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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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No, we should just delete it. And updated the README
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Remove asn1-kludge option from the req utility. It was a decade old
workaround for CAs and software which required an invalid encoding
of PKCS#10 certificate requests: omitting the attributes field even
though it is not OPTIONAL.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Apparently, emacs sees changes to auto-fill-mode as insecure
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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This file, when copied to .dir-locals.el in the OpenSSL source top,
will make sure that the CC mode style "OpenSSL-II" will be used for
all C files.
Additionally, I makes sure that tabs are never used as indentation
character, regardless of the emacs mode, and that the fill column is
78.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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This hopefully conforms closely enough to the current code style.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error. Also update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Make all mention of digest algorithm use "any supported algorithm"
RT2071, some new manpages from Victor B. Wagner <vitus@cryptocom.ru>:
X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod
X509_check_ca.pod
X509_check_issued.pod
RT 1600:
Remove references to non-existant objects(3)
Add RETURN VALUES to BIO_do_accept page.
RT1818:
RSA_sign Can return values other than 0 on failure.
RT3634:
Fix AES CBC aliases (Steffen Nurpmeso <sdaoden@yandex.com>)
RT3678:
Some clarifications to BIO_new_pair
(Devchandra L Meetei <dlmeetei@gmail.com>)
RT3787:
Fix some EVP_ function return values
(Laetitia Baudoin <lbaudoin@google.com>)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Came up on the mailing list, from Ken Goldman.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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L<foo|foo> is sub-optimal If the xref is the same as the title,
which is what we do, then you only need L<foo>. This fixes all
1457 occurrences in 349 files. Approximately. (And pod used to
need both.)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Clarify and update documention for extra chain certificates.
PR#3878.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
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Thanks folks:
348 Benjamin Kaduk
317 Christian Brueffer
254 Erik Tews
253 Erik Tews
219 Carl Mehner
155 (ghost)
95 mancha
51 DominikNeubauer
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Add support for loading verify and chain stores in SSL_CONF.
Commands to set verify mode and client CA names.
Add documentation.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Remove support for RSA_NET and Netscape key format (-keyform n).
Also removed documentation of SGC.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This reverts commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about
the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against
those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
Add BIO_CTX_secure_new so all BIGNUM's in the context are secure.
Contributed by Akamai Technologies under the Corporate CLA.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This is a workaround so old that nobody remembers what buggy clients
it was for. It's also been broken in stable branches for two years and
nobody noticed (see
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1694/).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The new accessors SSL_get_client_random, SSL_get_server_random and
SSL_SESSION_get_master_key should return a size_t to match the type of the
|outlen| parameter.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Change the new SSL_get_client_random(), SSL_get_server_random() and
SSL_SESSION_get_master_key() functions to use size_t for |outlen| instead of
int.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Tor uses these values to implement a low-rent clone of RFC 5705 (which,
in our defense, we came up with before RFC 5705 existed). But now that
ssl_st is opaque, we need another way to get at them.
Includes documentation, with suitable warnings about not actually
using these functions.
Signed-off-by: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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