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2022-12-01Update copyright yearTomas Mraz
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Release: yes (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19803)
2022-11-30Remove redundant assignment in felem_mul_ref in p521Rohan McLure
ftmp4 is assigned immediately before receiving the reduced output of the multiplication of ftmp and ftmp3, without being read inbetween these assignments. Remove redundant assignment. Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19766) (cherry picked from commit 3d4dfeb28a5cb944b8300b4cf807e19ab97d04f5)
2022-11-29Honor OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT as set and default to ↵Nicola Tuveri
UNCOMPRESSED Originally the code to im/export the EC pubkey was meant to be consumed only by the im/export functions when crossing the provider boundary. Having our providers exporting to a COMPRESSED format octet string made sense to avoid memory waste, as it wasn't exposed outside the provider API, and providers had all tools available to convert across the three formats. Later on, with #13139 deprecating the `EC_KEY_*` functions, more state was added among the params imported/exported on an EC provider-native key (including `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT`, although it did not affect the format used to export `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`). Finally, in #14800, `EVP_PKEY_todata()` was introduced and prominently exposed directly to users outside the provider API, and the choice of COMPRESSED over UNCOMPRESSED as the default became less sensible in light of usability, given the latter is more often needed by applications and protocols. This commit fixes it, by using `EC_KEY_get_conv_form()` to get the point format from the internal state (an `EC_KEY` under the hood) of the provider-side object, and using it on `EVP_PKEY_export()`/`EVP_PKEY_todata()` to format `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`. The default for an `EC_KEY` was already UNCOMPRESSED, and it is altered if the user sets `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` via `EVP_PKEY_fromdata()`, `EVP_PKEY_set_params()`, or one of the more specialized methods. For symmetry, this commit also alters `ec_pkey_export_to()` in `crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c`, part of the `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD` for legacy EC keys: it exclusively used COMPRESSED format, and now it honors the conversion format specified in the EC_KEY object being exported to a provider when this function is called. Expand documentation about `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY` and mention the 3.1 change in behavior for our providers. Fixes #16595 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19681)
2022-11-23nit: fix some pointer comparisonsFdaSilvaYY
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059) (cherry picked from commit e1e93f7a07dfc7a8dddd4ddbb79d1d9bc9760d32)
2022-11-23crypto: Fix various typos, repeated words, align some spelling to LDP.FdaSilvaYY
partially revamped from #16712 - fall thru -> fall through - time stamp -> timestamp - file name -> filename - host name -> hostname Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059) (cherry picked from commit 1567a821a4616f59748fa8982724f88e542867d6)
2022-11-23ERR: replace remnant ECerr() and EVPerr() calls in crypto/Dr. David von Oheimb
except those throwing ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19302) (cherry picked from commit bd07cc1c7e3ca38689e59868b5945dc223235a49)
2022-11-23Cleanup : directly include of `internal/nelem.h` when required.FdaSilvaYY
And so clean a few useless includes Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19721) (cherry picked from commit f2a6f83862be3e20260b708288a8f7d0928e9018)
2022-11-11Move e_os.h to include/internalRichard Levitte
Including e_os.h with a path from a header file doesn't work well on certain exotic platform. It simply fails to build. Since we don't seem to be able to stop ourselves, the better move is to move e_os.h to an include directory that's part of the inclusion path given to the compiler. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17641) (cherry picked from commit d5f9166bacfb3757dfd6117310ad54ab749b11f9) Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
2022-11-09Simpler square-root computation for Ed25519James Muir
Description: Mark Wooden and Franck Rondepierre noted that the square-root-mod-p operations used in the EdDSA RFC (RFC 8032) can be simplified. For Ed25519, instead of computing u*v^3 * (u * v^7)^((p-5)/8), we can compute u * (u*v)^((p-5)/8). This saves 3 multiplications and 2 squarings. For more details (including a proof), see the following message from the CFRG mailing list: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qlKpMBqxXZYmDpXXIx6LO3Oznv4/ Note that the Ed448 implementation (see ossl_curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio() in ./crypto/ec/curve448/curve448.c) appears to already use this simpler method (i.e. it does not follow the method suggested in RFC 8032). Testing: Build and then run the test suite: ./Configure -Werror --strict-warnings make update make make test Numerical testing of the square-root computation can be done using the following sage script: def legendre(x,p): return kronecker(x,p) # Ed25519 p = 2**255-19 # -1 is a square if legendre(-1,p)==1: print("-1 is a square") # suppose u/v is a square. # to compute one of its square roots, find x such that # x**4 == (u/v)**2 . # this implies # x**2 == u/v, or # x**2 == -(u/v) , # which implies either x or i*x is a square-root of u/v (where i is a square root of -1). # we can take x equal to u * (u*v)**((p-5)/8). # 2 is a generator # this can be checked by factoring p-1 # and then showing 2**((p-1)/q) != 1 (mod p) # for all primes q dividing p-1. g = 2 s = p>>2 # s = (p-1)/4 i = power_mod(g, s, p) t = p>>3 # t = (p-5)/8 COUNT = 1<<18 while COUNT > 0: COUNT -= 1 r = randint(0,p-1) # r = u/v v = randint(1,p-1) u = mod(r*v,p) # compute x = u * (u*v)**((p-5)/8) w = mod(u*v,p) x = mod(u*power_mod(w, t, p), p) # check that x**2 == r, or (i*x)**2 == r, or r is not a square rr = power_mod(x, 2, p) if rr==r: continue rr = power_mod(mod(i*x,p), 2, p) if rr==r: continue if legendre(r,p) != 1: continue print("failure!") exit() print("passed!") Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17544) (cherry picked from commit a822a0cb3c8466adbcee510a6234c0fe95ff4bfe)
