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This gets EC_GROUP_clear_free EC_GROUP_free, EC_KEY_free,
EC_POINT_clear_free, EC_POINT_free
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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This commit handles BIO_ACCEPT_free BIO_CB_FREE BIO_CONNECT_free
BIO_free BIO_free_all BIO_vfree
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Ensure RAND_bytes return value is checked correctly, and that we no longer
use RAND_pseudo_bytes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Update error messages to say "EC is disabled" these can then be picked up
by mkdef.pl.
Update ordinals.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Suggested by John Foley <foleyj@cisco.com>.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Remove support for SHA0 and DSS0 (they were broken), and remove
the ability to attempt to build without SHA (it didn't work).
For simplicity, remove the option of not building various SHA algorithms;
you could argue that SHA_224/256/384/512 should be kept, since they're
like crypto algorithms, but I decided to go the other way.
So these options are gone:
GENUINE_DSA OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
OPENSSL_NO_SHA OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
OPENSSL_NO_SHA224 OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
OPENSSL_NO_SHA384 OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Introduce use of DECLARE_DEPRECATED
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER is only set if the fips module is being built
(as opposed to being used). Since the fips module wont be built in
master this is redundant.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Submitted by Shay Gueron, Intel Corp.
RT: 3149
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Add various functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
structure.
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Update ecdsatest to use ECDSA_sign_setup and ECDSA_sign_ex, this
avoids the nonce generation which would otherwise break the test.
Reinstate ecdsatest.
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Keep original function names for nonce versions so we don't have to change
error function codes.
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This change updates 8a99cb29 to make the generation of (EC)DSA nonces
using the message digest the default. It also reverts the changes to
(EC)DSA_METHOD structure.
In addition to making it the default, removing the flag from EC_KEY
means that FIPS modules will no longer have an ABI mismatch.
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This change adds the option to calculate (EC)DSA nonces by hashing the
message and private key along with entropy to avoid leaking the private
key if the PRNG fails.
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Submitted by: Adam Langley
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RFC5114 parameters and X9.42 DH public and private keys.
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Submitted by: Emilia Kasper
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aspirational __owur annotations.
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http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
Thanks to the original authors Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri for
bringing this to our attention.
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pairwise consistency test interfering with the test.
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of algorithm test program.
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Submitted by: "Andrzej Chmielowiec" <achmielowiec@enigma.com.pl>, steve@openssl.org
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Truncate hash if it is too large: as required by FIPS 186-3.
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