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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19914)
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Fixes #20084
In the 3.0 provider implementation the generic code that handles IV's
only allows a 12 byte IV. Older code intentionally added the ability for
the IV to be truncated.
As this truncation is unsafe, the documentation has been updated to
state that this in no longer allowed. The code has been updated to
produce an error when the iv length is set to any value other than 12.
NOTE: It appears that this additional padding may have originated from the code
which uses a 12 byte IV, that is then passed to CHACHA which zero pads it to 16 bytes.
Note that legacy behaviour in e_chacha20_poly1305.c has not been
updated.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20151)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20109)
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Context parameter OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE can now also be
retrieved for ECDSA and DSA.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20070)
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CPACF does not support pre-hashing. This was considered correctly for
Ed25519ph, but not for Ed448ph which lead to errors in the test_evp suite
(test vector 20 - pre-hashing without context string). Fix this by using the
non-accelerated version of Ed448 also if no context string is provided, but
pre-hashing is performed.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20067)
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In EC key generation, if allocation of struct ec_gen_ctx fails, values
provided by parameters are copied into the context at represented by a NULL
pointer. To fix this, prevent copy if allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20055)
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CPACF does not directly support xofs. Emulate this by using single block
operations on an empty input block.
Fixes: affc070aabc9 ("s390x: Optimize kmac")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19983)
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Fixes #6277
Description:
Make each of the five EdDSA instances defined in RFC 8032 -- Ed25519,
Ed25519ctx, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph -- available via the EVP APIs.
The desired EdDSA instance is specified via an OSSL_PARAM.
All instances, except for Ed25519, allow context strings as input.
Context strings are passed via an OSSL_PARAM. For Ed25519ctx, the
context string must be nonempty.
Ed25519, Ed25519ctx, Ed448 are PureEdDSA instances, which means that
the full message (not a digest) must be passed to sign and verify
operations.
Ed25519ph, Ed448ph are HashEdDSA instances, which means that the input
message is hashed before sign and verify.
Testing:
All 21 test vectors from RFC 8032 have been added to evppkey_ecx.txt
(thanks to Shane Lontis for showing how to do that). Those 21 test
vectors are exercised by evp_test.c and cover all five instances.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19705)
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is used.
Fixes #19934
The existing code was looking for the digest size, and then returned
zero.
The example code in EVP_KDF-SS.pod has been corrected to not use a
digest.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19935)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19985)
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Fixes #19909
I have enforced a maximum bound still but it is much higher.
Note also that TLS13 still uses the 2048 buffer size.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19923)
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If x and y are all NULL, then it is unnecessary to do subsequent operations.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19905)
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Now that ACVP test vectors exist, support has been added for this mode.
See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf
Note that the test vectors used fairly large values for the input key
and the context, so the contraints for these has been increased from
256 to 512 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19916)
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
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FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
not use more than the digest length when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
J.-S. Coron shows in "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other
Signature Schemes. Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272 – 287. Springer Verlag,
2002." that longer salts than the output size of modern hash functions
do not increase security: "For example,for an application in which at
most one billion signatures will be generated, k0 = 30 bits of random
salt are actually sufficient to guarantee the same level of security as
RSA, and taking a larger salt does not increase the security level."
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19724)
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This PR is based off the contributions in PR #9223 by Jemmy1228.
It has been modified and reworked to:
(1) Work with providers
(2) Support ECDSA and DSA
(3) Add a KDF HMAC_DRBG implementation that shares code with the RAND HMAC_DRBG.
A nonce_type is passed around inside the Signing API's, in order to support any
future deterministic algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18809)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19777)
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Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19619)
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UNCOMPRESSED
Originally the code to im/export the EC pubkey was meant to be consumed
only by the im/export functions when crossing the provider boundary.
Having our providers exporting to a COMPRESSED format octet string made
sense to avoid memory waste, as it wasn't exposed outside the provider
API, and providers had all tools available to convert across the three
formats.
