| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
The new naming scheme consistently usese the `OSSL_FUNC_` prefix for all
functions which are dispatched between the core and providers.
This change includes in particular all up- and downcalls, i.e., the
dispatched functions passed from core to provider and vice versa.
- OSSL_core_ -> OSSL_FUNC_core_
- OSSL_provider_ -> OSSL_FUNC_core_
For operations and their function dispatch tables, the following convention
is used:
Type | Name (evp_generic_fetch(3)) |
---------------------|-----------------------------------|
operation | OSSL_OP_FOO |
function id | OSSL_FUNC_FOO_FUNCTION_NAME |
function "name" | OSSL_FUNC_foo_function_name |
function typedef | OSSL_FUNC_foo_function_name_fn |
function ptr getter | OSSL_FUNC_foo_function_name |
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12222)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12222)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11914)
|
|
With capabilities we can query a provider about what it can do.
Initially we support a "TLS-GROUP" capability.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11914)
|
|
functions are now EVP_MAC functions, usually with ctx in their names.
Before 3.0 is released, the names are mutable and this prevents more
inconsistencies being introduced.
There are no functional or code changes.
Just the renaming and a little reformatting.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11997)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12043)
|
|
Dependencies on generated files must be declared explicitly. When
refactoring the DER code in providers/common/der, a few of those
dependency declaration were omitted, which may lead to build errors in
a parallel build.
Some cleanup and extensive used of build.info variables is done while
at it, to avoid unnecessary repetition.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11906)
|
|
This splits up all the providers/common/der/*.c.in so the generated
portion is on its own and all related DER writing routines are in
their own files. This also ensures that the DIGEST consstants aren't
reproduced in several files (resulting in symbol clashes).
Finally, the production of OID macros is moved to the generated header
files, allowing other similar macros, or DER constant arrays, to be
built on top of them.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11868)
|
|
A provider could be linked against a different version of libcrypto than
the version of libcrypto that loaded the provider. Different versions of
libcrypto could define opaque types differently. It must never occur that
a type created in one libcrypto is used directly by the other libcrypto.
This will cause crashes.
We can "cheat" for "built-in" providers that are part of libcrypto itself,
because we know that the two libcrypto versions are the same - but not for
other providers.
To ensure this does not occur we use different types names for the handful
of opaque types that are passed between the core and providers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11758)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11839)
|
|
The problem encountered is that some arrays were deemed unnecessary by
clang, for example:
providers/common/der/der_rsa.c:424:28: error: variable 'der_aid_sha224Identifier' is not needed and will not be emitted [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
static const unsigned char der_aid_sha224Identifier[] = {
^
However, these arrays are used in sizeof() expressions in other parts
of the code that's actually used, making that warning-turned-error a
practical problem. We solve this by making the array non-static,
which guarantees that the arrays will be emitted, even though
unnecessarily. Fortunately, they are very small.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
|
|
We separate out the NIST arc OIDs to a separate file, so it can be
re-used, and also the DIGEST OIDs.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11803)
|
|
The provider context structure is made to include the following information:
- The core provider handle (first argument to the provider init
function). This handle is meant to be used in all upcalls that need
it.
- A library context, used for any libcrypto calls that need it, done in
the provider itself.
Regarding the library context, that's generally only needed if the
provider makes any libcrypto calls, i.e. is linked with libcrypto. That
happens to be the case for all OpenSSL providers, but is applicable for
other providers that use libcrypto internally as well.
The normal thing to do for a provider init function is to create its own
library context. For a provider that's meant to become a dynamically
loadable module, this is what MUST be done.
However, we do not do that in the default provider; it uses the library
context associated with the core provider handle instead. This is
permissible, although generally discouraged, as long as the provider in
question is guaranteed to be built-in, into libcrypto or into the
application that uses it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11803)
|
|
Partial Fix for #11648.
Some additional work still needs to be done to support RSA-PSS mode.
RSA legacy digests will be addressed in another PR.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11681)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11696)
|
|
This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should
become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing.
Fixes #11538
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11328)
|
|
This replaces crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c with new code and generated OIDs
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11450)
|
|
This replaces crypto/dsa/dsa_aid.c with new code and generated OIDs
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11450)
|
|
This replaces crypto/rsa/rsa_aid.c with new code and generated OIDs
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11450)
|
|
This library is meant to be small and quick. It's based on WPACKET,
which was extended to support DER writing. The way it's used is a
bit unusual, as it's used to write the structures backward into a
given buffer. A typical quick call looks like this:
/*
* Fill in this structure:
*
* something ::= SEQUENCE {
* id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* x [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* y [1] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
* n INTEGER
* }
*/
unsigned char buf[nnnn], *p = NULL;
size_t encoded_len = 0;
WPACKET pkt;
int ok;
ok = WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, buf, sizeof(buf)
&& DER_w_start_sequence(&pkt, -1)
&& DER_w_bn(&pkt, -1, bn)
&& DER_w_boolean(&pkt, 1, bool)
&& DER_w_precompiled(&pkt, -1, OID, sizeof(OID))
&& DER_w_end_sequence(&pkt, -1)
&& WPACKET_finish(&pkt)
&& WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &encoded_len)
&& (p = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt)) != NULL;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11450)
|
|
We have an old OID database that's not as readable as would be
desired, and we have spots with hand coded DER for well known OIDs.
The perl modules added here give enough support that we can parse
OBJECT IDENTIFIER definitions and encode them as DER.
