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certificates.
One is a valid CA which has no basicConstraints
but does have certSign keyUsage.
Other is S/MIME signer with nonRepudiation but
no digitalSignature.
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The old code was painfully primitive and couldn't handle
distinct certificates using the same subject name.
The new code performs several tests on a candidate issuer
certificate based on certificate extensions.
It also adds several callbacks to X509_VERIFY_CTX so its
behaviour can be customised.
Unfortunately some hackery was needed to persuade X509_STORE
to tolerate this. This should go away when X509_STORE is
replaced, sometime...
This must have broken something though :-(
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like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.
This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
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yet tighter, and also put some heat on the rest of the library by
insisting (correctly) that compare callbacks used in stacks are prototyped
with "const" parameters. This has led to a depth-first explosion of
compiler warnings in the code where 1 constification has led to 3 or 4
more. Fortunately these have all been resolved to completion and the code
seems cleaner as a result - in particular many of the _cmp() functions
should have been prototyped with "const"s, and now are. There was one
little problem however;
X509_cmp() should by rights compare "const X509 *" pointers, and it is now
declared as such. However, it's internal workings can involve
recalculating hash values and extensions if they have not already been
setup. Someone with a more intricate understanding of the flow control of
X509 might be able to tighten this up, but for now - this seemed the
obvious place to stop the "depth-first" constification of the code by
using an evil cast (they have migrated all the way here from safestack.h).
Fortunately, this is the only place in the code where this was required
to complete these type-safety changes, and it's reasonably clear and
commented, and seemed the least unacceptable of the options. Trying to
take the constification further ends up exploding out considerably, and
indeed leads directly into generalised ASN functions which are not likely
to cooperate well with this.
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where the new functions are mentioned.
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This better reflects their behaviour.
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new purpose getting function.
Update the ca-cert.pem and pca-cert.pem "CA" certificates so they
really are CA certificate: that is they have the appropriate extensions.
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either and has a static and dynamic mix.
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yet.
Add a function X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() which implements the logic
of "inheriting" purpose and trust from a parent structure and using a default:
this will be used in the SSL code and possibly future S/MIME.
Partial documentation of the 'verify' utility. Still need to document how all
the extension checking works and the various error messages.
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trust settings of the root CA.
After a few fixes it seems to work OK.
Still need to add support to SSL and S/MIME code though.
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Extend the X509_PURPOSE structure to include shortnames for purposed and default
trust ids.
Still need some extendable trust checking code and integration with the SSL and
S/MIME code.
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certificate: currently this includes trust settings
and a "friendly name".
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Submitted by: Lennart Bång, Bodo Möller
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ultimately lead to certificate chain verification. It is
VERY EXPERIMENTAL at present though.
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