Later on, with #13139 deprecating the `EC_KEY_*` functions, more state
was added among the params imported/exported on an EC provider-native
key (including `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT`, although it
did not affect the format used to export `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`).
Finally, in #14800, `EVP_PKEY_todata()` was introduced and prominently
exposed directly to users outside the provider API, and the choice of
COMPRESSED over UNCOMPRESSED as the default became less sensible in
light of usability, given the latter is more often needed by
applications and protocols.
This commit fixes it, by using `EC_KEY_get_conv_form()` to get the
point format from the internal state (an `EC_KEY` under the hood) of the
provider-side object, and using it on
`EVP_PKEY_export()`/`EVP_PKEY_todata()` to format
`OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`.
The default for an `EC_KEY` was already UNCOMPRESSED, and it is altered
if the user sets `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` via
`EVP_PKEY_fromdata()`, `EVP_PKEY_set_params()`, or one of the
more specialized methods.
For symmetry, this commit also alters `ec_pkey_export_to()` in
`crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c`, part of the `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD` for legacy EC
keys: it exclusively used COMPRESSED format, and now it honors the
conversion format specified in the EC_KEY object being exported to a
provider when this function is called.
Expand documentation about `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY` and mention the
3.1 change in behavior for our providers.
Fixes #16595
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19681)
(cherry picked from commit 926db476bc669fdcc4c4d2f1cb547060bdbfa153)
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This supports all the modes, suites and export mechanisms defined
in RFC9180 and should be relatively easily extensible if/as new
suites are added. The APIs are based on the pseudo-code from the
RFC, e.g. OSS_HPKE_encap() roughly maps to SetupBaseS(). External
APIs are defined in include/openssl/hpke.h and documented in
doc/man3/OSSL_HPKE_CTX_new.pod. Tests (test/hpke_test.c) include
verifying a number of the test vectors from the RFC as well as
round-tripping for all the modes and suites. We have demonstrated
interoperability with other HPKE implementations via a fork [1]
that implements TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) which uses HPKE.
@slontis provided huge help in getting this done and this makes
extensive use of the KEM handling code from his PR#19068.
[1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/ECH-draft-13c
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17172)
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And so clean a few useless includes
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19721)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19678)
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Also add negative test cases for CMAC and GMAC using
a cipher with wrong mode.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19401)
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Fixes #19524
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19525)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19529)
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SYS$GETTIM_PREC is a very new function, only available on OpenVMS v8.4.
OpenSSL binaries built on OpenVMS v8.4 become unusable on older OpenVM
versions, but building for the older CRTL version will make the high
precision time functions unavailable.
Tests have shown that on Alpha and Itanium, the time update granularity
between SYS$GETTIM and SYS$GETTIM_PREC is marginal, so the former plus
a sequence number turns out to be better to guarantee a unique nonce.
Fixes #18727
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18731)
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This function isn't called from anywhere and cannot easily be used
by the current RNG infrastructure.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19493)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19375)
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Including RIPEMD160 in both the default and legacy providers shouldn't break
anyone and makes the algorithm available more readily.
Fixes #17722
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19375)
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Fixes #19290
update rsa_set_ctx_params() so that the digest function used in the
MGF1 construction is set correctly. Add a test for this to
evp_extra_test.c based on the code scaro-axway provided in #19290.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19342)
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Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
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The IKM was not respected by the s390x specific implementations of X25519 and
X448 keygen. This caused test failures and wrong results if the PCC
instruction was actually available and supported X25519 and/or X448.
Fixes: 78c44b05945b ("Add HPKE DHKEM provider support for EC, X25519 and X448.")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19278)
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The code is derived from @sftcd's work in PR #17172.
This PR puts the DHKEM algorithms into the provider layer as
KEM algorithms for EC and ECX.
This PR only implements the DHKEM component of HPKE as specified in
RFC 9180.
crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c has been added for fuctions that will
be shared between DHKEM and HPKE.
