Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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(cherry picked from commit a6c62f0c25a756c263a80ce52afbae888028e986)
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(cherry picked from commit 16bc45ba956fdf07c7cda7feda88de597569df63)
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(cherry picked from commit 01be36ef70525e81fc358d2e559bdd0a0d9427a5)
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(cherry picked from commit a4947e4e064d2d5bb622ac64cf13edc4a46ed196)
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<christian@python.org>.
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
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Submitted by: Yuriy Kaminskiy
(cherry picked from commit 524b00c0da42b129ed8622dfb3f5eab9cc5d6617)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/evp/e_des3.c
(cherry picked from commit eb22b7ec7515b42a5865af7b2a1da232ce100e97)
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Conflicts:
crypto/buffer/buffer.c
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(cherry picked from commit 415ece73015a0e24ea934ecfb857d022952bb65b)
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- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
which could be misused.)
- EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
equality (not an error).
Reported by: king cope
(cherry picked from commit 312a46791ab465cfa3bf26764361faed0e5df014)
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PR #3090
Reported by: Franck Youssef <fry@open.ch>
If no new reason codes are obtained after checking a CRL exit with an
error to avoid repeatedly checking the same CRL.
This will only happen if verify errors such as invalid CRL scope are
overridden in a callback.
(cherry picked from commit 4b26645c1a71cf9ce489e4f79fc836760b670ffe)
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PR: 3028
Fix bug introduced in PEM_X509_INFO_bio which wouldn't process RSA keys
correctly if they appeared first.
(cherry picked from commit 5ae8d6bcbaff99423a2608559d738a3fcf7ed6dc)
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(cherry picked from commit 0ded2a06891a4d5a207d8f29aa9a89a755158170)
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PR: 3005
(cherry picked from commit 5702e965d759dde8a098d8108660721ba2b93a7d)
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If an ASN1_INTEGER structure is allocated but not explicitly set encode
it as zero: don't generate an invalid zero length INTEGER.
(cherry picked from commit 1643edc63c3e15b6db5a15a728bc288f2cc2bbc7)
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(cherry picked from commit 3caeef94bd045608af03b061643992e3afd9c445)
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(cherry picked from commit 134c00659a1bc67ad35a1e4620e16bc4315e6e37)
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PR: 2963 and a number of others
(cherry picked from commit 4568182a8b8cbfd15cbc175189029ac547bd1762)
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This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bccfc0bb9da254dc84e23bc6a1c78a64e)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/c_allc.c
ssl/ssl_algs.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_enc.c
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This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
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Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
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PR: 2963 and a number of others
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Use -1 to check all extensions in CRLs.
Always set flag for freshest CRL.
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Submitted by: jean-etienne.schwartz@bull.net
In OCSP_basic_varify return an error if X509_STORE_CTX_init fails.
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Submitted by: Adam Langley
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little maze of #ifs, all different).
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Submitted by: Adam Langley
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Submitted by: Chromium Authors
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on path with spaces [from HEAD].
PR: 2835
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PR: 2833
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Reported by: Constantine Sapuntzakis <csapuntz@gmail.com>
Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
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Make sure tkeylen is initialised properly when encrypting CMS messages.
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of digest algorithms, mosty SHA, on Power7. Mystery of century, why SHA,
why slower algorithm are affected more... [from HEAD].
PR: 2794
Submitted by: Ashley Lai
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