Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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CVE-2014-3568
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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PR#3220
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(I'd rather use an option, but it appears that the options field is
full.)
Now, we send the time in the gmt_unix_time field if the appropriate
one of these mode options is set, but randomize the field if the flag
is not set.
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I'll be using this to make an option for randomizing the time.
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Instead, send random bytes.
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
* handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
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vector contiguous [from HEAD].
PR: 2802
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If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client
ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient.
Document workarounds in CHANGES.
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Some servers hang when presented with a client hello record length exceeding
255 bytes but will work with longer client hellos if the TLS record version
in client hello does not exceed TLS v1.0. Unfortunately this doesn't fix all
cases...
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If OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT is set then TLS v1.2 is disabled for clients
only.
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no FIPS compilation support
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This includes TLS v1.2 server and client support but at present
client certificate support is not implemented.
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Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
Since SSLv2 doesn't support renegotiation at all don't reject it if
legacy renegotiation isn't enabled.
Also can now use SSL2 compatible client hello because RFC5746 supports it.
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renegotiation
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Submitted by: Vadim Zeitlin <vz-openssl@zeitlins.org>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Make no-comp compile without warnings.
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hello if no SSLv2 cipher suites are included. This effectively disables
the broken SSLv2 use by default.
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(draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt), and do some cleanups and
bugfixes on the way. In particular, this fixes the buffer bounds
checks in ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext() and in ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext().
Note that the opaque PRF Input TLS extension is not compiled by default;
see CHANGES.
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Submitted by: Peter Sylvester
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- fix indentation
- rename some functions and macros
- fix up confusion between SSL_ERROR_... and SSL_AD_... values
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Submitted by: Peter Sylvester
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maximum send fragment size. Allocate I/O buffers accordingly.
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pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method const.
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for locking code. The CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD lock is now no longer used.
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(previous revision got this wrong)
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with the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option.
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(I wonder why s2_connect() handles the initial buffer allocation slightly
differently...)
PR: 416
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Submitted by: "Patrick McCormick" <patrick@tellme.com>
PR: 262
PR: 291
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PR: 262
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des_old.h redefines crypt:
#define crypt(b,s)\
DES_crypt((b),(s))
This scheme leads to failure, if header files with the OS's true definition
of crypt() are processed _after_ des_old.h was processed. This is e.g. the
case on HP-UX with unistd.h.
As evp.h now again includes des.h (which includes des_old.h), this problem
only came up after this modification.
Solution: move header files (indirectly) including e_os.h before the header
files (indirectly) including evp.h.
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
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Important SSL 2.0 bugfixes (bugs found while implementing msg_callback).
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never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within
one of the SSL handshake functions.
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missed any.
This compiles and runs on Linux, and external applications have no
problems with it. The definite test will be to build this on VMS.
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test was never triggered due to an off-by-one error.
In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding
(RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the
client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if
SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server.
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