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This is a simple check order correction.
Fixes #12143
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12144)
(cherry picked from commit 0800288e6e1d9f44d471043a970ba57743ca8f4c)
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[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11626)
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This adds optional constant time support for AES
when building openssl for no-asm.
Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11411)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11344)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10816)
(cherry picked from commit adc9086beb21a91ca59aaf0c619b38b82c223f9b)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8888)
(cherry picked from commit a05bf83c7964bb3928b323fe356b9f70f105036d)
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Fixes #10998
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11000)
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OpenSSL supports both PKCS#3 and X9.42 DH keys. By default we use PKCS#3
keys. The function `EVP_PKEY_set1_DH` was assuming that the supplied DH
key was a PKCS#3 key. It should detect what type of key it is and assign
the correct type as appropriate.
Fixes #10592
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10593)
(cherry picked from commit 32c869ffaba67822602ea9fec611272ff8e8db58)
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Reported-by: misspell-fixer <https://github.com/vlajos/misspell-fixer>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10544)
(cherry picked from commit 79c44b4e3044aee9dc9618850d4f1ce067757b4b)
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Even with custom ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function. The reason
is that these are the values passed by EVP_*Final, and some of the
backend cipher functions do check for these to see if a "final" call
is made.
An exception is made for CCM mode which has special handling for the case
where inl == 0: this may mean the total plaintext or ciphertext length is 0.
This is based on an original commit by Richard Levitte.
Fixes #8675
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9057)
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Check for NULL and return error if so.
This can possibly be called from apps/ca.c with a NULL argument.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10474)
(cherry picked from commit ab5c77b4766e0992751d86560193ca42b49cf316)
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In addition to 67c81ec3 which introduced this behavior in CCM mode
docs but only implemented it for AES-CCM.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10331)
(cherry picked from commit f7382fbbd846dd3bdea6b8c03b6af22faf0ab94f)
Conflicts:
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10388)
(cherry picked from commit 2555285fa5e4248ad4a5a0bc14ae4606443856c2)
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RSA-PSS keys use the same internal structure as RSA keys but do not
allow accessing it through EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA. This commit changes that
behavior.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10217)
(cherry picked from commit 465a58b117d5a85623f3998d6fbf2fe8712a5604)
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Because we have cases where basic assembler support isn't present, but
AESNI asssembler support is, we need a separate macro that indicates
that, and use it.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10080)
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Fixes #9999
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10002)
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Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
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Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9847)
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This leaves VPAES and AESNI support.
The VPAES performance is comparable but BSAES is not
completely constant time. There are table lookups
using secret key data in AES_set_encrypt/decrypt_key
and in ctr mode short data uses the non-constant
time AES_encrypt function instead of bit-slicing.
Furthermore the AES_ASM is by far outperformed
by recent GCC versions.
Since BSAES calls back to AES_ASM for short
data blocks the performance on those is also
worse than the pure software implementaion.
Fixes: #9640
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9675)
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Requesting zero bytes from shake previously led to out-of-bounds write
on some platforms.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9433)
(cherry picked from commit a890ef833d114da3430c2f2efd95e01714704d34)
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Note a flag needed to be added since some ssl tests fail if they output any error
(even if the error is ignored). Only ciphers that handle the GET_IV_LEN control set this flag.
Fixes #8330
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9499)
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The maximum key length for rc5 is 2040 bits so we should not attempt to
use keys longer than this.
Issue found by OSS-Fuzz and Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8834)
(cherry picked from commit 792cb4ee8d82e4b063f707fc9f4992271ffd65ab)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9275)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9255)
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This feature is enabled by default outside of FIPS builds
which ban such actions completely.
Encryption is always disallowed and will generate an error.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9112)
(cherry picked from commit 2c840201e57e27fa9f1b26a970270a91813e32fe)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9034)
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67c81ec311 forgot about s390x
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8971)
(cherry picked from commit 887e22dd8b6f054e39b2d20fc8870eaba7fc61a8)
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This reverts commit dcb982d792d6064ed3493e79749208d8c257ff04.
This change is causing extended tests to fail.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8964)
(cherry picked from commit 2c23689402f1894861519d0c1ad762a3e52f4677)
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This change allows to pass the authentication tag after specifying
the AAD in CCM mode. This is already true for the other two supported
AEAD modes (GCM and OCB) and it seems appropriate to match the
behavior.
GCM and OCB also support to set the tag at any point before the call
to `EVP_*Final`, but this won't work for CCM due to a restriction
imposed by section 2.6 of RFC3610: The tag must be set before
actually decrypting data.
This commit also adds a test case for setting the tag after supplying
plaintext length and AAD.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7243)
(cherry picked from commit 67c81ec311d696464bdbf4c6d6f8a887a3ddf9f8)
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Even with custome ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function. The reason
is that these are the values passed by EVP_*Final, and some of the
backend cipher functions do check for these to see if a "final" call
is made.
Fixes #8675
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8676)
(cherry picked from commit dcb982d792d6064ed3493e79749208d8c257ff04)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8620)
(cherry picked from commit 8cf85d489978c384a3f193fb7cb25469e0559f27)
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Fixes #8567
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8586)
(cherry picked from commit 183f52e29af27285ea4ed7c947b71c83618f8702)
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We treat that as automatic success. Other EVP_*Update functions already do
this (e.g. EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptUpdate etc). EVP_EncodeUpdate is
a bit of an anomoly. That treats 0 byte input length as an error.
Fixes #8576
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8587)
(cherry picked from commit a8274ea351988aa754cb9983b27d7059613ee11e)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8526)
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ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.
Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
CVE-2019-1543
Fixes #8345
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
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CLA: trivial
Function EVP_PKEY_size has been modified to take a const parameter
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7892)
(cherry picked from commit 47ec2367ebf6082abb103e66e609feb5c128d358)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7852)
(cherry picked from commit f2f734d4f9e34643a1d3e5b79d2447cd643519f8)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7852)
(cherry picked from commit a8bf2f8f24bda57c860e4356f31264fff63fe8b9)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7669)
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Check some return values on some functions.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7335)
(cherry picked from commit 434893af2bd4c1fa72655f8e5262c8a432713968)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7277)
(cherry picked from commit 46d085096c6ead624c61e4b8b301421301511e64)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7209)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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zero-length ID is allowed, but it's not allowed to skip the ID.
Fixes: #6534
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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Thus users can use this function to set customized EVP_PKEY_CTX to
EVP_MD_CTX structure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
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Put a NULL check back in to avoid dereferencing the NULL pointer.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7146)
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