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2019-05-31Fix various mistakes in ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits comment.David Benjamin
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9050) (cherry picked from commit 8be6a4ed02297f380bbea269f2e1c08a592444bc)
2019-05-28Update copyright yearRichard Levitte
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9034)
2019-05-22EVP_Digest*: enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSAPatrick Steuer
Fixes #8957 Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8970) (cherry picked from commit e8d0678da4942dd027981175b16b6b3162731205)
2019-04-14Don't use coordinate blinding when scalar is group orderBernd Edlinger
This happens in ec_key_simple_check_key and EC_GROUP_check. Since the the group order is not a secret scalar, it is unnecessary to use coordinate blinding. Fixes: #8731 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8734) (cherry picked from commit 3051bf2afab7ac8b7b9c64e68755d1addd2fb8ff)
2019-04-11Fixed linux_x86_icc compiler errors in EC code related to __uint128_t/__int128_tShane Lontis
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8697) (cherry picked from commit 3a86f1db282569c538273cc48462a3fa5fcffa39)
2019-03-30fixed public range check in ec_GF2m_simple_oct2pointShane Lontis
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8607) (cherry picked from commit cad8347be23c5e0c0d9eea02d090d42daf2dd7a9)
2019-03-19Added NULL check to BN_clear() & BN_CTX_end()Shane Lontis
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8518) (cherry picked from commit ce1415ed2ce15305356cd028bcf7b9bc688d6d5c)
2019-03-18Clear the point S before freeing in ec_scalar_mul_ladderBernd Edlinger
The secret point R can be recovered from S using the equation R = S - P. The X and Z coordinates should be sufficient for that. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8504) (cherry picked from commit 8a74bb5c7becbd7492f4445b852602c3e88ba143)
2019-03-18Clear the secret point in ecdh_simple_compute_keyBernd Edlinger
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8501) (cherry picked from commit 1ff2c992c24c330c0d40708b4169b862563d6aab)
2019-03-11fix truncation of integers on 32bit AIXShane Lontis
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8417) (cherry picked from commit 98f29466dc1ed7f80b9b8750309a41b5a1150d25)
2019-03-07Avoid an underflow in ecp_nistp521.cMatt Caswell
The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in| from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p (which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the underflow is avoided. It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve. Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and therefore no CVE has been assigned. This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure option. With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant help in investigating this issue. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405) (cherry picked from commit 13fbce17fc9f02e2401fc3868f3f8e02d6647e5f)
2019-02-27Fix the default digest algorthm of SM2Paul Yang
Currently SM2 shares the ameth with EC, so the current default digest algorithm returned is SHA256. This fixes the default digest algorithm of SM2 to SM3, which is the only valid digest algorithm for SM2 signature. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8186) (cherry picked from commit e766f4a0531bffdab8ad2038279b755928d7a40a)
2019-02-26Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8347)
2019-02-25Rearrange the inclusion of curve448/curve448_lcl.hRichard Levitte
The real cause for this change is that test/ec_internal_test.c includes ec_lcl.h, and including curve448/curve448_lcl.h from there doesn't work so well with compilers who always do inclusions relative to the C file being compiled. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8334)
2019-02-20SCA hardening for mod. field inversion in EC_GROUPBilly Brumley
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures. The new pointer is defined as: `int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)` and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field, storing the result in `r`. Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA countermeasures: - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through blinding. - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) inversion. - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which already features SCA hardening through blinding. From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e., `EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack states. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit e0033efc30b0f00476bba8f0fa5512be5dc8a3f1) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)
2019-02-17Fix some CFI issues in x86_64 assemblyDavid Benjamin
The add/double shortcut in ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl left one instruction point that did not unwind, and the "slow" path in AES_cbc_encrypt was not annotated correctly. For the latter, add .cfi_{remember,restore}_state support to perlasm. Next, fill in a bunch of functions that are missing no-op .cfi_startproc and .cfi_endproc blocks. libunwind cannot unwind those stack frames otherwise. Finally, work around a bug in libunwind by not encoding rflags. (rflags isn't a callee-saved register, so there's not much need to annotate it anyway.) These were found as part of ABI testing work in BoringSSL. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> GH: #8109 (cherry picked from commit c0e8e5007ba5234d4d448e82a1567e0c4467e629)
2019-02-13AArch64 assembly pack: authenticate return addresses.Andy Polyakov