2022-11-09Fix typosDimitris Apostolou
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17392) (cherry picked from commit e304aa87b35fac5ea97c405dd3c21549faa45e78)
2022-11-09aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assemblyRuss Butler
This change adds optional support for - Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and - Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI) features to the perl scripts. Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags. Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at all. The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete specification. Scope ----- This change only affects generated assembly code. Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication -------------------------------- Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching or load. PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key. The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register. A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead. With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped, it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the LR on the stack is detectable. The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not affected by PAuth. There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B. PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively. The keys are typically managed by the operating system. To enable generating code for PAuth compile with -mbranch-protection=<mode>: - standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI (read below) - pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification -------------------------------------- Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not intended branch targets. If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated. In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the specification for the details. Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc depending on system register configuration. BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to. BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the .note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI for the whole binary or shared object. The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded. To insert this new and optional instruction compile with -mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti. When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM. Compiler support ---------------- Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>' and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following: ------------------------------------------------------- | Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 | +----------+---------------------+--------------------+ | gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ | ------------------------------------------------------- Available Platforms ------------------ Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions. https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models https://www.qemu.org/ Implementation Notes -------------------- This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates. Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligible. Interaction with C code ----------------------- Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility between the two. Useful Links ------------ To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM): https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/ Additional materials: "Providing protection for complex software" https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE) https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest Addional Notes -------------- This patch is a copy of the work done by Tamas Petz in boringssl. It contains the changes from the following commits: aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791 URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084 aarch64: Improve conditional compilation Change-Id: I14902a64e5f403c2b6a117bc9f5fb1a4f4611ebf URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43524 aarch64: Fix name of gnu property note section Change-Id: I6c432d1c852129e9c273f6469a8b60e3983671ec URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44024 Change-Id: I2d95ebc5e4aeb5610d3b226f9754ee80cf74a9af Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16674) (cherry picked from commit 19e277dd19f2897f6a7b7eb236abe46655e575bf)
2022-11-02dsa/ec: update pairwise tests to account for 140-3 IG 10.3.A additiocal ↵Pauli
comment 1 This mandates following SP 800-56A which, in 5.6.2.4, mandates a comparision against a newly calculated public key. Co-authored-by: Randall Steck <rsteck@thinqsoft.com> Co-authored-by: Mark J. Minnoch <mark@keypair.us> Co-authored-by: Steve Weymann <steve@keypair.us> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19486)
2022-10-11eckey_priv_encode(): Call ASN1_STRING_free() only on an ASN1_STRINGTomas Mraz
Also ASN1_OBJECT_free() never needs to be called on objects returned from OBJ_nid2obj(). Fixes #19138 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19367) (cherry picked from commit 8b5424eae5577809264e73a229fcc4c384611fae)
2022-09-09s390x: fix ecx deriveJuergen Christ
Derivation via ecx-methods did not properly set the length. Make the code more similar to common code and set the length property. Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19158) (cherry picked from commit 3cca05cc194c0528865deea57d9e60ca3fb0e5d3)
2022-08-04Fix EC_KEY_set_private_key() priv_key regressionRoberto Hueso Gomez
This allows to set EC_KEY's private key to NULL and fixes regression issue following OTC guideline in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18744#issuecomment-1195175696 Fixes #18744. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18941)
