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This only manifested itself with FIPS enabled statically linked
engines. The OPENSSL_init call ended up invoking RAND_init_fips
for a FIPS enabled build, which called CRYPTO_malloc, resulting in
disallowing the engine to finish its IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN call.
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1308)Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CLA: trivial
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1308)
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This fixes the following error when building with no particular pointer size
is specified (implied 32 bit):
static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc;
................................................^
%CC-E-UNDECLARED, In the initializer for realloc_func, "_realloc32" is not declared.
at line number 93 in file DEV:[OPENSSL102.crypto]mem.c;1
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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crypto/mem_clr.c was harmonized with master branch and doesn't use
cleanse_ctr kludge anymore.
RT#4563
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.
RT3786
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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This doesn't really fix the datarace but changes it so it can only happens
once. This isn't really a problem since we always just set it to the same
value. We now just stop writing it after the first time.
PR3584, https://bugs.debian.org/534534
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
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Call OPENSSL_init() in a few more places to make sure it is always called
at least once.
Initial cipher API redirection (incomplete).
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knock-on work than expected - they've been extracted into a patch
series that can be completed elsewhere, or in a different branch,
before merging back to HEAD.
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sha1_block_data_order when hashing short messages. Move OPENSSL_cleanse
to "cpuid" assembler module and gain 2x.
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if the give size is 0.
This is a thought that came up in PR 751.
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allocated.
Notified by Daniel Lucq <daniel@lucq.org>
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I've covered all the memset()s I felt safe modifying, but may have missed some.
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and linker optimizations.
PR: 343
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OPENSSL_malloc().
PR: 187
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allocation callbacks so that it is no longer visible to applications
that these live at a different call level than conventional memory
allocation callbacks.
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handling routines that need file name and line number information,
I've added a call level to our memory handling routines to allow that
kind of hooking.
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functions need to be constified, and therefore meant a number of easy
changes a little everywhere.
Now, if someone could explain to me why OBJ_dup() cheats...
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like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.
This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
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"Jan Mikkelsen" <janm@transactionsite.com> correctly states that the
OpenSSL header files have #include's and extern "C"'s in an incorrect
order. Thusly fixed.
Also, make the memory debugging routines defined and declared with
prototypes, and use void* instead of char* for memory blobs.
And last of all, redo the ugly callback construct for elegance and
better definition (with prototypes).
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-Wcast-align
-Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline''.
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eliminate some of the -Wcast-qual warnings (debug-ben-strict target)
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(and that malloc can be called with an int argument).
- Use proper prototypes (with argument list) for various function pointers,
avoid casts (however there are still many such cases left in these files).
- Avoid collissions in app_info_cmp if sizeof int != sizeof long.
- Use CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC in mem_dbg.c.
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- Made CRYPTO_MDEBUG even less used in crypto.h, giving
MemCheck_start() and MemCheck_stop() only one possible definition.
- Made the values of the debug function pointers in mem.c dependent
on the existence of the CRYPTO_MDEBUG macro, and made the rest of
the code understand the NULL case.
That's it. With this code, the old behvior of the debug functionality
is restored, but you can still opt to have it on, even when the
library wasn't compiled with a defined CRYPTO_MDEBUG.
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With this change, the following is provided and present at all times
(meaning CRYPTO_MDEBUG is no longer required to get this functionality):
- hooks to provide your own allocation and deallocation routines.
They have to have the same interface as malloc(), realloc() and
free(). They are registered by calling CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
with the function pointers.
- hooks to provide your own memory debugging routines. The have to
have the same interface as as the CRYPTO_dbg_*() routines. They
are registered by calling CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() with
the function pointers.
I moved everything that was already built into OpenSSL and did memory
debugging to a separate file (mem_dbg.c), to make it clear what is
what.
With this, the relevance of the CRYPTO_MDEBUG has changed. The only
thing in crypto/crypto.h that it affects is the definition of the
MemCheck_start and MemCheck_stop macros.
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wrongly decreased). Fixed.
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1. Added code to the memory leak detecting code to give the user the
possibility to add information, thereby forming a traceback.
2. Make the memory leak detecting code multithread-safe.
The idea is that we're actually dealing with two separate critical
sections, one containing the hash tables with the information, the
other containing the current memory checking mode. Those should not
be handled with the same lock, especially since their handling overlap.
Hence, the added second lock.
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and make it the default for some debugging configurations.
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This is much more helpful than the counter when doing tests with the library
interactively.
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a pain to read when using 4-space tabs.
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Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
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