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DES's keyschedules.
I know these two should be separate, and I'll back out the DES changes if they
are deemed to be an error.
Note that there is a memory leak lurking in SSL somewhere in this version.
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HP-UX in common in ./config). Note that for the moment of this writing
none of 64-bit platforms pass bntest. I'm committing this anyway as it's
too frustrating to patch snapshots over and over while 0.9.6 is known to
work.
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circumstances.
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Split private key PEM and normal PEM handling. Private key
handling needs to link in stuff like PKCS#8.
Relocate the ASN1 *_dup() functions, to the relevant ASN1
modules using new macro IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION. Previously
these were all in crypto/x509/x_all.c along with every ASN1
BIO/fp function which linked in *every* ASN1 function if
a single dup was used.
Move the authority key id ASN1 structure to a separate file.
This is used in the X509 routines and its previous location
linked in all the v3 extension code.
Also move ASN1_tag2bit to avoid linking in a_bytes.c which
is now largely obsolete.
So far under Linux stripped binary with single PEM_read_X509
is now 238K compared to 380K before these changes.
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reduce linker bloat. For example the
single line:
PEM_read_X509()
results in a binary of around 400K in Linux!
This first step separates some of the PEM functions and
avoids linking in some PKCS#7 and PKCS#12 code.
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or bogus DH parameters can be used for launching DOS attacks
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Submitted by: Travis Vitek <vitek@roguewave.com>
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OpenBSD /dev/crypto (this will be revamped later when the appropriate machinery
is available).
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does not contain more bytes than the RSA modulus 'n' - it does not check
that the input is strictly *less* than 'n'. Whether this should be the
case or not is open to debate - however, due to security problems with
returning miscalculated CRT results, the 'rsa_mod_exp' implementation in
rsa_eay.c now performs a public-key exponentiation to verify the CRT result
and in the event of an error will instead recalculate and return a non-CRT
(more expensive) mod_exp calculation. As the mod_exp of 'I' is equivalent
to the mod_exp of 'I mod n', and the verify result is automatically between
0 and n-1 inclusive, the verify only matches the input if 'I' was less than
'n', otherwise even a correct CRT calculation is only congruent to 'I' (ie.
they differ by a multiple of 'n'). Rather than rejecting correct
calculations and doing redundant and slower ones instead, this changes the
equality check in the verification code to a congruence check.
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certificate so need to match its subject with the certificate IDs in the
response.
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the term "simultaneous multiplication" (which -- acording to the
paper, at least -- applies only to certain methods which we don't use
here)
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SSL according to RFC 2712. His comment is:
This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication. I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week. The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients. The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .
Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct. I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field. I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
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for encrypt?).
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Worth around 5% for encrypt. Slows down decrypt slightly, but I expect to
regain that later.
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used.
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Changes to have OpenSSL compile on OS/2.
Contributed by "Brian Havard" <brianh@kheldar.apana.org.au>
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Contributed by "Brian Havard" <brianh@kheldar.apana.org.au>
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