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2022-05-24Fix undefined behaviour in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparametersBernd Edlinger
This happens for instance with fuzz/corpora/asn1/65cf44e85614c62f10cf3b7a7184c26293a19e4a and causes the OPENSSL_malloc below to choke on the zero length allocation request. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18363)
2022-05-24Fix a memory leak in ec_key_simple_oct2privBernd Edlinger
This is reproducible with my error injection patch: $ ERROR_INJECT=1652710284 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./server-test ./corpora/server/4e48da8aecce6b9b58e8e4dbbf0523e6d2dd56dc 140587884632000:error:03078041:bignum routines:bn_expand_internal:malloc failure:crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:282: 140587884632000:error:10103003:elliptic curve routines:ec_key_simple_oct2priv:BN lib:crypto/ec/ec_key.c:662: 140587884632000:error:100DE08E:elliptic curve routines:old_ec_priv_decode:decode error:crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:464: 140587884632000:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1149: 140587884632000:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_item_embed_d2i:nested asn1 error:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:309:Type=X509_ALGOR 140587884632000:error:0D08303A:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_template_noexp_d2i:nested asn1 error:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:646:Field=pkeyalg, Type=PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 140587884632000:error:0907B00D:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey:ASN1 lib:crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c:88: ================================================================= ==19676==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fdd2a6bb09f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69 #1 0x7fdd2a2fa430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230 #2 0x7fdd2a15df11 in BN_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:246 #3 0x7fdd2a15df88 in BN_secure_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:257 #4 0x7fdd2a247390 in ec_key_simple_oct2priv crypto/ec/ec_key.c:655 #5 0x7fdd2a241fc5 in d2i_ECPrivateKey crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1030 #6 0x7fdd2a23dac5 in old_ec_priv_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:463 #7 0x7fdd2a109db7 in d2i_PrivateKey crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c:46 #8 0x7fdd2a33ab16 in PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c:84 #9 0x7fdd2a3330b6 in PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey crypto/pem/pem_all.c:151 #10 0x402dba in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:592 #11 0x40370b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182 #12 0x402846 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226 #13 0x7fdd297b9f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 24 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18361)
2022-05-03Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Release: yes
2022-03-25Fix Coverity 1498612: integer overflowPauli
The assert added cannot ever fail because (current & 0xFFFF) != 0 from the while loop and the trailing zero bit count therefore cannot be as large as 32. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17892) (cherry picked from commit 81487b65b9eb8148471e729b8c1959521d62c69e)
2022-03-21Fix coverity 1498607: uninitialised valuePauli
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17897) (cherry picked from commit 70cd9a51911e9a4e2f24e29ddd84fa9fcb778b63)
2021-12-14Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17271)
2021-08-30[ec] Do not default to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE for curves without OIDNicola Tuveri
Some curves don't have an associated OID: for those we should not default to `OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE` encoding of parameters and instead set the ASN1 flag to `OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE`. This is a follow-up to https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12312 (cherry picked from commit 7aa3dfc42104588f65301d20324388ac2c9a6b11) Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12457)
2021-08-25Fix some strict gcc-12 warningsBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16375)
2021-08-24Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2021-08-24Fix EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters to check the base lengthMatt Caswell
Check that there's at least one byte in params->base before trying to read it. CVE-2021-3712 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
2021-05-17Avoid division by zero in hybrid point encodingTheo Buehler
In hybrid and compressed point encodings, the form octet contains a bit of information allowing to calculate y from x. For a point on a binary curve, this bit is zero if x is zero, otherwise it must match the rightmost bit of of the field element y / x. The existing code only considers the second possibility. It could thus incorrecly fail with a division by zero error as found by Guido Vranken's cryptofuzz. This commit adds a few explanatory comments to oct2point. The only actual code change is in the last hunk which adds a BN_is_zero(x) check to avoid the division by zero. Fixes #15021 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15112)
2020-09-22Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12949)
2020-09-21EC_KEY: add EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params()Tomas Mraz
The function returns 1 when the encoding of a decoded EC key used explicit encoding of the curve parameters. Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12909)
2020-09-20Fix: ecp_nistz256-armv4.S bad argumentsHenry N
Fix this error: crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3853: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r10' crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3854: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r12' crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3855: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orrs r11,r14' CLA: trivial Fixes #12848 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> GH: #12854 (cherry picked from commit b5f82567afa820bac55b7dd7eb9dd510c32c3ef6)
2020-08-27Ignore vendor name in Clang version number.Jung-uk Kim
For example, FreeBSD prepends "FreeBSD" to version string, e.g., FreeBSD clang version 11.0.0 (git@github.com:llvm/llvm-project.git llvmorg-11.0.0-rc2-0-g414f32a9e86) Target: x86_64-unknown-freebsd13.0 Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /usr/bin This prevented us from properly detecting AVX support, etc. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12725) (cherry picked from commit cd84d8832d274357a5ba5433640d7ef76691b1ac)
2020-07-04[EC][ASN1] Detect missing OID when serializing EC parameters and keysNicola Tuveri
