Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- safestack macro changes for C++ were incomplete
- RLE decompression boundary case
- SSL 2.0 key arg length check
Submitted by: Google (Adam Langley, Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller)
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Submitted by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Correct BIO_ctrl error handling in s2_srvr.c
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Fix additional gcc 4.2 value not used warnings.
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for OpenSSL.
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pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method const.
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for locking code. The CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD lock is now no longer used.
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with the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option.
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functions and macros.
This change has associated tags: LEVITTE_before_const and
LEVITTE_after_const. Those will be removed when this change has been
properly reviewed.
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Check if IDEA is being built or not.
This is part of a large change submitted by Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
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Submitted by: "Patrick McCormick" <patrick@tellme.com>
PR: 262
PR: 291
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PR: 262
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Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
F30602-01-2-0537.
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values really are unsigned
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call ssl2_part_read again to parse error message
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Important SSL 2.0 bugfixes (bugs found while implementing msg_callback).
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never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within
one of the SSL handshake functions.
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with existing code.
Modify library to use digest *_ex() functions.
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(The attack against SSL 3.1 and TLS 1.0 is impractical anyway,
otherwise this would be a security relevant patch.)
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missed any.
This compiles and runs on Linux, and external applications have no
problems with it. The definite test will be to build this on VMS.
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the clients choice; in SSLv2 the client uses the server's preferences.
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like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.
This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
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as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
Submitted by: Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>
Modified by Ulf Möller
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returns int (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). New function RAND_add() is the
same as RAND_seed() but takes an estimate of the entropy as an additional
argument.
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Pointed out by: Janez Jere <jj@void.si>
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