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This (re-)allows RSA-PSS signers
Fixes #13931
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13982)
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SRP_Calc_client_key calls BN_mod_exp with private data. However it was
not setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME and therefore not using the constant time
implementation. This could be exploited in a side channel attack to
recover the password.
Since the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL
threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned.
Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this
issue.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13889)
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...in case the candidate issuer cert is identical to the target cert.
Fixes #13739
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13749)
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to invalid cert
This is the backport of #13755 to v1.1.1.
Fixes #13698
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13756)
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Fixes #13840
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13857)
(cherry picked from commit 4369a882a565c42673b28c586a5c46a8bca98d17)
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when possible using the getauxval equivalent which has similar ids as Linux, instead of bad instructions catch approach.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13650)
(cherry picked from commit 5eb24fbd1c3e0d130ba7f81f1ccf457a2b9d75ad)
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Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13821)
(cherry picked from commit b57ec7394aace731c460b509aa84039274337600)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13772)
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I.e.:
error: out of range immediate fixup value
This fix is identical to one of the changes made in 3405db9, which I
discovered right after taking a quick stab at fixing this.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #7878
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13757)
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This backports #13764.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13769)
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Backport of #13394
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13637)
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When X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() receives an invalid NID (e.g., -1), return
failure rather than silently constructing a broken X509_ATTRIBUTE object
that might cause NULL pointer accesses later on. This matters because
X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() is used by API functions like PKCS7_add_attribute(3)
and the NID comes straight from the user.
This bug was found while working on LibreSSL documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12052)
(cherry picked from commit c4b2c53fadb158bee34aef90d5a7d500aead1f70)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to have implicit
tagging. If we have a template that uses the in this way then we
should immediately fail.
Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
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It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to use implicit
tagging since the content would be ambiguous. It is an error in the
template if this ever happens. If we detect it we should stop parsing.
Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
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If a GENERAL_NAME field contained EdiPartyName data then it was
incorrectly being handled as type "other". This could lead to a
segmentation fault.
Many thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
CVE-2020-1971
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
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EDIPartyName has 2 fields that use a DirectoryString. However they were
marked as implicit tagging - which is not correct for a CHOICE type.
Additionally the partyName field was marked as Optional when, according to
RFC5280 it is not.
Many thanks to github user @filipnavara for reporting this issue. Also to
David Benjamin from Google who independently identified and reported it.
Fixes #6859
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
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The certificate path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280 does not
include checking the validity period of the trusted (root) certificate.
Still it is common good practice to perform this check.
Also OpenSSL did this until version 1.1.1h, yet
commit e2590c3a162eb118c36b09c2168164283aa099b4 accidentally killed it.
The current commit restores the previous behavior.
It also removes the cause of that bug, namely counter-intuitive design
of the internal function check_issued(), which was complicated by checks
that actually belong to some other internal function, namely find_issuer().
Moreover, this commit adds a regression check and proper documentation of
the root cert validity period check feature, which had been missing so far.
Fixes #13471
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13585)
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ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are affected
by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1], respectively, where the
second instruction of a AES instruction pair may execute twice if an
interrupt is taken right after the first instruction consumes an input
register of which a single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it
was modified.
This is not such a rare occurrence as it may seem: in counter mode, only
the least significant 32-bit word is incremented in the absence of a
carry, which makes our counter mode implementation susceptible to these
errata.
So let's shuffle the counter assignments around a bit so that the most
recent updates when the AES instruction pair executes are 128-bit wide.
[0] ARM-EPM-049219 v23 Cortex-A57 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
[1] ARM-EPM-012079 v11.0 Cortex-A72 MPCore Software Developers Errata Notice
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13571)
(cherry picked from commit 26217510d21cd4d5928db8bff41c6756a7c7a636)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13515)
(cherry picked from commit a614af95531dd9f168aa4b71bd1195b4fdfe1794)
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Fixes #13082
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13106)
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PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
the control flow. However, this requires that the AUTIASP is issued with
SP holding the same value as it held when the PAC value was generated.
The Poly1305 armv8 code got this wrong, resulting in crashes on PAC
capable hardware.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13256)
(cherry picked from commit fcf6e9d056162d5af64c6f7209388a5c3be2ce57)
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This unifies the behaviour of a single certificate with
an unknown CA certificate with a self-signed certificate.
The user callback can mask that error to retrieve additional
error information. So the user application can decide to
abort the connection instead to be forced by openssl.