2022-07-14Fix EC ASM flag passingJuergen Christ
Flags for ASM implementations of EC curves were only passed to the FIPS provider and not to the default or legacy provider. This left some potential for optimization. Pass the correct flags also to these providers. Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18791) (cherry picked from commit 12186377cb987c4527d286e91e735e8261a45669)
2022-06-25Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparametersBernd Edlinger
This can be reproduced with my error injection patch. The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch but the issue is of course identical in all branches. $ ERROR_INJECT=1656112173 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./x509-test ./corpora/x509/fe543a8d7e09109a9a08114323eefec802ad79e2 #0 0x7fb61945eeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87 #1 0x402f84 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114 #2 0x7fb619092430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230 #3 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand_internal crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:280 #4 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand2 crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:304 #5 0x7fb618ef819d in BN_bin2bn crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:454 #6 0x7fb618e7aa13 in asn1_string_to_bn crypto/asn1/a_int.c:503 #7 0x7fb618e7aa13 in ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN crypto/asn1/a_int.c:559 #8 0x7fb618fd8e79 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:814 #9 0x7fb618fd98e8 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:935 #10 0x7fb618fd9aec in d2i_ECPKParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:966 #11 0x7fb618fdace9 in d2i_ECParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1184 #12 0x7fb618fd1fc7 in eckey_type2param crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:119 #13 0x7fb618fd57b4 in eckey_pub_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:165 #14 0x7fb6191a9c62 in x509_pubkey_decode crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:124 #15 0x7fb6191a9e42 in pubkey_cb crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:46 #16 0x7fb618eac032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432 #17 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643 #18 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518 #19 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382 #20 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643 #21 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518 #22 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382 #23 0x7fb618eadd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124 #24 0x7fb618eade35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114 #25 0x40310c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:33 #26 0x402afb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182 #27 0x402656 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226 #28 0x7fb618551f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44) #29 0x402756 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/x509-test+0x402756) ================================================================= ==12221==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb61945309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69 #1 0x7fb619092430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230 #2 0x7fb618ef5f11 in BN_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:246 #3 0x7fb618ef82f4 in BN_bin2bn crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:440 #4 0x7fb618fd8933 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:618 #5 0x7fb618fd98e8 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:935 #6 0x7fb618fd9aec in d2i_ECPKParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:966 #7 0x7fb618fdace9 in d2i_ECParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1184 #8 0x7fb618fd1fc7 in eckey_type2param crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:119 #9 0x7fb618fd57b4 in eckey_pub_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:165 #10 0x7fb6191a9c62 in x509_pubkey_decode crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:124 #11 0x7fb6191a9e42 in pubkey_cb crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:46 #12 0x7fb618eac032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432 #13 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643 #14 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518 #15 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382 #16 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643 #17 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518 #18 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382 #19 0x7fb618eadd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124 #20 0x7fb618eade35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114 #21 0x40310c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:33 #22 0x402afb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182 #23 0x402656 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226 #24 0x7fb618551f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44) Indirect leak of 56 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb61945309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69 #1 0x7fb619092430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230 #2 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand_internal crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:280 #3 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand2 crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:304 #4 0x7fb618ef819d in BN_bin2bn crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:454 #5 0x7fb618fd8933 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:618 #6 0x7fb618fd98e8 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:935 #7 0x7fb618fd9aec in d2i_ECPKParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:966 #8 0x7fb618fdace9 in d2i_ECParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1184 #9 0x7fb618fd1fc7 in eckey_type2param crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:119 #10 0x7fb618fd57b4 in