3511
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
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In |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.
Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Use same logic when determining when to expect a client
certificate for both TLS and DTLS.
PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit c8d710dc5f83d69d802f941a4cc5895eb5fe3d65)
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PR#319 (reoponed version).
(cherry picked from commit 7f6e9578648728478e84246fd3e64026b8b6a48e)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
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PR#2531.
(cherry picked from commit 59899c4d1b4b6ee4066a540bad2b62cb22ac3d91)
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Some state strings were erronously not compiled when no-ssl2
was set.
PR#3295
(cherry picked from commit 0518a3e19e18cfc441cab261b28441b8c8bd77bf)
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PR#3174
(cherry picked from commit fd331c0bb9b557903dd2ce88398570a3327b5ef0)
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PR#3374
(cherry picked from commit 0436369fccd128cb7f6a8538d5fed1c876c437af)
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In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.
Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team.
PR#3375
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This reverts commit def1490717c091c6ef669da9fc5ea4c8b2a4d776.
Incorrect attribution
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Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.
PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
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In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.
PR#3375
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(Backported as a result of PR#3377 reported by Rainer Jung <rainer.jung@kippdata.de>)
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