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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12043)
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This can happen if the 32-bit counter overflows
and the last block is not a multiple of 16 bytes.
Fixes #12012
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12016)
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PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(), i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(),
PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(), and i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp() are affected
by this.
Fixes #11845
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11855)
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Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11928)
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Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11983)
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Unfortunately -Ofast seems to break that check.
Fixes #11994
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12003)
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The underlying functions remain and these are widely used.
This undoes the deprecation part of PR8442
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12001)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11971)
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There is a problem casting ULONG_MAX to double which clang-10 is warning about.
ULONG_MAX typically cannot be exactly represented as a double. ULONG_MAX + 1
can be and this fix uses the latter, however since ULONG_MAX cannot be
represented exactly as a double number we subtract 65535 from this number,
and the result has at most 48 leading one bits, and can therefore be
represented as a double integer without rounding error. By adding
65536.0 to this number we achive the correct result, which should avoid the
warning.
The addresses a symptom of the underlying problem: we print doubles via an
unsigned long integer. Doubles have a far greater range and should be printed
better.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11955)
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As of the previous commit, when a zero-length (string) parameter
is present in the parameters passed to a provider for a given operation,
we will produce an object corresponding to that zero-length parameter,
indicating to the underlying cryptographic operation that the parameter
was passed. However, rsa_cms_decrypt() was relying on the previous
behavior, and unconditionally tried to call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() even when the implicit default label
was used (and thus the relevant local variable was still NULL).
In the new setup that distinguishes present-but-empty and absent
more clearly, it is an error to attempt to set a NULL parameter,
even if it is zero-length.
Exercise more caution when setting parameters, and do not call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() when there is not actually a
label provided.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
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Prior to this commit, if a string (or octet string) parameter
was present but indicated it was zero-length, we would return success
but with a NULL output value. This can be problematic in cases where
there is a protocol-level distinction between parameter-absent and
parameter-present-but-zero-length, which is uncommon but can happen.
Since OPENSSL_malloc() returns NULL for zero-length allocation requests,
make a dummy allocation for this case, to give a signal that the string
parameter does exist but has zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
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If we failed to fetch an EVP_KEYMGMT then we were falling back to legacy.
This is because some algorithms (such as MACs and KDFs used via an old
style EVP_PKEY) have not been transferred to providers.
Unfortunately this means that you cannot stop some algorithms from being
used by not loading the provider.
For example if you wanted to prevent RSA from being used, you might expect
to just not load any providers that make it available. Unfortunately that
doesn't work because we simply fall back to legacy if we fail to fetch
the EVP_KEYMGMT.
Instead we should fail *unless* the key type is one of those legacy key
types that we have not transferred.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11826)
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Fixes: #4983
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6074)
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EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11953)
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for signing certificate V2 and signing certificate extensions.
CAdES: lowercase name for now internal methods.
crypto/cms: generated file changes.
Add some CHANGES entries.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8098)
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Fixes #11904
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11959)
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document it
Fixes #11870
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11894)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11894)
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Renamed some values in core_names i.e Some DH specific names were changed to use DH instead of FFC.
Added some strings values related to RSA keys.
Moved set_params related docs out of EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod into its own file.
Updated Keyexchange and signature code and docs.
Moved some common DSA/DH docs into a shared EVP_PKEY-FFC.pod.
Moved Ed25519.pod into EVP_SIGNATURE-ED25519.pod and reworked it.
Added some usage examples. As a result of the usage examples the following change was also made:
ec allows OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH as a settable gen parameter.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11610)
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doc/man3/ERR_error_string.pod
Fixes #11743
The ouput format had 2 issues that caused it not to match the expected documented format:
(1) At some point the thread id printing was changed to use the OPENSSL_hex2str method which puts ':' between hex bytes.
An internal function that skips the seperator has been added.
(2) The error code no longer exists. So this was completely removed from the string. It is now replaced by ::
As an example:
00:77:6E:52:14:7F:00:00:error:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1135:
Is now:
00776E52147F0000:error::asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1135:
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11789)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11941)
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This should fix 2 issues detected by Coverity and introduced with
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11807
- CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
- CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
In practice the tests seem to show that they both aren't real issues,
yet I believe this small change should appease the scanner and at the
same time improve clarity for the reader.