This change in behaviour is backward compatible as user callbacks
who don't want to ignore UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE will
still abort the connection by default.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #11297
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11359)
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request #11464)
Cherry-pick of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13056 for branch 1.1.1. Tested against
the release 1.1.1h
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13218)
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Fixes #10638
Fixes #13188
Fixes a bug for aarch64 bigendian with instructions 'st1' and 'ld1' on AES-GCM mode.
CLA: trivial
(cherry picked from commit bc8b648f744566031ce84d77333dbbcb9689e975)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13193)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13062)
(cherry picked from commit 796948cd733d2bd0d8acbaf2354c718bcd4352a6)
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Several embedded toolchains may provide dummy implemented getentropy()
function which always returns -1 and sets errno to the ENOSYS.
As a result the function SSL_CTX_new() fails to create a new context.
Fixes #13002
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13112)
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Since glibc 2.8, these defines like `NI_MAXHOST` are exposed only
if suitable feature test macros are defined, namely: _GNU_SOURCE,
_DEFAULT_SOURCE (since glibc 2.19), or _BSD_SOURCE or _SVID_SOURCE
(before glibc 2.19), see GETNAMEINFO(3).
CLA: trivial
Fixes #13049
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13054)
(cherry picked from commit 99501e817cbc4f11cc045dbaa7a81854d4349335)
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Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12949)
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OCSP_basic_sign_ctx() in ocsp_srv.c , does not check for RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK.
If a key has RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK set, OCSP sign operations can fail
because the X509_check_private_key() can fail.
The check for the RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK was moved to crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
as a common place to check. Checks in ssl_rsa.c were removed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12419)
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The check is applied only with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Fixes #12139
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12909)
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The function returns 1 when the encoding of a decoded EC key used
explicit encoding of the curve parameters.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12909)
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Fix this error:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3853: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r10'
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3854: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r12'
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3855: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orrs r11,r14'
CLA: trivial
Fixes #12848
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
GH: #12854
(cherry picked from commit b5f82567afa820bac55b7dd7eb9dd510c32c3ef6)
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The original names were more intuitive: the generate_counter counts the
number of generate requests, and the reseed_counter counts the number
of reseedings (of the principal DRBG).
reseed_gen_counter -> generate_counter
reseed_prop_counter -> reseed_counter
This partially reverts commit 35a34508ef4d649ace4e373e1d019192b7e38c36.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12759)
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In a nutshell, reseed propagation is a compatibility feature with the sole
purpose to support the traditional way of (re-)seeding manually by calling
'RAND_add()' before 'RAND_bytes(). It ensures that the former has an immediate
effect on the latter *within the same thread*, but it does not care about
immediate reseed propagation to other threads. The implementation is lock-free,
i.e., it works without taking the lock of the primary DRBG.
Pull request #7399 not only fixed the data race issue #7394 but also changed
the original implementation of the seed propagation unnecessarily.
This commit reverts most of the changes of commit 1f98527659b8 and intends to
fix the data race while retaining the original simplicity of the seed propagation.
- use atomics with relaxed semantics to load and store the seed counter
- add a new member drbg->enable_reseed_propagation to simplify the
overflow treatment of the seed propagation counter
- don't handle races between different threads
This partially reverts commit 1f98527659b8290d442c4e1532452b9ba6463f1e.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12759)
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Fixes #12471
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12533)
(cherry picked from commit 4348995b0d818203f37ffa51c9bdf4488cf24bad)
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x_algor.c: Explicit null dereferenced
cms_sd.c: Resource leak
ts_rsp_sign.c Resource Leak
extensions_srvr.c: Resourse Leak
v3_alt.c: Resourse Leak
pcy_data.c: Resource Leak
cms_lib.c: Resource Leak
drbg_lib.c: Unchecked return code
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12531)
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PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional() uses i2d_PrivateKey() to do the
actual encoding to DER. However, i2d_PrivateKey() is a generic
function that will do what it can to produce output according to what
the associated EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD offers. If that method offers a
function 'old_priv_encode', which is expected to produce the
"traditional" encoded form, then i2d_PrivateKey() uses that. If not,
i2d_PrivateKey() will go on and used more modern methods, which are
all expected to produce PKCS#8.
