| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d1b7bef3d46d41382dc4dafde8b3900)
(cherry picked from commit 5e4ca556e970edb8a7f364fcb6ee6818a965a60b)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_enc.c
ssl/d1_pkt.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
|
|
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)
(cherry picked from commit 2c948c1bb218f4ae126e14fd3453d42c62b93235)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
|
|
|
|
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bccfc0bb9da254dc84e23bc6a1c78a64e)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/c_allc.c
ssl/ssl_algs.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_enc.c
(cherry picked from commit 3622239826698a0e534dcf0473204c724bb9b4b4)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_enc.c
ssl/s3_enc.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssl_algs.c
ssl/t1_enc.c
|
|
|
|
|
|
at present because it asserts either noop flags or is inside
OPENSSL_FIPS #ifdef's.
|
|
PR: 1490
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Submitted by: Nils Larsch
|
|
I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.
|
|
|
|
I've covered all the memset()s I felt safe modifying, but may have missed some.
|
|
|
|
des_old.h redefines crypt:
#define crypt(b,s)\
DES_crypt((b),(s))
This scheme leads to failure, if header files with the OS's true definition
of crypt() are processed _after_ des_old.h was processed. This is e.g. the
case on HP-UX with unistd.h.
As evp.h now again includes des.h (which includes des_old.h), this problem
only came up after this modification.
Solution: move header files (indirectly) including e_os.h before the header
files (indirectly) including evp.h.
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
|
|
(but noone uses it anyway)
fix t1_enc.c: use OPENSSL_NO_RC4, not NO_RC4
|
|
vulnerability workaround (included in SSL_OP_ALL).
PR: #90
|
|
Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello().
Use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to fix ssl3_read_internal().
|
|
|
|
to digests to retain compatibility.
|
|
with existing code.
Modify library to use digest *_ex() functions.
|
|
|
|
reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
verification error occured.
In ssl/s2_pkt.c, verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in
the legal range.
|
|
|
|
applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and
don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy().
Note: this is almost identical to the patch submitted to openssl-dev
by Verdon Walker <VWalker@novell.com> except some redundant
EVP_add_digest_()/EVP_cleanup() calls were removed and some changes
made to avoid compiler warnings.
|
|
|
|
Spotted by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
Protect against future mistakes with an assert().
|
|
compiler bug reported in <01032110293775.22278@weba3.iname.net>
(the '++seq[i]' condition is evaluated as 256 rather than 0
when the previous value is 255).
|
|
|
|
like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.
This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
|
|
the old functionality.
Various warning fixes.
Initial EVP symmetric cipher docs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if anyone had actually ever needed that they should have fixed this typo)
|
|
Submitted by: Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>
|
|
|
|
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
|
|
wrong keylength with export null ciphers.
|
|
|
|
|