ARMv8.3 adds pointer authentication extension, which in this case allows to ensure that, when offloaded to stack, return address is same at return as at entry to the subroutine. The new instructions are nops on processors that don't implement the extension, so that the vetification is backward compatible. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8205) (cherry picked from commit 9a18aae5f21efc59da8b697ad67d5d37b95ab322)
2019-02-05Remove unnecessary trailing whitespaceSam Roberts
Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards, AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling. Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source. Backport-of: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8134)
2018-12-11Disallow Ed448 signature malleabilityMatt Caswell
Check that s is less than the order before attempting to verify the signature as per RFC8032 5.2.7 Fixes #7706 Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7748) (cherry picked from commit 08afd2f37a4465c90b9b9e2081c9e8df4726db89)
2018-12-06curve25519.c: improve formula alignmentDr. Matthias St. Pierre
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7750) (cherry picked from commit 425dde5d75a6ffff9a1027107711b99da39e3519)
2018-12-06curve25519.c: reformat code to follow coding guidelinesDr. Matthias St. Pierre
Fixes #7698 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7750) (cherry picked from commit 3a17b9a46ecf54a30073534dff04e3223ff98813)
2018-12-03Disallow Ed25519 signature maleabilityMatt Caswell
Check that s is less than the order before attempting to verify the signature as per RFC8032 5.1.7 Fixes #7693 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7697) (cherry picked from commit 0ac8f35c04c4fcdee421170ae6351e42b9e84ce4)
2018-11-24Stop marking default digest for EC keys as mandatoryDavid Woodhouse
ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID is documented to return 2 for a mandatory digest algorithm, when the key can't support any others. That isn't true here, so return 1 instead. Partially fixes #7348 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit eb7eb1378cd15c4652884b3701d4c0ef27b5b8a6) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7609)
2018-10-29Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735)Pauli
Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation that can potentially provide a side channel. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486) (cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
2018-10-17EVP module documentation passAntoine Salon
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63() Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345) (cherry picked from commit ffd89124bdfc9e69349492c3f15383bb35520a11)
2018-09-11Update copyright yearMatt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)
2018-09-05Harmonize the error handling codepathNicola Tuveri
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7121)
2018-09-05Fix segfault in RSA_free() (and DSA/DH/EC_KEY)Nicola Tuveri
`RSA_free()` and friends are called in case of error from `RSA_new_method(ENGINE *e)` (or the respective equivalent functions). For the rest of the description I'll talk about `RSA_*`, but the same applies for the equivalent `DSA_free()`, `DH_free()`, `EC_KEY_free()`. If `RSA_new_method()` fails because the engine does not implement the required method, when `RSA_free(RSA *r)` is called, `r->meth == NULL` and a segfault happens while checking if `r->meth->finish` is defined. This commit fixes this issue by ensuring that `r->meth` is not NULL before dereferencing it to check for `r->meth->finish`. Fixes #7102 . Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7121)
2018-09-03[test] throw error from wrapper function instead of an EC_METHOD specific oneBilly Brumley
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7028)
2018-08-22Improve the usability of the ca app using EdDSAMatt Caswell
Previously you had to supply "null" as the digest to use EdDSA. This changes things so that any digest is ignored. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6901)
2018-08-21Replace GFp ladder implementation with ladd-2002-it-4 from EFDNicola Tuveri
The EFD database does not state that the "ladd-2002-it-3" algorithm assumes X1 != 0. Consequently the current implementation, based on it, fails to compute correctly if the affine x coordinate of the scalar multiplication input point is 0. We replace this implementation using the alternative algorithm based on Eq. (9) and (10) from the same paper, which being derived from the additive relation of (6) does not incur in this problem, but costs one extra field multiplication. The EFD entry for this algorithm is at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4 and the code to implement it was generated with tooling. Regression tests add one positive test for each named curve that has such a point. The `SharedSecret` was generated independently from the OpenSSL codebase with sage. This bug was originally reported by Dmitry Belyavsky on the openssl-users maling list: https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008540.html Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7000)
2018-08-03Fix some undefined behaviour in the Curve448 code (2nd attempt)Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
Fixes #6800 Replaces #5418 This commit reverts commit 7876dbffcee9 and moves the check for a zero-length input down the callstack into sha3_update(). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6838)
2018-07-31Deprecate the EC curve type specific functions in 1.2.0Matt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
2018-07-31Use the new non-curve type specific EC functions internallyMatt Caswell
Fixes #6646 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