eckey_pub_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:165 #11 0x7fb6191a9c62 in x509_pubkey_decode crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:124 #12 0x7fb6191a9e42 in pubkey_cb crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:46 #13 0x7fb618eac032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432 #14 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643 #15 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518 #16 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382 #17 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643 #18 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518 #19 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382 #20 0x7fb618eadd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124 #21 0x7fb618eade35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114 #22 0x40310c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:33 #23 0x402afb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182 #24 0x402656 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226 #25 0x7fb618551f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18633) (cherry picked from commit be50862e72d96e599f1111bbb69f41b5af651c97)
2022-06-23The flag "decoded-from-explicit" must be imp/exportableTomas Mraz
Otherwise the information that the EC group was imported from explicit parameters is lost when the key is moved across providers. Fixes #18600 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18629)
2022-06-21Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Release: yes
2022-06-16Add sensitive memory clean in priv encodeKan
Fixes #18540 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18541) (cherry picked from commit 16249341bb64329c2542c3d1e23b97ed3c44fad3)
2022-06-02Fix possible null pointer dereference of evp_pkey_get_legacy()Zhou Qingyang
evp_pkey_get_legacy() will return NULL on failure, however several uses of it or its wrappers does not check the return value of evp_pkey_get_legacy(), which could lead to NULL pointer dereference. Fix those possible bugs by adding NULL checking. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17967) (cherry picked from commit b9a86d5dd8b5bd33be42390bcbb5121fe0ae71a1)
2022-05-24Fix undefined behaviour in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparametersBernd Edlinger
This happens for instance with fuzz/corpora/asn1/65cf44e85614c62f10cf3b7a7184c26293a19e4a and causes the OPENSSL_malloc below to choke on the zero length allocation request. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18365) (cherry picked from commit 97de6145851922a33f7afd9c308adfc1b2e5732b)
2022-05-24Fix a memory leak in ec_key_simple_oct2privBernd Edlinger
This is reproducible with my error injection patch. The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch but the issue is of course identical in all branches. $ ERROR_INJECT=1652710284 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./server-test ./corpora/server/4e48da8aecce6b9b58e8e4dbbf0523e6d2dd56dc 140587884632000:error:03078041:bignum routines:bn_expand_internal:malloc failure:crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:282: 140587884632000:error:10103003:elliptic curve routines:ec_key_simple_oct2priv:BN lib:crypto/ec/ec_key.c:662: 140587884632000:error:100DE08E:elliptic curve routines:old_ec_priv_decode:decode error:crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:464: 140587884632000:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1149: 140587884632000:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_item_embed_d2i:nested asn1 error:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:309:Type=X509_ALGOR 140587884632000:error:0D08303A:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_template_noexp_d2i:nested asn1 error:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:646:Field=pkeyalg, Type=PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 140587884632000:error:0907B00D:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey:ASN1 lib:crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c:88: ================================================================= ==19676==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fdd2a6bb09f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69 #1 0x7fdd2a2fa430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230 #2 0x7fdd2a15df11 in BN_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:246 #3 0x7fdd2a15df88 in BN_secure_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:257 #4 0x7fdd2a247390 in ec_key_simple_oct2priv crypto/ec/ec_key.c:655 #5 0x7fdd2a241fc5 in d2i_ECPrivateKey crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1030 #6 0x7fdd2a23dac5 in old_ec_priv_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:463 #7 0x7fdd2a109db7 in d2i_PrivateKey crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c:46 #8 0x7fdd2a33ab16 in PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c:84 #9 0x7fdd2a3330b6 in PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey crypto/pem/pem_all.c:151 #10 0x402dba in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:592 #11 0x40370b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182 #12 0x402846 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226 #13 0x7fdd297b9f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 24 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18366) (cherry picked from commit 22a96c6be41897d11a18455b2ab142422bc57f3f)
2022-05-24Rename x86-32 assembly files from .s to .S.Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Rename x86-32 assembly files from .s to .S. While processing the .S file gcc will use the pre-processor whic will evaluate macros and ifdef. This is turn will be used to enable the endbr32 opcode based on the __CET__ define. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18353) (cherry picked from commit 9968c77539d6f7c5b1dcf0162fd4b57c144318c7)
2022-05-03Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Release: yes
2022-04-21str[n]casecmp => OPENSSL_strncasecmpDmitry Belyavskiy
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18103)
2022-04-14Add error code for unsupported explicit parametersTomas Mraz
