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Fixes #3867
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3873)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1293)
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Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
CVE-2015-3194
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Fix a bug where invalid PSS parameters are not rejected resulting in a
NULL pointer exception. This can be triggered during certificate
verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server
enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issues.
CVE-2015-0208
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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This is a more comprehensive fix. It changes all
keygen apps to use 2K keys. It also changes the
default to use SHA256 not SHA1. This is from
Kurt's upstream Debian changes.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 44e0c2bae4bfd87d770480902618dbccde84fd81)
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(cherry picked from commit 3820fec3a09faecba7fe9912aa20ef7fcda8337b)
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Some CMS SignedData structure use a signature algorithm OID such
as SHA1WithRSA instead of the RSA algorithm OID. Workaround this
case by tolerating the signature if we recognise the OID.
(cherry picked from commit 3a98f9cf20c6af604799ee079bec496b296bb5cc)
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For RSA and DSA keys return an appropriate RecipientInfo type. By setting
CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE for DSA keys an appropriate error is returned if
an attempt is made to use DSA with enveloped data.
(cherry picked from commit 41b920ef01abeb4c4b1c0f11e647370ae6533d02)
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Extend RSA ASN1 method to support CMS PSS signatures for both sign
and verify.
For signing the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are read and the appropriate
CMS structures set up.
For verification the CMS structures are analysed and the corresponding
parameters in the EVP_PKEY_CTX set.
Also add RSA-OAEP support.
For encrypt the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are used.
For decrypt the CMS structure is uses to set the appropriate EVP_PKEY_CTX
parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 0574cadf857b19485465b9d71b7dec9549857a4d)
Also sync error codes with OpenSSL 1.0.1 and add new ones.
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Fix PSS signature printing: consistently use 0x prefix for hex values for
padding length and trailer fields.
(cherry picked from commit deb24ad53147f5a8dd63416224a5edd7bbc0e74a)
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knock-on work than expected - they've been extracted into a patch
series that can be completed elsewhere, or in a different branch,
before merging back to HEAD.
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OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED, etc. Steve, please double-check the CMS stuff...
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examples. All RFC4134 examples can not be processed.
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Initial support for CMS.
Add zlib compression BIO.
Add AES key wrap implementation.
Generalize S/MIME MIME code to support CMS and/or PKCS7.
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ctrl.
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Use cross reference table in ASN1_item_sign(), ASN1_item_verify() to eliminate
the need for algorithm specific code.
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been deleted.
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initialize it. Initial support for application added public key ASN1.
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key ASN1 handling through a single EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure and move
the spaghetti algorithm specific code to a single ASN1 module for each
algorithm.
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