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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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the new files s3_msg.c and s1_msg.c respectively.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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The recent updates to libssl to enforce stricter return code checking, left
a small number of instances behind where return codes were being swallowed
(typically because the function they were being called from was declared as
void). This commit fixes those instances to handle the return codes more
appropriately.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ensure that all functions have their return values checked where
appropriate. This covers all functions defined and called from within
libssl.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ensure all malloc failures return -1.
Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c
RT#3725
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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I left many "#if 0" lines, usually because I thought we would
probably want to revisit them later, or because they provided
some useful internal documentation tips.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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TLS and TLS1 are no longer optional.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
crypto/pem/pem_all.c
fips/dh/dh_gen.c
fips/dh/fips_dh_check.c
fips/dh/fips_dh_gen.c
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_clnt.c
Conflicts:
ssl/s2_pkt.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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failure.
PR#1767
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Remove some redundant logical expressions
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@silkandcyanide.net>
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use-after-free bug. PR#3362
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Make DTLS behave like TLS when negotiating version: record layer has
DTLS 1.0, message version is 1.2.
Tolerate different version numbers if version hasn't been negotiated
yet.
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This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
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Reported by: Prashant Jaikumar <rmstar@gmail.com>
Fix handling of application data received before a handshake.
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Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.
As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
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Port TLS 1.2 GCM code to DTLS. Enable use of TLS 1.2 only ciphers when in
DTLS 1.2 mode too.
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Add DTLS record header parsing, different client hello format and add
HelloVerifyRequest message type.
Add code to d1_pkt.c to send message headers to the message callback.
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Revert is appropriate because binary compatibility is not an issue
in 1.1.
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Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 8bfd4c659f180a6ce34f21c0e62956b362067fba)
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This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d1b7bef3d46d41382dc4dafde8b3900)
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The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)
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This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Fix DTLS timeout handling.
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Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
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<tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and
Kenny Paterson.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Add SCTP support for DTLS (RFC 6083).
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix DTLS buffering and decryption bug.
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alert.
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Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Support for abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating.
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Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Don't drop DTLS connection if mac or decryption failed.
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