OpenSSL::OID is a general OID parsing and encoding of ASN.1
definitions, and supports enough of the X.680 syntax to understand
what we find in RFCs and similar documents and produce the DER
encoding for them.
oids_to_c is a specialized module to convert the DER encoding from
OpenSSL::OID to C code. This is primarily useful in file templates
that are processed with util/dofile.pl.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11450)
|
|
Some fetch failurs are ok and should be ignored.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11405)
|
|
At the moment we only provider support for these algorithms in the default
provider. These algorithms only support "one shot" EVP_DigestSign() and
EVP_DigestVerify() as per the existing libcrypto versions.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11261)
|
|
This includes legacy PSS controls to params conversion, and an attempt
to generalise the parameter names when they are suitable for more than
one operation.
Also added crypto/rsa/rsa_aid.c, containing proper AlgorithmIdentifiers
for known RSA+hash function combinations.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10557)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10964)
|
|
Because the libcrypto code has relinquished control of exact words to
express padding mode choices, we re-implement them in the appropriate
provider implementation.
For the sake of legacy controls, we maintain support for the numeric
form of the padding mode, but leave that support otherwise undeclared.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10947)
|
|
Also Add ability for providers to dynamically exclude cipher algorithms.
Cipher algorithms are only returned from providers if their capable() method is either NULL,
or the method returns 1.
This is mainly required for ciphers that only have hardware implementations.
If there is no hardware support, then the algorithm needs to be not available.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10146)
|
|
The idea to have all these things in providers/common was viable as
long as the implementations was spread around their main providers.
This is, however, no longer the case, so we move the common blocks
closer to the source that use them.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10564)
|
|
In TLSv1.2 a pre-master secret value is passed from the client to the
server encrypted using RSA PKCS1 type 2 padding in a ClientKeyExchange
message. As well as the normal formatting rules for RSA PKCA1 type 2
padding TLS imposes some additional rules about what constitutes a well
formed key. Specifically it must be exactly the right length and
encode the TLS version originally requested by the client (as opposed to
the actual negotiated version) in its first two bytes.
All of these checks need to be done in constant time and, if they fail,
then the TLS implementation is supposed to continue anyway with a random
key (and therefore the connection will fail later on). This avoids
padding oracle type attacks.
This commit implements this within the RSA padding code so that we keep
all the constant time padding logic in one place. A later commit will
remove it from libssl.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10411)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10394)
|
|
To support generic output of public keys wrapped in a X509_PUBKEY,
additional PEM and i2d/d2i routines are added for that type.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10394)
|
|
The BIO_vprintf() will allow the provider to print any text, given a
BIO supplied by libcrypto.
Additionally, we add a provider library with functions to collect all
the currently supplied BIO upcalls, as well as wrappers around those
upcalls.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10394)
|
|
If we call EVP_EncryptUpdate/EVP_DecryptUpdate with length 0 we should
be able to handle it. Most importantly we shouldn't get different
results if we do this compared to if we don't!
An exception is made for CCM mode which has special handling for this in
the low level cipher function.
Fixes #8675
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10530)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10487)
|
|
The asm modules may assume an input length > 0.
Fixes: #9262
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10323)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_keylen() was succeeding even though a bad key length
is passed to it. This is because the set_ctx_params() were all accepting
this parameter and blindly changing the keylen even though the cipher did
not accept a variable key length. Even removing this didn't entirely
resolve the issue because set_ctx_params() functions succeed even if
passed a parameter they do not recognise.
This should fix various issues found by OSSfuzz/Cryptofuzz.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10449)
|
|
Fixes #10438
issue found by clusterfuzz/ossfuzz
The dest was getting a copy of the src structure which contained a pointer that should point to an offset inside itself - because of the copy it was pointing to the original structure.
The setup for a ctx is mainly done by the initkey method in the PROV_CIPHER_HW structure. Because of this it makes sense that the structure should also contain a copyctx method that is use to resolve any pointers that need to be setup.
A dup_ctx has been added to the cipher_enc tests in evp_test. It does a dup after setup and then frees the original ctx. This detects any floating pointers in the duplicated context that were pointing back to the freed ctx.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10443)
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10152)
|
|
It contains only one function, which should only get added to non-FIPS
providers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10389)
|
|
Previous macros suggested that from 3.0, we're only allowed to
deprecate things at a major version. However, there's no policy
stating this, but there is for removal, saying that to remove
something, it must have been deprecated for 5 years, and that removal
can only happen at a major version.
Meanwhile, the semantic versioning rule is that deprecation should
trigger a MINOR version update, which is reflected in the macro names
as of this change.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10364)
|
|
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9949)
|
|
Implement SP800-108 section 5.2 with CMAC support. As a side effect,
enable 5.1 with CMAC and 5.2 with HMAC. Add test vectors from RFC 6803.
Add OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CIPHER and PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10143)
|
|
Not needed any more, since the presence of the OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER
function is enough to tell that there's a custom cipher function.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10137)
|
|
This involves gcm_cipher() (providers/common/ciphers/cipher_gcm.c),
ccm_cipher() (providers/common/ciphers/cipher_ccm.c), and
tdes_wrap_cipher() (providers/common/ciphers/cipher_tdes_wrap.c)
These are generic implementations of the OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER
function, which returned -1 on error when they should return 0.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10137)
|
|
The end up in providers/common/include/prov/.
All inclusions are adjusted accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
|
