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aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl() and aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl() cleanse the
HMAC key after use, but static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl() doesn't.
Fixes an OCAP Audit issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0def528bc502a888a3f4ef3c38ea4c5e69fd7375)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Add missing ifdefs. Same change is already present in master, see
b4a3aeebd9f9280aa7e69a343f5c824e68466d90
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1155)
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Don't copy parameters is they're already present in the destination.
Return error if an attempt is made to copy different parameters to
destination. Update documentation.
If key type is not initialised return missing parameters
RT#4149
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f72f00d49549c6620d7101f5e9bf7963da6df9ee)
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After a call to EVP_PKEY_new() we should check for malloc failure.
RT#4180
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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RT#3826
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes
CMS work with SEED.
PR#4504
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c0aa8c274843c5b8a70d70fc05d71fa3dfd510db)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CVE-2016-2107
MR: #2572
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With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.
Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.
User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2105
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.
Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.
The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()
i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.
The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.
Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.
It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.
CVE-2016-2106
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26)
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There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed
to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it
anyway.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffe9150b1508a0ffc9e724f975691f24eb045c05)
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In backporting from master one modification was mistreated.
RT#4210
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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RT#4210
(1.0.2-specific adaptation of 7687f5255011a5a3ca75e8c5427683d58ae411c0)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Since we don't use the eay style any more, there's no point tryint to
tell emacs to use it.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
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It was also found that stich performs suboptimally on AMD Jaguar, hence
execution is limited to XOP-capable and Intel processors.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a5fd24d19bbb586b1c6d235c2021e9bead22c9f5)
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During work on a larger change in master a number of locations were
identified where return value checks were missing. This backports the
relevant fixes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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RT#4081
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 070c23325af4526c9a8532a60d63522c58d5554b)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8cf9d71a3a43d9b98a8a278d47dc08088a954a7b)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f6c7691870d1cd2ad0e0c83638cef3f35a0b548)
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RFC5753 requires that we omit parameters for AES key wrap and set them
to NULL for 3DES wrap. OpenSSL decrypt uses the received algorithm
parameters so can transparently handle either form.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ec36aff2a3c221b640dafa56ac838312e6724f4)
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PR#4079
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c69ce9351336f5b4a8b33890756b3fd185528210)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4fe1cbdff89768c5d1983988ce1022674a438bbb)
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Previously, the conversion would silently coerce to ASCII. Now, we error
out.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b785504a10310cb2872270eb409b70971be5e76e)
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Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate.
In particular: reject extra trailing padding, and padding in the middle
of the content. Don't limit line length. Add tests.
Previously, the behaviour was ill-defined, and depended on the position
of the padding within the input.
In addition, this appears to fix a possible two-byte oob read.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3cdd1e94b1d71f2ce3002738f9506da91fe2af45)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Fix both the caller to error out on malloc failure, as well as the
eventual callee to handle a NULL gracefully.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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PR#3974
PR#3975
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4)
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mismatch.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f0fa5c8306236ce742168d664d53b1551649a47b)
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Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e4a355dcabe2f75df5bb8b41b394d37037169d2)
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PR#3872
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in. This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.
This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2f45580435c39dada44dd276e79cb88)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
apps/Makefile
test/Makefile
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40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a4fb61c66c2a8cd2a9800751828d328)
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There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc)
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The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8269881093324b881b81472be037055571f73f3)
Conflicts:
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org>
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Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a01087027bd0c5ec053d4eabd972bd942bfcd92f)
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- SIGSEGV/ILL in CCM (RT#3688);
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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When OpenSSL is configured with no-ec, then the new evp_extra_test fails to
pass. This change adds appropriate OPENSSL_NO_EC guards around the code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a988036259a4e119f6787b4c585f506226330120)
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called evp_test.c, so I have called this one evp_extra_test.c
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/Makefile
test/Makefile
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
crypto/dsa/dsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c8435171a7af575f73c526d79e1ef0ee5960)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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This facilitates "universal" builds, ones that target multiple
architectures, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv7. See commentary in
Configure for details.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c1669e1c205dc8e695fb0c10a655f434e758b9f7)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03af843039af758fc9bbb4ae6c09ec2bc715f2c5)
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