The following built-in curves do not have an assigned OID: - Oakley-EC2N-3 - Oakley-EC2N-4 In general we shouldn't assume that an OID is always available. This commit detects such cases, raises an error and returns appropriate return values so that the condition can be detected and correctly handled by the callers, when serializing EC parameters or EC keys with the default `ec_param_enc:named_curve`. Fixes #12306 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12312)
2020-06-07[crypto/ec] Remove unreachable AVX2 code in NISTZ256 implementationNicola Tuveri
`crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c` contained code sections guarded by a `ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2` define. The relevant comment read: > /* > * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great > * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation > * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication > * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result > * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that > * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work, > * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module. > */ Without diminishing the quality of the original submission, it's evident that this code has been basically unreachable without modifications to the library source code and is under-tested. This commit removes these sections from the codebase. (cherry picked from commit 00da0f69890874feaa555fafb99b967b861e9118 , backported from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12019 ) Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12046)
2020-05-27Avoid undefined behavior with unaligned accessesBernd Edlinger
Fixes: #4983 [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11781)
2020-04-24Fix typo from #10631Nicola Tuveri
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11595) (cherry picked from commit 4692e98bdbaebb6f078e89a75c54395839e68b24)
2020-04-24[EC] harden EC_KEY against leaks from memory accessesNicola Tuveri
We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key, so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM` holding the secret scalar. This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when the called specifically set it. The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer. In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated correctly and should not generate unintended consequences. Setting the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag alone is never enough, we also have to preallocate the `BIGNUM` internal buffer to a fixed public size big enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory accesses. Fixed Length ------------ The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid secret scalars. For preallocating the `BIGNUM` storage we look at the number of "words" required for the internal representation of the order, and we preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing might temporarily overflow the order length. Future work ----------- A separate commit addresses further hardening of `BN_copy()` (and indirectly `BN_dup()`). (cherry picked from commit 0401d766afcd022748763f5614188301c9856c6e) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11127)
2020-04-24[EC] Constify internal EC_KEY pointer usageNicola Tuveri
A pair of internal functions related to EC_KEY handling could benefit from declaring `EC_KEY *` variables as `const`, providing clarity for callers and readers of the code, in addition to enlisting the compiler in preventing some mistakes. (cherry picked from commit cd701de96a147260c2290d85af8a0656120a8ff8) In master `id2_ECParameters` and most of the ASN1 public functions have been properly constified in their signature. Unfortunately this has been deemed not doable in a patch release for 1.1.1 as, in subtle ways, this would break API compatibility. See the discussion at https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9347 for more details about this. This constification commit should still be portable w.r.t. our criteria, as the constification happens only on internal functions. The fix here is to explicitly discard the const qualifier before the call to `i2d_ECParameters`, which should be safe anyway because we can expect `i2d_ECParameters()` to treat the first argument as if it was const. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11127)
2020-04-21Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2020-04-07[crypto/ec] blind coordinates in ec_wNAF_mul for robustnessBilly Brumley
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nicola.tuveri@ibm.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11439) (cherry picked from commit c61ced5ec50fc68707c7cea79f7df1d170f03f13)
2020-04-07Fix the error handling in EC_POINTs_mulBernd Edlinger
This was pointed out by a false-positive -fsanitizer warning ;-) However from the cryptographical POV the code is wrong: A point R^0 on the wrong curve is infinity on the wrong curve. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475) (cherry picked from commit 1eb9b54af7e00fa12196411964ce742ea8677766)
2020-04-07Ensure ECDSA_size always returns >= 0William Brawner
Fixes #10484 Signed-off-by: William Brawner <me@wbrawner.com> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11472)
2020-04-01[crypto/ec] Ladder tweaksBilly Brumley
- Convert to affine coords on ladder entry. This lets us use more efficient ladder step formulae. - Convert to affine coords on ladder exit. This prevents the current code awkwardness where conversion happens twice during serialization: first to fetch the buffer size, then again to fetch the coords. - Instead of projectively blinding the input point, blind both accumulators independently. (cherry picked from commit a4a93bbfb0e679eaa249f77c7c4e7e823ca870ef) Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)
2020-03-17Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11344)
2020-03-05crypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c: fix EBCDIC platformsPatrick Steuer
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11229) (cherry picked from commit af7f656cd91d99d62567e2b20c61f07cb4d81d0b)
2020-02-28Fix comment placement in ecp_nistp256.ciScott Arciszewski
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11175) (cherry picked from commit c590be6f12d0b725863961e41bc64a81c8cf30d6)
2020-02-17Do not silently truncate files on perlasm errorsDavid Benjamin
If one of the perlasm xlate drivers crashes, OpenSSL's build will currently swallow the error and silently truncate the output to however far the driver got. This will hopefully fail to build, but better to check such things. Handle this by checking for errors when closing STDOUT (which is a pipe to the xlate driver). This is the OpenSSL 1.1.1 version of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930. Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10931)
2020-01-17For all assembler scripts where it matters, recognise clang > 9.xRichard Levitte
Fixes #10853 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10857)
