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This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 0.9.8 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
ssl/tls1.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bss_file.c
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/evp/evp.h
crypto/store/str_mem.c
crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
ssl/tls1.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c8435171a7af575f73c526d79e1ef0ee5960)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
crypto/bn/bn_div.c
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c
crypto/modes/gcm128.c
crypto/opensslv.h
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/heartbeat_test.c
ssl/s3_clnt.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_sess.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
test/testutil.h
Conflicts:
apps/openssl.c
apps/ts.c
apps/vms_decc_init.c
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
crypto/objects/objects.h
crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
crypto/stack/safestack.h
crypto/ts/ts.h
crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
e_os2.h
engines/ccgost/gost89.c
engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
engines/ccgost/gost_keywrap.c
engines/ccgost/gost_keywrap.h
engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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In |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.
Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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PR#3394
(cherry picked from commit 7a9d59c148b773f59a41f8697eeecf369a0974c2)
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Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
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A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
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PR#3302
(cherry picked from commit 9717f01951f976f76dd40a38d9fc7307057fa4c4)
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(cherry picked from commit 80ccc66d7eedb2d06050130c77c482ae1584199a)
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reduce MTU after failed transmissions. [0.9.8 version of patch]
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reduce MTU after failed transmissions.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix DTLS bug which prevents manual MTU setting
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix DTLS Retransmission Buffer Bug
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Don't change state when answering DTLS ClientHello.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix DTLS fragment reassembly bug.
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Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Fix bug in bitmask macros and stop warnings.
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Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Fixed various DTLS fragment reassembly bugs patch for 0.9.8.
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Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Fix various DTLS fragment reassembly bugs.
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Clear error queue in a few places in SSL code where errors are expected
so they don't stay in the queue.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Add Renegotiation extension to DTLS, fix DTLS ClientHello processing bug.
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Submitted by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Use EVP_MD_size() in OpenSSL 0.9.8.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
DTLS Fragment size bug fix.
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Submitted by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Correct BIO_ctrl error handling
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
DTLS timeout handling fix.
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Submitted by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Replace ad-hoc chain builder with X509_verify_cert().
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Fix DTLS retransmission bug.
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Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
DTLS fragment bug.
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HEAD with a twist: server interoperates with non-compliant client.
PR: 1587
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server interoperates with non-compliant pre-0.9.8f.
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