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GH issue #1916 affects only big-endian platforms. TLS is not affected,
because TLS fragment is never big enough.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 76f572ed0469a277d92378848250b7a9705d3071)
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A temporary buffer containing g^xy was not cleared in ecdh_compute_key()
before freeing it, so the shared secret was leaked in memory.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0e4690165b4beb6777b747b0aeb1646a301f41d9)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.
CVE-2016-6303
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55d83bf7c10c7b205fffa23fa7c3977491e56c07)
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Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc
("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()").
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 099e2968ed3c7d256cda048995626664082b1b30)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR: #3176
(cherry picked from commit a73be798ced572a988d455d961a2387f6eccb549)
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(cherry picked from commit a1be17a72f6e0fe98275dc113cddd799bf55df44)
Conflicts:
crypto/pem/pem_err.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Apply a limit to the maximum blob length which can be read in do_d2i_bio()
to avoid excessive allocation.
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 66bcba145740e4f1210499ba6e5033035a2a4647)
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If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause
BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting
in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing.
Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes
don't overflow buffer.
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
CVE-2016-2182
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07bed46f332fce8c1d157689a2cdf915a982ae34)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_print.c
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Check for error return in BN_div_word().
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b9afbc0fc7f8be0049d389d34d9416fa377e2aa)
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Thanks to Hanno Böck for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 39a43280316f1b9c45be5ac5b04f4f5c3f923686)
Conflicts:
crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
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Fix error path leaks in a2i_ASN1_STRING(), a2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and
a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED().
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting these issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e1be1dce7722ee40ced16b1b91d5e1b9fce13d08)
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GH: #1322
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 32baafb2f6fb2a424824df08232d86765f554880)
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Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 81f69e5b69b8e87ca5d7080ab643ebda7808542c)
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Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit af601b83198771a4ad54ac0f415964b90aab4b5f)
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Use correct length in old ASN.1 indefinite length sequence decoder
(only used by SSL_SESSION).
This bug was discovered by Hanno Böck using libfuzzer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 436dead2e2a157fa501a7538a77b6078391b477f)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 134ab5139a8d41455a81d9fcc31b3edb8a4b2f5c)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e9f17097e9fbba3e7664cd67e54eebf2bd438863)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56f9953c846204cb3251ab27605e403c7444fd72)
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TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acce328ec16a3aa635f1ca37365e8c7403a)
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Ensure things really do get cleared when we intend them to.
Addresses an OCAP Audit issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb5ebf961333896776fbce10ef88c2af7bec8aea)
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While travelling up the certificate chain, the internal
proxy_path_length must be updated with the pCPathLengthConstraint
value, or verification will not work properly. This corresponds to
RFC 3820, 4.1.4 (a).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30aeb3128199c15760a785d88a4eda9e156d5af6)
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The subject name MUST be the same as the issuer name, with a single CN
entry added.
RT#1852
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 338fb1688fbfb7efe0bdd475b01791a6de5ef94b)
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RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy
conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance
of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with
RAND_bytes().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.
CVE-2016-2178
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b)
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Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
CVE-2016-2178
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534)
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Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure. Similarly for issuer lookup failures
and caller errors (bad parameters or invalid state).
Also, when X509_verify_cert() returns <= 0 make sure that the
verification status does not remain X509_V_OK, as a last resort set
it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, just in case some code path returns
an error without setting an appropriate value of ctx->error.
Add new and some missing error codes to X509 error -> SSL alert switch.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The functions SRP_Calc_client_key() and SRP_Calc_server_key() were
incorrectly returning a valid pointer in the event of error.
Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 308ff28673ae1a4a1b346761224b4a8851d41f58)
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RT#3826
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b4825d0bb6057e44717007a54797df72babdb7e)
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PR#4449
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1f8ba4dc7032a061d60b960c393178263e4a471)
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PR#4466
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06227924ad77fee9ead79189328aebf078c37add)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 708cf5ded249f871fcd5e3de27d9281b1f37ae71)
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The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes
CMS work with SEED.
PR#4504
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c0aa8c274843c5b8a70d70fc05d71fa3dfd510db)
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Try to set the ASN.1 parameters for CMS encryption even if the IV
length is zero as the underlying cipher should still set the type.
This will correctly result in errors if an attempt is made to use
an unsupported cipher type.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3fd60dc42288591737a35a90368d72dbd00fdef8)
Conflicts:
crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
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The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.
Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.
RT#4531
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4e0d184ac1dde845ba9574872e2ae5c903c81dff)
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RT#4527
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3340e8bb186f689df5720352f65a9c0c42b6046b)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER
tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used
for on the wire encoding.
Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug.
This was found using libFuzzer.
RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CVE-2016-2107
MR: #2572
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With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.
Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.
User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2105
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.
Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.
The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()
i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.
The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.
Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.
It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.
CVE-2016-2106
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26)
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Reported by David Benjamin
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 05aef4bbdbc18e7b9490512cdee41e8a608bcc0e)
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Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64eaf6c928f4066d62aa86f805796ef05bd0b1cc)
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Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9b08619cb45e75541809b1154c90e1a00450e537)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509/x509.h
crypto/x509/x509_err.c
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Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b33d1141b6dcce947708b984c5e9e91dad3d675d)
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