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Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
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The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned
ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities
(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of
OpenSSL do it correctly.
Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in
application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods
as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in
application code.
To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection".
For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the
padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret
data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the
attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case
any part of padding check fails.
The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the
returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the
actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have
to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free
way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks.
Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla
NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the
other in heterogeneous environments.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
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Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15801)
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This nicely reduces the number of files considered as fips
provider sources.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15609)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15540)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15513)
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This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising
places.
This was done using util/err-to-raise
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)
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Many of the new types introduced by OpenSSL 3.0 have an OSSL_ prefix,
e.g., OSSL_CALLBACK, OSSL_PARAM, OSSL_ALGORITHM, OSSL_SERIALIZER.
The OPENSSL_CTX type stands out a little by using a different prefix.
For consistency reasons, this type is renamed to OSSL_LIB_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12621)
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The functions being:
rsa_check_crt_components, rsa_check_key, rsa_check_pminusq_diff,
rsa_check_prime_factor, rsa_check_prime_factor_range,
rsa_check_private_exponent, rsa_check_public_exponent,
rsa_digestinfo_encoding, rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes, rsa_fromdata,
rsa_get0_all_params, rsa_get0_libctx, rsa_get0_pss_params_30,
rsa_get_lcm, rsa_mgf_nid2name, rsa_mp_coeff_names, rsa_mp_exp_names,
rsa_mp_factor_names, rsa_new_with_ctx, rsa_oaeppss_md2nid,
rsa_oaeppss_nid2name, rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_with_libctx,
rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_with_libctx,
rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_with_libctx, rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS,
rsa_pkey_method, rsa_pss_params_30_copy, rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata,
rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted,
rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg, rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg,
rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen, rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults,
rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenalg,
rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen,
rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield, rsa_pss_params_30_todata,
rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield, rsa_pss_pkey_method, rsa_set0_all_params,
rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair, rsa_sp800_56b_check_private,
rsa_sp800_56b_check_public, rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq,
rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key, rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test,
rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength, rsa_todata, rsa_validate_pairwise,
rsa_validate_private and rsa_validate_public.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13040)
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Automatically rename all instances of _with_libctx() to _ex() as per
our coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12970)
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This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should
become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing.
Fixes #11538
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)
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At various points in crypto/rsa we need to get random numbers. We should
ensure that we use the correct libctx when doing so.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11355)
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Use of the low level RSA functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11063)
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RSA ASYM_CIPHER was already available within the default provider. We
now make it also available from inside the FIPS module.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10881)
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In TLSv1.2 a pre-master secret value is passed from the client to the
server encrypted using RSA PKCS1 type 2 padding in a ClientKeyExchange
message. As well as the normal formatting rules for RSA PKCA1 type 2
padding TLS imposes some additional rules about what constitutes a well
formed key. Specifically it must be exactly the right length and
encode the TLS version originally requested by the client (as opposed to
the actual negotiated version) in its first two bytes.
All of these checks need to be done in constant time and, if they fail,
then the TLS implementation is supposed to continue anyway with a random
key (and therefore the connection will fail later on). This avoids
padding oracle type attacks.
This commit implements this within the RSA padding code so that we keep
all the constant time padding logic in one place. A later commit will
remove it from libssl.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10411)
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Suggested by Matt Hart
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10084)
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Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
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constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend
on secret information.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8543)
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Fixes #8364 and #8357
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)
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Fixes #7117
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7880)
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[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7814)
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And make RSAErr call unconditional.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5254)
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this part contains only the return (x) fix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4223)
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The memory blocks contain secret data and must be
cleared before returning to the system heap.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4062)
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Fixed in 5b8fa431ae8eb5a18ba913494119e394230d4b70
[ci skip]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3924)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Accept leading 0-byte in PKCS1 type 1 padding. Internally, the byte is
stripped by BN_bn2bin but external callers may have other expectations.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx<kurt@openssl.org>
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This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset.
Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that.
(Missed one conversion; thanks Richard)
Also fixes GH328
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules. Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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There are header files in crypto/ that are used by the rest of
OpenSSL. Move those to include/internal and adapt the affected source
code, Makefiles and scripts.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/constant_time_locl.h
crypto/o_dir.h
crypto/o_str.h
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
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Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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that use it.
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incorrect. Fortunately, there is a second check that's correct, when adding
the pads.
PR: 355
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library, the output buffer always is large enough, but if the tlen
parameter is there, it should be checked in the interest of clarity,
as proposed by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>.
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returns int (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). New function RAND_add() is the
same as RAND_seed() but takes an estimate of the entropy as an additional
argument.
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Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
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