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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Fixes #13082
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13106)
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Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
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Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9847)
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An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6371)
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The function CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey() is a "set0" and therefore
memory management passes to OpenSSL. If the same function is called again
then we should ensure that any previous value that was set is freed first
before we set it again.
Fixes #5052
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6142)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4115)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1300)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Make X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP,
and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD opaque.
Remove unused X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Continuing from previous commit ensure our style is consistent for malloc
return checks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules. Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.
The header files that got moved are:
crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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After the finale, the "real" final part. :) Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This commit handles BIO_ACCEPT_free BIO_CB_FREE BIO_CONNECT_free
BIO_free BIO_free_all BIO_vfree
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Move ASN.1 internals used across multiple directories into new internal
header file asn1_int.h remove crypto/Makefile hack which allowed other
directories to include "asn1_locl.h"
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.
PR#3348
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If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
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Add hooks to support key agreement recipient info type (KARI) using
algorithm specific code in the relevant public key ASN1 method.
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continue with symmetric decryption process to avoid leaking timing
information to an attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
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e_os2.h, this should fix WIN32 compilation issues and hopefully avoid
conflicts with other headers which may workaround ssize_t in different ways.
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PR:1664
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Make streaming support in cms cleaner.
Note errors in various S/MIME functions if CMS_final() fails.
Add streaming support for enveloped data.
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Generalise RecipientInfo and enveloped data handling so applications can
add their own key lookup routines as well as using the standard ones.
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Fix signed data creation so versions are only corrected if structure is
being created.
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