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17998) (cherry picked from commit 53137462f42f8673fbd5b0831f8ea051ddea509f)
2022-04-14Import only named params into FIPS moduleTomas Mraz
Fixes #17978 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17998) (cherry picked from commit 638c3a28af45bd81a1c90b81efd8e10449eace1b)
2022-03-25Fix Coverity 1498612: integer overflowPauli
The assert added cannot ever fail because (current & 0xFFFF) != 0 from the while loop and the trailing zero bit count therefore cannot be as large as 32. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17892) (cherry picked from commit 81487b65b9eb8148471e729b8c1959521d62c69e)
2022-03-21Fix coverity 1498607: uninitialised valuePauli
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17897) (cherry picked from commit 70cd9a51911e9a4e2f24e29ddd84fa9fcb778b63)
2022-03-15Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2022-02-14Apply the correct Apache v2 licenseTomas Mraz
There were still a few files mentioning the old OpenSSL license. Fixes #17684 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17686) (cherry picked from commit 7585073892af9cffd28b7b5872c2b102b99af807)
2022-02-03Fix copyrightsTodd Short
Add copyright to files that were missing it. Update license from OpenSSL to Apache as needed. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17606) (cherry picked from commit 9d987de3aabe54e65a55649a61953966f33b070b)
2022-01-13Cleansing all the temporary data for s390xDmitry Belyavskiy
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17486) (cherry picked from commit 79c7acc59bb98c2b8451b048ed1dd8cc517df76e)
2022-01-11Fix: some patches related to error exitingPeiwei Hu
Signed-off-by: Peiwei Hu <jlu.hpw@foxmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17443)
2021-12-16EC_POINT_hex2point: forget to free ptPeiwei Hu
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17276) (cherry picked from commit dd2fcc1f7c44c5fb5aa2d33aecdc699c7018ce01)
2021-12-14Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2021-11-16Don't create an ECX key with short keysMatt Caswell
If an ECX key is created and the private key is too short, a fromdata call would create the key, and then later detect the error and report it after freeing the key. However freeing the key was calling OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() and assuming that the private key was of the correct length. If it was actually too short this will write over memory that it shouldn't. Fixes #17017 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17041) (cherry picked from commit 50938aec35fd57fb3bec707ead2eee381fcfaf04)
2021-11-08Fix incorrect return check of BN_bn2binpadPW Hu
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16942) (cherry picked from commit 098f2627c8d283a518a6e6e60e7893664c7510e0)
2021-10-27add checks for the return values of BN_new(), sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(),x2018
EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(). Otherwise may result in memory errors. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16892) (cherry picked from commit 9dddcd90a1350fa63486cbf3226c3eee79f9aff5)
2021-08-30[ec] Do not default to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE for curves without OIDNicola Tuveri
Some curves don't have an associated OID: for those we should not default to `OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE` encoding of parameters and instead set the ASN1 flag to `OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE`. This is a follow-up to https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12312 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16355)
2021-08-24Fix EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters to check the base lengthMatt Caswell
Check that there's at least one byte in params->base before trying to read it. CVE-2021-3712 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2021-07-29Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16176)
2021-07-22Update our EVP_PKEY_METHODs to get low level keys via public APIsMatt Caswell
It is possible to call built-in EVP_PKEY_METHOD functions with a provided key. For example this might occur if a custom EVP_PKEY_METHOD is in use that wraps a built-in EVP_PKEY_METHOD. Therefore our EVP_PKEY_METHOD functions should not assume that we are using a legacy key. Instead we get the low level key using EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA() or other similar functions. This "does the right thing" if the key is actually provided. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16118)
2021-07-15Split bignum code out of the sparcv9cap.cTomas Mraz
Fixes #15978 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16019)
2021-07-07CRYPTO: Remove the check for built-in methods in the export_to functionRichard Levitte
That check was seen as necessary at the time, but other changes have been made since, so we now have better control on when we're handling legacy structures and methods, making it safe to run the export_to function on keys with foreign methods. The basic message is that foreign methods must set key structure values according to our standards no matter what, or not set them at all. This has really always been the case, but was harder to see at the time because of interaction with other bugs. Fixes #15927 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15996)
2021-07-06fips module header inclusion fine-tunningTomas Mraz
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15974)
2021-06-25ppccap.c: Split out algorithm-specific functionsTomas Mraz
Fixes #13336 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15828)
2021-06-22ec: Only build ecp_nistp521-ppc64.s if enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128Martin Schwenke
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net> Signed-off-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15798)
2021-06-22ec: Add alignment pseudo-op at beginning of functionMartin Schwenke
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net> Reviewed-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15798)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-08-15 00:13:43 +0000