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Previous versions of OpenSSL had the max size limit for a CertificateRequest
message as |s->max_cert_list|. Previously master had it to be
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH. However these messages can get quite long if a
server is configured with a long list of acceptable CA names. Therefore
the size limit has been increased to be consistent with previous versions.
RT#4198
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Move all calls of the OCSP callback into one place, rather than repeating it
in two different places.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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It makes no sense to call the OCSP status callback if we are resuming a
session because no certificates will be sent.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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If a server sends the status_request extension then it may choose
to send the CertificateStatus message. However this is optional.
We were treating it as mandatory and the connection was failing.
Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.
RT#4120
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Suggested by David Benjamin
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
MR: #1520
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When EC is disabled, and an error occurs in ssl_generate_master_secret()
or RAND_bytes(), the error path does not free rsa_decrypt.
RT#4197
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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After the recent change to use ossl_inline, builds were failing on some
platforms due to a missing usage of "inline".
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Add macro ossl_inline for use in public headers where a portable inline
is required. Change existing inline to use ossl_inline
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This adds support for SSL/TLS configuration using configuration modules.
Sets of command value pairs are store and can be replayed through an
SSL_CTX or SSL structure using SSL_CTX_config or SSL_config.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Remove all fixed DH ciphersuites and associated logic.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Since we don't use the eay style any more, there's no point tryint to
tell emacs to use it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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SSL_CIPHER_description() was returning "unknown" for the encryption
in the new ChaCha20/Poly1305 TLS ciphersuites.
RT#4183
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rename BUF_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
to OPENSSL_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
Add #define's for the old names.
Add CRYPTO_{memdup,strndup}, called by OPENSSL_{memdup,strndup} macros.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Remove incomplete non-functional ECDH client authentication code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Since auto ecdh is now always used SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE is
redundant. Simplify associated code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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GCM and CCM are modes of operation for block ciphers only. ChaCha20-Poly1305
operates in neither of them but it is AEAD. This change also enables future
AEAD ciphers to be available for use with DTLS.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This reverts commit 777f482d993322d69025014bf1b99c270c978fc0.
Author credit missing. Reverting this and re-committing with
an Author line.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Fix compile failure introduced by commit 94d61512360c due to a typo.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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GCM and CCM are modes of operation for block ciphers only. ChaCha20-Poly1305
operates in neither of them but it is AEAD. This change also enables future
AEAD ciphers to be available for use with DTLS.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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A BIO_flush call in the DTLS code was not correctly setting the |rwstate|
variable to SSL_WRITING. This means that SSL_get_error() will not return
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE in the event of an IO retry.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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If using DTLS and NBIO then if a second or subsequent handshake message
fragment hits a retry, then the retry attempt uses the wrong fragment
offset value. This commit restores the fragment offset from the last
attempt.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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If the call to OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs fails to find the relevant NID then
we should set the NID to NID_undef.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Add new flag TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS which is set when the peer sends
the extended master secret extension.
Server now sends extms if and only if the client sent extms.
Check consistency of extms extension when resuming sessions following (where
practical) RFC7627.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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