Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10676)
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10672)
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Verifications are public, there is no need to clear the used storage before
freeing it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10475)
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EC_POINT_bn2point() rejected BIGNUMs with a zero value.
This behavior indirectly caused failures when converting a point
at infinity through EC_POINT_point2hex() and then back to a point with
EC_POINT_hex2point().
With this change such BIGNUMs are treated like any other and exported to
an octet buffer filled with zero.
It is then EC_POINT_oct2point() (either the default implementation or
the custom one in group->meth->oct2point) to determine if such encoding
maps to a valid point (generally the point at infinity is encoded as
0x00).
Fixes #10258
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329)
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Previous macros suggested that from 3.0, we're only allowed to
deprecate things at a major version. However, there's no policy
stating this, but there is for removal, saying that to remove
something, it must have been deprecated for 5 years, and that removal
can only happen at a major version.
Meanwhile, the semantic versioning rule is that deprecation should
trigger a MINOR version update, which is reflected in the macro names
as of this change.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10364)
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...in constant time.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10339)
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The s390x x448 implementation does not correctly reduce non-canonical
values i.e., u-coordinates >= p = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10339)
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ecp_s390x_nistp.c and ecx_meth.c need to include s390x_arch.h.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10317)
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There is nothing confidential in `EC_GROUP` so really having a
`EC_GROUP_clear_free` function at all does not make much sense anymore.
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/9822
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9874)
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There is nothing confidential in `EC_GROUP` so really having a
`EC_GROUP_clear_free` function at all does not make much sense anymore.
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/9822
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9874)
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Implementations are now spread across several libraries, so the assembler
related defines need to be applied to all affected libraries and modules.
AES_ASM define was missing from libimplementations.a which disabled AESNI
aarch64 changes were made by xkqian.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10180)
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An unintended consequence of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808
is that when an explicit parameters curve is matched against one of the
well-known builtin curves we automatically inherit also the associated
seed parameter, even if the input parameters excluded such
parameter.
This later affects the serialization of such parsed keys, causing their
input DER encoding and output DER encoding to differ due to the
additional optional field.
This does not cause problems internally but could affect external
applications, as reported in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9811#issuecomment-536153288
This commit fixes the issue by conditionally clearing the seed field if
the original input parameters did not include it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10140)
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We put almost everything in these internal static libraries:
libcommon Block building code that can be used by all
our implementations, legacy and non-legacy
alike.
libimplementations All non-legacy algorithm implementations and
only them. All the code that ends up here is
agnostic to the definitions of FIPS_MODE.
liblegacy All legacy implementations.
libnonfips Support code for the algorithm implementations.
Built with FIPS_MODE undefined. Any code that
checks that FIPS_MODE isn't defined must end
up in this library.
libfips Support code for the algorithm implementations.
Built with FIPS_MODE defined. Any code that
checks that FIPS_MODE is defined must end up
in this library.
The FIPS provider module is built from providers/fips/*.c and linked
with libimplementations, libcommon and libfips.
The Legacy provider module is built from providers/legacy/*.c and
linked with liblegacy, libcommon and libcrypto.
If module building is disabled, the object files from liblegacy and
libcommon are added to libcrypto and the Legacy provider becomes a
built-in provider.
The Default provider module is built-in, so it ends up being linked
with libimplementations, libcommon and libnonfips. For libcrypto in
form of static library, the object files from those other libraries
are simply being added to libcrypto.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
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Also added blanks lines after declarations in a couple of places.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9916)
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Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below
For the public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory), the guard
names try to match the path specified in the include directives, with
all letters converted to upper case and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. For the
private header files files, an extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
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Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
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Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
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using PCC and KDSA instructions.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
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of instruction parameter blocks.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
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They now generally conform to the following argument sequence:
script.pl "$(PERLASM_SCHEME)" [ C preprocessor arguments ... ] \
$(PROCESSOR) <output file>
However, in the spirit of being able to use these scripts manually,
they also allow for no argument, or for only the flavour, or for only
the output file. This is done by only using the last argument as
output file if it's a file (it has an extension), and only using the
first argument as flavour if it isn't a file (it doesn't have an
extension).
While we're at it, we make all $xlate calls the same, i.e. the $output
argument is always quoted, and we always die on error when trying to
start $xlate.
There's a perl lesson in this, regarding operator priority...
This will always succeed, even when it fails:
open FOO, "something" || die "ERR: $!";
The reason is that '||' has higher priority than list operators (a
function is essentially a list operator and gobbles up everything
following it that isn't lower priority), and since a non-empty string
is always true, so that ends up being exactly the same as:
open FOO, "something";
This, however, will fail if "something" can't be opened:
open FOO, "something" or die "ERR: $!";
The reason is that 'or' has lower priority that list operators,
i.e. it's performed after the 'open' call.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9884)
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Since the arguments are now generated in the build file templates,
they should be removed from the build.info files.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9884)
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9830)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9833)
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The output C code was made to use ERR_func_error_string() to see if a
string table was already loaded or not. Since this function returns
NULL always, this check became useless.
Change it to use ERR_reason_error_string() instead, as there's no
reason to believe we will get rid of reason strings, ever.
To top it off, we rebuild all affected C sources.
Fixes #9756
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9756)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9814)
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Description
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Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
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Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific
BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_lebin2bn().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
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BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the
processed BIGNUM.
The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and
ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the
internal fixed length representation.
This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce
while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations.
The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack
varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the
ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the
size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM
representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture).
To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with BN_bn2binpad(), bounding the
output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this
length is public.
Internally the final implementation of both BN_bn2binpad() and
BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top
through memory access patterns.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside
setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
Finally, the internal implementation of BN_bn2binpad() indirectly calls
BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of
BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed
in the next commit.
Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
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The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present.
This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code.
This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent.
It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero).
The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks.
CVE-2019-1547
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9827)
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This function re-implements EVP_MD_meth_free(), but has a name that
isn't encumbered by legacy EVP_MD construction functionality.
We also refactor most of EVP_MD_meth_new() into an internal
evp_md_new() that's used when creating fetched methods.
EVP_MD_meth_new() and EVP_MD_meth_free() are rewritten in terms of
evp_md_new() and EVP_MD_free(). This means that at any time, we can
deprecate all the EVP_MD_meth_ functions with no harmful consequence.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9758)
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Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9607)
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for NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 using KDSA instruction.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
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which are already enabled for ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
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for NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 using PCC instruction.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
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fixes #8936
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9132)
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When creating a BN_CTX, make sure we store it in the right variable!
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9546)
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Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9380)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9466)
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Some have been creeping into the source code.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9397)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9058)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9111)
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Adds simple utility functions to allow both the default and fips providers to
encode and decode DSA-Sig-Value and ECDSA-Sig-Value (DSA_SIG and ECDSA_SIG
structures) to/from ASN.1 DER without requiring those providers to have a
dependency on the asn1 module.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9111)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9321)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9288)
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SM2 certificate signing request can be created and signed by OpenSSL
now, both in library and apps.
Documentation and test cases are added.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9085)
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Once there are buildable fips tests, some tests that are data driven
from files will need to be modified to exclude non approved curves in
fips mode.
These changes were tested by temporarily adding #define FIPS_MODE 1 to
all the modified source files.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9081)
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After avoiding OPENSSL_memcmp for EC curve comparison, there are no remaining
uses in the source code. The function is only defined in an internal header
and thus should be safe to remove for 3.0.0.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9207)
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