2020-01-05Fix incorrect return code on ECDSA key verificationAndrew Hoang
ECDSA_do_verify() is a function that verifies a ECDSA signature given a hash and a public EC key. The function is supposed to return 1 on valid signature, 0 on invalid signature and -1 on error. Previously, we returned 0 if the key did not have a verify_sig method. This is actually an error case and not an invalid signature. Consequently, this patch updates the return code to -1. Fixes #8766 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10693) (cherry picked from commit 26583f6aa8dc28e3598e61db66e54e2fdf8b195f)
2020-01-05Fix side channel in ecp_nistz256-armv8.plFangming.Fang
This change addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the internals of nistz256 low level operations for armv8. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit f5a659b6dfcc735a62c712dcca64d116d2289b97)
2020-01-05Fix side channel in the ecp_nistz256.c reference implementationBernd Edlinger
This is only used if configured with ./config -DECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit 7d4716648e8348dea862e198b9395478fae01907)
2020-01-05Improve side channel fix in ecp_nistz256-x86_64.plBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit e9fe87950db2e6169029b2ecf3ed09d64265bc9c)
2020-01-05Fix side channel in ecp_nistz256-armv4.plBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit 3d139746ca72f0906c036d0a4a3e176c7b61ed1b)
2020-01-05Fix side channel in ecp_nistz256-x86.plBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit 0de3399b691f025153c8001045d5eeb0909dfd7a)
2020-01-05Avoid leaking intermediate states in point doubling special case.David Benjamin
Cherry picked from https://github.com/google/boringssl/commit/12d9ed670da3edd64ce8175cfe0e091982989c18 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit 2baea7c7e0896658b74956cac6084dd7e82e8c1b)
2020-01-05Fix potential SCA vulnerability in some EC_METHODsNicola Tuveri
This commit addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the internals of some elliptic curve low level operations. The side-channel leakage appears to be tiny, so the severity of this issue is rather low. The issue was reported by David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239) (cherry picked from commit 3cb914c463ed1c9e32cfb773d816139a61b6ad5f)
2019-12-23Add some missing cfi frame info in x25519-x86_64.plBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10676) (cherry picked from commit 9d079f2744b9b624c6fe75f95fc0f766ef88ffcf)
2019-12-23Add some missing cfi frame info in ecp_nistz256-x86_64.plBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10672) (cherry picked from commit eff5076a78502d1ac04669e44127d4bd7c0a9ce7)
2019-11-21ECDSA: don't clear free memory after verify.Pauli
Verifications are public, there is no need to clear the used storage before freeing it. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10475) (cherry picked from commit cff7d199e0dc51ae939de5fb7702aab2a9ef30fc)
2019-11-13Fix EC_POINT_bn2point() for BN_zero()Nicola Tuveri
EC_POINT_bn2point() rejected BIGNUMs with a zero value. This behavior indirectly caused failures when converting a point at infinity through EC_POINT_point2hex() and then back to a point with EC_POINT_hex2point(). With this change such BIGNUMs are treated like any other and exported to an octet buffer filled with zero. It is then EC_POINT_oct2point() (either the default implementation or the custom one in group->meth->oct2point) to determine if such encoding maps to a valid point (generally the point at infinity is encoded as 0x00). Fixes #10258 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329) (cherry picked from commit d47c10875656790d146f62ac3c437db54c58dbf7)
2019-10-15[ec_asn1.c] Avoid injecting seed when built-in matchesNicola Tuveri
An unintended consequence of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808 is that when an explicit parameters curve is matched against one of the well-known builtin curves we automatically inherit also the associated seed parameter, even if the input parameters excluded such parameter. This later affects the serialization of such parsed keys, causing their input DER encoding and output DER encoding to differ due to the additional optional field. This does not cause problems internally but could affect external applications, as reported in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9811#issuecomment-536153288 This commit fixes the issue by conditionally clearing the seed field if the original input parameters did not include it. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10140) (cherry picked from commit f97a8af2f3f3573f0759693117c9d33d2a63c27e)
2019-09-27Fix header file include guard namesDr. Matthias St. Pierre
Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according to the naming conventions below The public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory) are not changed in 1.1.1, because it is a stable release. For the private header files files, the guard names try to match the path specified in the include directives, with all letters converted to upper case and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. An extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
2019-09-27Reorganize local header filesDr. Matthias St. Pierre
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called local header files, which are located next to source files in the source directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like '*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h' This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
2019-09-27Reorganize private crypto header filesDr. Matthias St. Pierre
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally: While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal' are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only. To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this ambiguity: #include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal' #include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal' This commit moves the private crypto headers from 'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto' As a result, the include directives become unambiguous #include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal' #include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto' hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped. The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially; they are joined into a single file. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
2019-09-16clearing the ecx private key memoryManishPatidar1
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9830) (cherry picked from commit 6ef03ea98fac501e6d6e33bac6ad3c92ea074712)
2019-09-13Fix potential memory leaks with BN_to_ASN1_INTEGERBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9833) (cherry picked from commit f28bc7d386b25fb75625d0c62c6b2e6d21de0d09)
2019-09-10Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9847)
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