API's for EVP_PKEY_auth_encapsulate_init() and EVP_PKEY_auth_decapsulate_init()
have been added to support authenticated encapsulation. auth_init() functions
were chosen rather that a EVP_PKEY_KEM_set_auth() interface to support
future algorithms that could possibly need different init functions.
Internal code has been refactored, so that it can be shared between the DHKEM
and other systems. Since DHKEM operates on low level keys it needs to be
able to do low level ECDH and ECXDH calls without converting the keys
back into EVP_PKEY/EVP_PKEY_CTX form. See ossl_ecx_compute_key(),
ossl_ec_public_from_private()
DHKEM requires API's to derive a key using a seed (IKM). This did not sit
well inside the DHKEM itself as dispatch functions. This functionality
fits better inside the EC and ECX keymanagers keygen, since
they are just variations of keygen where the private key is generated
in a different manner. This should mainly be used for testing purposes.
See ossl_ec_generate_key_dhkem().
It supports this by allowing a settable param to be passed to keygen
(See OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DHKEM_IKM).
The keygen calls code within ec and ecx dhkem implementation to handle this.
See ossl_ecx_dhkem_derive_private() and ossl_ec_dhkem_derive_private().
These 2 functions are also used by the EC/ECX DHKEM implementations to generate
the sender ephemeral keys.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19068)
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Fixes #18020.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18070)
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Properly fallback to the default implementation on CPUs
missing necessary instructions.
Fixes #19163
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19182)
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It looks like a typo when copy & pasting the structure from blowfish.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19186)
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Use a single definiton for protocol string defintions.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19122)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18308)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18819)
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The current code has issues when sizeof(long) <> sizeof(size_t). The two
types are assumed to be interchangeable and them being different will
cause crashes and endless loops.
This fix limits the maximum chunk size for many of the symmetric ciphers
to 2^30 bytes. This chunk size limits the amount of data that will
be encrypted/decrypted in one lump. The code internally handles block
of data later than the chunk limit, so this will present no difference
to the caller. Any loss of efficiency due to limiting the chunking to
1Gbyte rather than more should be insignificant.
Fixes Coverity issues:
1508498, 1508500 - 1508505, 1508507 - 1508527, 1508529 - 1508533,
1508535 - 1508537, 1508539, 1508541 - 1508549, 1508551 - 1508569 &
1508571 - 1508582.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18997)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18132)
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If the public key is not set on the key, return error instead of crash.
Fixes #18495
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18902)
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The s390x provides its custom implementation for the creation of the
ed448 and ed25519 signatures. Unfortunately it does not set the size.
Users that rely of this return parameter end up with wrong values and
will compare wrong sizes of signature.
Set the proper size of the returned signature on success. Set an error
if the signing operation fails.
Fixes: #18912
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18928)
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Fixes #18911
`BSWAP`x/`GETU`xx are no-ops on big-endian. Change the byte swapper.
Fix big-endian issues in the `mulx_ghash()` function
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18920)
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Fixes #16721
This uses AES-ECB to create a counter mode AES-CTR32 (32bit counter, I could
not get AES-CTR to work as-is), and GHASH to implement POLYVAL. Optimally,
there would be separate polyval assembly implementation(s), but the only one
I could find (and it was SSE2 x86_64 code) was not Apache 2.0 licensed.
This implementation lives only in the default provider; there is no legacy
implementation.
The code offered in #16721 is not used; that implementation sits on top of
OpenSSL, this one is embedded inside OpenSSL.
Full test vectors from RFC8452 are included, except the 0 length plaintext;
that is not supported; and I'm not sure it's worthwhile to do so.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18693)
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It shouldn't be. This moves the reset to the init function instead and only
does the reset on a key change.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18860)
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Use hardware acceleration for kmac on s390x. Since klmd does not support
kmac, perform padding of the last block by hand and use kimd. Yields a
performance improvement of between 2x and 3x.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18863)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18480)
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