| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Pull out the state machine into a separate sub directory. Also moved some
functions which were nothing to do with the state machine but were in state
machine files. Pulled all the SSL_METHOD definitions into one place...most
of those files had very little left in them any more.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Previously each message specific process function would create its own
PACKET structure. Rather than duplicate all of this code lots of times we
should create it in the state machine itself.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Clean up and remove lots of code that is now no longer needed due to the
move to the new state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Implement all of the necessary changes to make DTLS on the server work
with the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Implement all of the necessary changes for moving TLS server side
processing into the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Split the TLS server ssl3_get_* and ssl3_send_* functions into two ready
for the migration to the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
RT#4081
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
False positive: gcc (4.8) can't figure out the SSL_IS_DTLS logic.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Note that this commit constifies a user callback parameter and therefore
will break compilation for applications using this callback. But unless
they are abusing write access to the buffer, the fix is trivial.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Fix alerts.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Move all packet parsing to the beginning of the method. This limits the
SSLv2 compatibility soup to the parsing, and makes the rest of the
processing uniform.
This is also needed for simpler EMS support: EMS servers need to do an
early scan for EMS to make resumption decisions. This'll be easier when
the entire ClientHello is parsed in the beginning.
As a side effect,
1) PACKETize ssl_get_prev_session and tls1_process_ticket; and
2) Delete dead code for SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Since SSLv3, a CipherSuite is always 2 bytes. The only place where we
need 3-byte ciphers is SSLv2-compatible ClientHello processing.
So, remove the ssl_put_cipher_by_char indirection.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
|
The bookmark API results in a lot of boilerplate error checking that can
be much more easily achieved with a simple struct copy. It also lays the
path for removing the third PACKET field.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
|
Simplify encrypted premaster secret reading by using new methods in the
PACKET API.
Don't overwrite the packet buffer. RSA decrypt accepts truncated
ciphertext with leading zeroes omitted, so it's even possible that by
crafting a valid ciphertext with several leading zeroes, this could
cause a few bytes out-of-bounds write. The write is harmless because of
the size of the underlying message buffer, but nevertheless we shouldn't
write into the packet.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
For server use a PSK identity hint value in the CERT structure which
is inherited when SSL_new is called and which allows applications to
set hints on a per-SSL basis. The previous version of
SSL_use_psk_identity_hint tried (wrongly) to use the SSL_SESSION structure.
PR#4039
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
|
Use each once in s3_srvr.c to show how they work.
Also fix a bug introduced in c3fc7eeab884b6876a1b4006163f190d325aa047
and made apparent by this change:
ssl3_get_next_proto wasn't updating next_proto_negotiated_len
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Rewrite ssl3_get_client_hello to use the new methods.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
If the client challenge is less than 32 bytes, it is padded with leading - not trailing - zero bytes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Use the new PACKET code to process the CKE message
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
|
Enhance the PACKET code readability, and fix a stale comment. Thanks
to Ben Kaduk (bkaduk@akamai.com) for pointing this out.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
|
|
The new ClientHello PACKET code is missing a return value check.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
|
|
This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
--strict-warnings started showing warnings for this today...
Surely an error should be raised if these reads fail?
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Change NextProto message processing to use the PACKET API.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
|
Modify CertificateVerify processing to use the new PACKET API.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
|
Use the PACKET API for processing ClientCertificate messages
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
|
|
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
|
|
Uses the new PACKET code to process the incoming ClientHello including all
extensions etc.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
|
|
Commit e481f9b90b164 removed OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT from the code.
Previously if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT *was not* defined then the server random was
filled during getting of the ClientHello. If it *was* defined then the
server random would be filled in ssl3_send_server_hello(). Unfortunately in
commit e481f9b90b164 the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT guards were removed but *both*
server random fillings were left in. This could cause problems for session
ticket callbacks.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK server side.
Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
are only sent when required.
Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now include an
identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
client key exchange message expects PSK identity and requests key for
all PSK key exchange ciphersuites.
Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Rewrite ssl3_digest_cached_records handling. Only digest cached records
if digest array is NULL: this means it is safe to call
ssl3_digest_cached_records multiple times (subsequent calls are no op).
Remove flag TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE instead only update handshake buffer
if digest array is NULL.
Add additional "keep" parameter to ssl3_digest_cached_records to indicate
if the handshake buffer should be retained after digesting cached records
(needed for TLS 1.2 client authentication).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
|
Where we called openssl_cleanse, make sure we do it on all error
paths. Be consistent in use of sizeof(foo) when possible.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
|
|
Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run
OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining
the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably
not well tested). Therefore it is being removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
|
Move per-connection state out of the CERT structure: which should just be
for shared configuration data (e.g. certificates to use).
In particular move temporary premaster secret, raw ciphers, peer signature
algorithms and shared signature algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
|
More miscellaneous updates to version negotiation following feedback.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
|
|
Move these functions into t1_clnt.c, t1_srvr.c and t1_meth.c and take
advantage of the existing tls1_get*_method() functions that all the other
methods are using. Since these now have to support SSLv3 anyway we might
as well use the same set of get functions for both TLS and SSLv3.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
|
|
Miscellaneous updates following review comments on the version negotiation
rewrite patches.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
|
|
This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
reason to maintain this complexity.
The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
ClientHellos.
Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.
Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
removal of the old s23* code.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
|
|
There are header files in crypto/ that are used by the rest of
OpenSSL. Move those to include/internal and adapt the affected source
code, Makefiles and scripts.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/constant_time_locl.h
crypto/o_dir.h
crypto/o_str.h
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
|
Remove RFC2712 Kerberos support from libssl. This code and the associated
standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
|
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.
Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.
RT#2958
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
|