Here is the original report:
```
** CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118 if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119 ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121 else
1122 /* use default */
CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
Passing "&point" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123 ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127 BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128 #endif
** CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118 if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119 ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121 else
1122 /* use default */
CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
Passing "&p_scalar" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123 ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127 BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128 #endif
```
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11919)
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include/openssl/crmf.h
fixes #11818
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11911)
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EVP_PKEYs with provider side internal keys got the key type
EVP_PKEY_NONE. This turned out to be too disruptive, so we try
instead to find a matching EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and use whatever
EVP_PKEY type it uses.
To make internal coding easier, we introduce a few internal macros to
distinguish what can be expected from a EVP_PKEY:
- evp_pkey_is_blank(), to detect an unassigned EVP_PKEY.
- evp_pkey_is_typed(), to detect that an EVP_PKEY has been assigned a
type, which may be an old style type number or a EVP_KEYMGMT method.
- evp_pkey_is_assigned(), to detect that an EVP_PKEY has been assigned
an key value.
- evp_pkey_is_legacy(), to detect that the internal EVP_PKEY key is a
legacy one, i.e. will be handled via an EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and an
EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
- evp_pkey_is_provided(), to detect that the internal EVP_PKEY key is
a provider side one, i.e. will be handdled via an EVP_KEYMGMT and
other provider methods.
This also introduces EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT, to indicate that this EVP_PKEY
contains a provider side key for which there are no known
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs or EVP_PKEY_METHODs, i.e. these can only be
handled via EVP_KEYMGMT and other provider methods.
Fixes #11823
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11913)
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This fixes a strict aliasing issue in ui_dup_method_data.
The parameter type of CRYPTO_EX_dup's from_d parameter
is in fact void **, since it points to a pointer.
This function is rarely used, therefore fix the param type
although that may be considered an API breaking change.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2986)
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This fixes warnings detected by -Wstringop-truncation.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11878)
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If buggy application calls engine functions after cleanup of engines
already happened the global_engine_lock will be used although
already freed.
See for example:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1831086
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11896)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11892)
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This function only considered the built-in and application
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs, and is now amended with a loop that goes
through all loaded engines, using whatever table of methods they each
have.
Fixes #11861
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11872)
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In the FIPS module, the code as written generate an unconditional
error.
Fixes #11865
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11869)
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Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11874)
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Although there are platforms where int is 64 bit, 2GiB large BIGNUMs
instead of 4GiB should be "big enough for everybody".
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11857)
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This is needed to avoid automatic promotion to signed int.
Fixes #11853
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11857)
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./config --with-rand-seed=egd
need to defines OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD and OPENSSL_NO_EGD
so get rid of OPENSSL_NO_EGD (compiles but I did not really test EGD)
./config --with-rand-seed=devrandom
does not work since wait_random_seeded works under the assumption
that OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM is supposed to be enabled as well,
that is usually the case, but not when only devrandom is enabled.
Skip the wait code in this special case.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11848)
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This allows applications to iterate over all loaded providers.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11858)
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Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11851)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11442)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11442)
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When a desired algorithm wasn't available, we didn't register anywhere
that an attempt had been made, with the result that next time the same
attempt was made, the whole process would be done again.
To avoid this churn, we register a bit for each operation that has
been queried in the libcrypto provider object, and test it before
trying the same query and method construction loop again.
If course, if the provider has told us not to cache, we don't register
this bit.
Fixes #11814
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11842)
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without error handling.
This takes up the ball from #11278
without trying to solve everything at once.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11850)
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(EPERM, Linux)
Signed-off-by: Maxim Zakharov <5158255+Maxime2@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11767)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11807)
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A provider could be linked against a different version of libcrypto than
the version of libcrypto that loaded the provider. Different versions of
libcrypto could define opaque types differently. It must never occur that
a type created in one libcrypto is used directly by the other libcrypto.
This will cause crashes.
We can "cheat" for "built-in" providers that are part of libcrypto itself,
because we know that the two libcrypto versions are the same - but not for
other providers.
To ensure this does not occur we use different types names for the handful
of opaque types that are passed between the core and providers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11758)
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The call of ossl_provider_query_operation() used |data->operation_id|,
when |cur_operation| should be used.
If any ossl_provider_query_operation() call returned NULL, the loop
was stopped, when it should just continue on to the next operation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11837)
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This also adds the more flexible and general load_key_cert_crl()
as well as helper functions get_passwd(), cleanse(), and clear_free()
to be used also in apps/cmp.c etc.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11755)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11839)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
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Instead of passing it with signature->digest_verify_init() and
signature->digest_sign_init(), we pass it with signature->newctx().
This allows the digests that are indicated by RSA PSS parameters
to have a useful propquery.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
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