| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19382)
|
|
If we can't construct the ticket don't send one. This requires a change
to the TLS state machine to be able to a handle a construction function
deciding not to send a message after all.
Fixes #18977
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19249)
|
|
In TLS we process received messages like this:
1) Read Message Header
2) Validate and transition state based on received message type
3) Read Message Body
4) Process Message
In DTLS we read messages like this:
1) Read Message Header and Body
2) Validate and transition state based on received message type
3) Process Message
The difference is because of the stream vs datagram semantics of the
underlying transport.
In both TLS and DTLS we were doing finished MAC processing as part of
reading the message body. This means that in DTLS this was occurring
*before* the state transition has been validated. A crash was occurring
in DTLS if a Finished message was sent in an invalid state due to
assumptions in the code that certain variables would have been setup by
the time a Finished message arrives.
To avoid this problem we shift the finished MAC processing to be after
the state transition in DTLS.
Thanks to github user @bathooman for reporting this issue.
Fixes #14906
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14930)
|
|
This change includes swapping the PUT and SPT configuration,
includes of sys/stat.h and sys/types.h in the correct scope
to be picked up by SPT definitions.
Fixes: #14698
Fixes: #14734
CLA: The author has the permission to grant the OpenSSL Team the right to use this change.
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14736)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13999)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13467)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13533)
|
|
Since SSLfatal() doesn't take a function code any more, we drop that
argument everywhere. Also, we convert all combinations of SSLfatal()
and ERR_add_data() to an SSLfatal_data() call.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13316)
|
|
ossl_statem_fatal() is refactored to be an extended ERR_set_error(),
and SSLfatal() is refactored to work like ERR_raise(). We also add
SSLfatal_data() to work like ERR_raise_data().
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13316)
|
|
This was done using util/err-to-raise
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13316)
|
|
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
|
|
If compiled with 'no-deprecated', ERR_put_error() is undefined. We
had one spot where we were using it directly, because the file and
line information was passed from elsewhere.
Fortunately, it's possible to use ERR_raise() for that situation, and
call ERR_set_debug() immediately after and thereby override the
information that ERR_raise() stored in the error record.
util/mkerr.pl needed a small adjustment to not generate code that
won't compile in a 'no-deprecated' configuration.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9452)
|
|
With the removal of SSLv2, the s3 structure is always allocated, so
there is little point in having it be an allocated pointer. Collapse
the ssl3_state_st structure into ssl_st and fixup any references.
This should be faster than going through an indirection and due to
fewer allocations, but I'm not seeing any significant performance
improvement; it seems to be within the margin of error in timing.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7888)
|
|
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message
exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses
some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means
that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly.
This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake
message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in
the normal way.
This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already
written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it,
KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications.
Fixes #8069
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7768)
|
|
Fixes: #7161 (hopefully)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7175)
|
|
If we sent early_data and then received back an HRR, the enc_write_ctx
was stale resulting in errors if an alert needed to be sent.
Thanks to Quarkslab for reporting this.
In any case it makes little sense to encrypt alerts using the
client_early_traffic_secret, so we add special handling for alerts sent
after early_data. All such alerts are sent in plaintext.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
|
|
These tiny functions only read from the input SSL, and we are
about to use them from functions that only have a const SSL* available,
so propagate const a bit further.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
|
|
It is not valid to send early_data after an HRR has been received.
Fixes #6734
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6737)
|
|
Fixes #4929
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6170)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5645)
|
|
This commit adds SSL_export_keying_material_early() which exports
keying material using early exporter master secret.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5252)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4944)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
|
|
The check_fatal macro is supposed to only be called if we are already
expecting to be in the fatal state. The macro asserts that we are and
puts us into the fatal state if not.
This issue combined with the problem fixed in the previous commit meant
that the fuzzer detected a crash at a point in the processing when we
should have already been in the fatal state.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4847)
|
|
The most likely explanation for us ending up at this point in the code
is that we were called by the user application incorrectly - so use an
appropriate error code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
|
|
We shouldn't call SSLfatal() multiple times for the same error condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
|
|
Sometimes at the top level of the state machine code we know we are
supposed to be in a fatal error condition. This commit adds some sanity
checks to ensure that SSLfatal() has been called.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
|
|
Typically if a fatal error occurs three things need to happen:
- Put an error on the error queue
- Send an alert
- Put the state machine into the error state
Although all 3 of these things need to be done every time we hit a fatal
error the responsibilities for doing this are distributed throughout the
code. The place where the error goes on the queue, where the alert gets
sent and where the state machine goes into the error state are almost
invariably different. It has been a common pattern to pass alert codes up
and down the stack to get the alert information from the point in the code
where the error is detected to the point in the code where the alert gets
sent.
This commit provides an SSLfatal() macro (backed by an ossl_statem_fatal
function) that does all 3 of the above error tasks. This is largely a drop
in replacement for SSLerr, but takes a couple of extra parameters (the SSL
object, and an alert code).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
|
|
cryptilib.h is the second.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
|
|
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).
Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.
Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
|
|
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.
Re-order seeding and stop after first success.
Add RAND_poll_ex()
Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.
Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.
Various code cleanups:
-Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
-Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
-Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
-Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
-Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
implementation of NIST DRBG.
-Remove blocklength
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
|
|
early_data is not allowed after an HRR. We failed to handle that
correctly.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3933)
|
|
The value of BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was clashing with the value for
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. In an SCTP enabled build
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE was used unconditionally with
the reasoning that it would be ignored if SCTP wasn't in use. Unfortunately
due to this clash, this wasn't the case. The BIO ended up going into peek
mode and was continually reading the same data over and over - throwing it
away as a replay.
Fixes #3723
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3724)
|
|
There was code existing which attempted to handle the case where application
data is received after a reneg handshake has started in SCTP. In normal DTLS
we just fail the connection if this occurs, so there doesn't seem any reason
to try and work around it for SCTP. In practice it didn't work properly
anyway and is probably a bad idea to start with.
Fixes #3251
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3220)
|
|
The end of early data is now indicated by a new handshake message rather
than an alert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
SSL_read_early()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
SSL_write_early()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
We also skip any early_data that subsequently gets sent. Later commits will
process it if we can.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
|
We provide SSL_write_early() which *must* be called first on a connection
(prior to any other IO function including SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake()).
Also SSL_write_early_finish() which signals the end of early data.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
|