2018-07-31Provide EC functions that are not curve type specificMatt Caswell
Some EC functions exist in *_GFp and *_GF2m forms, in spite of the implementations between the two curve types being identical. This commit provides equivalent generic functions with the *_GFp and *_GF2m forms just calling the generic functions. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
2018-07-26EC GFp ladderBilly Brumley
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690 (alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks. The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto generated with tooling, from the following formulae: - `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2 - `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10) from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3 - `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in projective coordinates. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
2018-07-26Add ec/asm/x25519-ppc64.pl module.Andy Polyakov
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6782)
2018-07-25Check for failures, to avoid memory leakRich Salz
Thanks to Jiecheng Wu, Zuxing Gu for the report. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6791)
2018-07-25ec/ecp_nistz256.c: fix Coverity nit.Andy Polyakov
|ctx| recently became unconditionally non-NULL and is already dereferenced earlier. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2018-07-22ec/ecp_nistz256.c: fix ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine.Andy Polyakov
ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine is called when application attempts to use custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though it was wrong, it didn't affect point operations, they were just not as fast as expected. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6738)
2018-07-22ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-{!x86_64}.pl: fix scatter_w7 function.Andy Polyakov
The ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 function is called when application attempts to use custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though non-x86_64 versions were wrong, it didn't affect point operations, they were just not as fast as expected. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6738)
2018-07-20ec/ec_lcl.h: fix pre-C9x compilation problems.Andy Polyakov
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)
2018-07-18ec/ecdsa_ossl.c: switch to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.Andy Polyakov
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
2018-07-18ec/ecdsa_ossl.c: formatting and readability fixes.Andy Polyakov
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
2018-07-18ec/ecdsa_ossl.c: revert blinding in ECDSA signature.Andy Polyakov
Originally suggested solution for "Return Of the Hidden Number Problem" is arguably too expensive. While it has marginal impact on slower curves, none to ~6%, optimized implementations suffer real penalties. Most notably sign with P-256 went more than 2 times[!] slower. Instead, just implement constant-time BN_mod_add_quick. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
2018-07-17Fix typo in x25519-x86_64.plMat
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6726)
2018-07-16EC2M Lopez-Dahab ladder: use it also for ECDSA verifyNicola Tuveri
By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint). ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case. With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it. While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and again in every single implementation (and actually some implementations lacked some of the tests). I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes these changes. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
2018-07-16EC2M Lopez-Dahab ladder implementationNicola Tuveri
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands. The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is auto generated with tooling: - see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the `ladder_pre` implementation; - see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3 for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in `ladder_step`; - see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m) without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in affine coordinates. Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
2018-07-16EC point multiplication: add `ladder` scaffoldNicola Tuveri
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret scalar is feed to the point multiplication). The newly introduced default implementation directly used EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop. The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling and different coordinate systems. - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R. Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling; - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could, e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential addition-and-doubling; - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of the result point. This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`, as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily constant-time themselves. What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar. Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
2018-07-16Remove stale SM2 error codesNicola Tuveri
Run `make update ERROR_REBUILD=-rebuild` to remove some stale error codes for SM2 (which is now using its own submodule for error codes, i.e., `SM2_*`). Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
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