To ensure that PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional() never produces
more modern encoded forms, an extra check that 'old_priv_encode' is
non-NULL is added. If it is NULL, an error is returned.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12729)
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For example, FreeBSD prepends "FreeBSD" to version string, e.g.,
FreeBSD clang version 11.0.0 (git@github.com:llvm/llvm-project.git llvmorg-11.0.0-rc2-0-g414f32a9e86)
Target: x86_64-unknown-freebsd13.0
Thread model: posix
InstalledDir: /usr/bin
This prevented us from properly detecting AVX support, etc.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12725)
(cherry picked from commit cd84d8832d274357a5ba5433640d7ef76691b1ac)
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If a presumably self-signed cert is last in chain we verify its signature
only if X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE is set. Upon this request we do the
signature verification, but not in case it is a (non-conforming) self-issued
CA certificate with a key usage extension that does not include keyCertSign.
Make clear when we must verify the signature of a certificate
and when we must adhere to key usage restrictions of the 'issuing' cert.
Add some comments for making internal_verify() easier to understand.
Update the documentation of X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12357)
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Move check that cert signing is allowed from x509v3_cache_extensions() to
where it belongs: internal_verify(), generalize it for proxy cert signing.
Correct and simplify check_issued(), now checking self-issued (not: self-signed).
Add test case to 25-test_verify.t that demonstrates successful fix.
As prerequisites, this adds the static function check_sig_alg_match()
and the internal functions x509_likely_issued() and x509_signing_allowed().
This is a backport of the core of PR #10587.
Fixes #1418
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12357)
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Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11526)
(cherry picked from commit c35b8535768e22cd3b7743f4887a72e53a621a5f)
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its miscompilation of the function.
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008465.html
Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11526)
(cherry picked from commit 7a09fab2b3d201062a2cc07c1a40d09d61ea31bd)
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Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11526)
(cherry picked from commit 6c2a56beec847da18e5ac60a30219f0dea39baf9)
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The following built-in curves do not have an assigned OID:
- Oakley-EC2N-3
- Oakley-EC2N-4
In general we shouldn't assume that an OID is always available.
This commit detects such cases, raises an error and returns appropriate
return values so that the condition can be detected and correctly
handled by the callers, when serializing EC parameters or EC keys with
the default `ec_param_enc:named_curve`.
Fixes #12306
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12312)
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The mmap function never returns NULL. If an error occurs, the function returns MAP_FAILED.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12187)
(cherry picked from commit 1d78129dd205e3e85083a91c33540a70c51b0a23)
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Closes #12129
As described in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/12129 the
readability of the internal functions providing the two alternative
implementations for `BN_mod_inverse()` is a bit lacking.
Both these functions are now completely internal, so we have the
flexibility needed to slightly improve readability and remove
unnecessary NULL checks.
The main changes here are:
- rename `BN_mod_inverse_no_branch()` as `bn_mod_inverse_no_branch()`:
this function is `static` so it is not even visible within the rest of
libcrypto. By convention upcase prefixes are reserved for public
functions.
- remove `if (pnoinv == NULL)` checks in `int_bn_mod_inverse()`: this
function is internal to the BN module and we can guarantee that all
callers pass non-NULL arguments.
- `bn_mod_inverse_no_branch()` takes an extra `int *pnoinv` argument, so
that it can signal if no inverse exists for the given inputs: in this
way the caller is in charge of raising `BN_R_NO_INVERSE` as it is the
case for the non-consttime implementation of `int_bn_mod_inverse()`.
- `BN_mod_inverse()` is a public function and must guarantee that the
internal functions providing the actual implementation receive valid
arguments. If the caller passes a NULL `BN_CTX` we create a temporary
one for internal use.
- reorder function definitions in `crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c` to avoid forward
declaration of `static` functions (in preparation for inlining)
- inline `bn_mod_inverse_no_branch()`.
(Backport to 1.1.1 from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12142)
(cherry picked from commit 5d8b3a3ef2941b8822523742a0408ca6896aa65d)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12169)
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EVP_Cipher() is a very low level routine that directly calls the
underlying cipher function. It's return value semantics are very odd.
Depending on the type of cipher 0 or -1 is returned on error. We should
just check for <=0 for a failure.
Fixes #11957
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12107)
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If the CMAC_CTX is partially initialised then we make a note of this so
that future operations will fail if the initialisation has not been
completed.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12107)
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This is a simple check order correction.
Fixes #12143
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12144)
(cherry picked from commit 0800288e6e1d9f44d471043a970ba57743ca8f4c)
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