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Remove duplicate defines from EVP source files.
Most of them were in evp.h, which is always included.
Add new ones evp_int.h
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK is now always defined in evp.h, so
remove conditionals on it
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2201)
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Well, not as much, at least.
Commit 07afdf3c3ac97af4f2b4eec22a97f7230f8227e0 changed things so
that for SSLv2 format ClientHellos we store the cipher list in the
TLS format, i.e., with two bytes per cipher, to be consistent with
historical behavior.
However, the space allocated for the array still performed the computation
with three bytes per cipher, a needless over-allocation (though a relatively
small one, all things considered).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2281)
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SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist() was a little too "raw" in the case of an SSLv2
compat ClientHello. In 1.0.2 and below, during version negotiation, if
we received an SSLv2 compat ClientHello but actually wanted to do SSLv3+
then we would construct a "fake" SSLv3+ ClientHello. This "fake" ClientHello
would have its ciphersuite list converted to the SSLv3+ format. It was
this "fake" raw list that got saved away to later be returned by a call to
SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist().
In 1.1.0+ version negotiation works differently and we process an SSLv2
compat ClientHello directly without the need for an intermediary "fake"
ClientHello. This meant that the raw ciphersuite list being saved was in
the SSLv2 format. Any caller of this function would not expect that and
potentially overread the returned buffer by one byte.
Fixes #2189
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2280)
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- s == NULL can mean c is a new session *or* lh_insert was
unable to create a hash entry.
- use lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve to check for this error condition.
- If it happens simply remove the extra reference again.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2138)
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This comes from a comment in GH issue #1027. Andy wrote the code,
Rich made the PR.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2253)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646)
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In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was*
client auth, then the server will expect the client to send a Certificate
message anyway resulting in a connection failure.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1982)
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In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was*
client auth, then the client will send a Certificate message anyway
resulting in a connection failure.
Fixes #1920
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1982)
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The flag SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is documented as follows:
B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL
handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a
renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
B<Client mode:> ignored
But the implementation actually did nothing. After the server sends its
ServerKeyExchange message, the code was checking s->session->peer to see if
it is NULL. If it was set then it did not ask for another client
certificate. However s->session->peer will only be set in the event of a
resumption, but a ServerKeyExchange message is only sent in the event of a
full handshake (i.e. no resumption).
The documentation suggests that the original intention was for this to
have an effect on renegotiation, and resumption doesn't come into it.
The fix is to properly check for renegotiation, not whether there is already
a client certificate in the session.
As far as I can tell this has been broken for a *long* time.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1982)
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ssl3_change_cipher_state
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2164)
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Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1597)
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A guard was in the wrong place in the header file.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2212)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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The length passed to tls1_set_sigalgs() is a multiple of two and there are
two char entries in the list for each sigalg. When we set
client_sigalgslen or conf_sigalgslen this is the number of ints in the list
where there is one entry per sigalg (i.e. half the length of the list passed
to the function).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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The SHA1 sigalgs were inadvertently missed off in the sigalgs refactor.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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The siglen value needs to be initialised prior to it being read in the
call to EVP_DigestSignFinal later in this function.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Declare a variable as static to silence the warning
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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TLSv1.3 introduces PSS based sigalgs. Offering these in a TLSv1.3 client
implies that the client is prepared to accept these sigalgs even in
TLSv1.2.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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TLSv1.3 freezes the record layer version and ensures that it is always set
to TLSv1.0. Some implementations check this.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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In TLSv1.3 we must use PSS based sig algs for RSA signing. Ignore any
shared sig algs which are PKCS1 based.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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A misreading of the TLS1.3 spec meant we were using the handshake hashes
up to and including the Client Finished to calculate the client
application traffic secret. We should be only use up until the Server
Finished.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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We can't handle these messages yet, so ignore them for now.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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We need to use the length of the handshake hash for the length of the
finished key.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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We were not incrementing the sequence number every time we sent/received
a record.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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The sigalgs work has made some old lookup tables and functions redundant
so remove them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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We had an extra layer of indirection in looking up hashes and sigs based
on sigalgs which is now no longer necessary. This removes it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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The extensions refactor made this function redundant so we can remove it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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In TLSv1.2 an individual sig alg is represented by 1 byte for the hash
and 1 byte for the signature. In TLSv1.3 each sig alg is represented by
two bytes, where the two bytes together represent a single hash and
signature combination. This converts the internal representation of sigalgs
to use a single int for the pair, rather than a pair of bytes.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
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Otherwise the client will try to process it again. The second time around
it will try and move the record data into handshake fragment storage and
realise that there is no data left. At that point it marks it as read
anyway. However, it is a bug that we go around the loop a second time, so
we prevent that.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2200)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2052)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2052)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2052)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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This variable represents the index of the cert within the chain, so give it
a name that better represents that.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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al can be used uninitialised in an error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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We remove the separate CertificateStatus message for TLSv1.3, and instead
send back the response in the appropriate Certificate message extension.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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Also updates TLSProxy to be able to understand the format and parse the
contained extensions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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Continuing from the previous commit we also need to extend the extensions
framework to supply the Certificate we just read during parsing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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The Certificate message in TLS1.3 has an extensions block for each
Certificate. Therefore we need to extend tls_construct_extensions() to pass
in the certificate we are working on. We also pass in the position in the
chain (with 0 being the first certificate).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2173)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2153)
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