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A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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If no-module or no-shared is used, the symbols from
libcrypto should not be duplicated in legacy.a
Also the BIGNUM functions are currently not needed
in legacy.a at all.
Fixes #20124
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20137)
(cherry picked from commit f6a6f7b6aa84dab44384780cb77050d15c5f575e)
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Otherwise the alloca can cause an exception.
Issue reported by Jiayi Lin.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20005)
(cherry picked from commit 30667f5c306dbc11ac0e6fddc7d26fd984d546ab)
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This reverts commit 4378e3cd2a4d73a97a2349efaa143059d8ed05e8.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20005)
(cherry picked from commit 92d306b32b63dd502531a89fb96c4172be0ddb49)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19597)
(cherry picked from commit 4b65d79d7132d6e46bfb385a76082f6502ef617b)
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Fixes #19584
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19597)
(cherry picked from commit 9506a2e274c643b94a2c265019ea9288f99a521a)
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This reverts commit 8511520842b744d1794ea794c032ce5f78cd874b.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19597)
(cherry picked from commit f83490fb9ce4dd1c09d4f94526fbcad14bd2fd85)
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Fixes #9205
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19954)
(cherry picked from commit 177d433bda2ffd287d676bc53b549b6c246973e6)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19803)
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partially revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- host name -> hostname
- ipv6 -> IPv6
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
(cherry picked from commit c7340583097a80a4fe42bacea745b2bbaa6d16db)
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partially revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- file name -> filename
- host name -> hostname
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
(cherry picked from commit 1567a821a4616f59748fa8982724f88e542867d6)
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In the reference C implementation in bn_asm.c, tp[num + 1] contains the
carry bit for accumulations into tp[num]. tp[num + 1] is only ever
assigned, never itself incremented.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18883)
(cherry picked from commit 2f1112b22a826dc8854b41b60a422c987f8ddafb)
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Multiplication""
This reverts commit 712d9cc90e355b2c98a959d4e9398610d2269c9e.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18883)
(cherry picked from commit eae70100fadbc94f18ba7a729bf065cb524a9fc9)
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Reduce the Miller Rabin counts to the values specified by FIPS 186-5.
The old code was using a fixed value of 64.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19579)
(cherry picked from commit d2f6e66d2837bff1f5f7636bb2118e3a45c9df61)
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FIPS 186-4 has 5 different algorithms for key generation,
and all of them rely on testing GCD(a,n) == 1 many times.
Cachegrind was showing that during a RSA keygen operation,
the function BN_gcd() was taking a considerable percentage
of the total cycles.
The default provider uses multiprime keygen, which seemed to
be much faster. This is because it uses BN_mod_inverse()
instead.
For a 4096 bit key, the entropy of a key that was taking a
long time to generate was recorded and fed back into subsequent
runs. Roughly 40% of the cycle time was BN_gcd() with most of the
remainder in the prime testing. Changing to use the inverse
resulted in the cycle count being 96% in the prime testing.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19578)
(cherry picked from commit dd1d7bcb69994d81662e709b0ad838880b943870)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18518)
(cherry picked from commit a644cb7c1c19c78e2ca393c8ca36989e7ca61715)
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Otherwise the powerbufLen can overflow.
Issue reported by Jiayi Lin.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19632)
(cherry picked from commit 4378e3cd2a4d73a97a2349efaa143059d8ed05e8)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17392)
(cherry picked from commit e304aa87b35fac5ea97c405dd3c21549faa45e78)
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This is likely the leftover of a previous hack,
and thus should be removed now.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17259)
(cherry picked from commit 17cca0e85e83eac23069ddc5c5ebab6d7dd13ee1)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
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It uses AVX512_IFMA + AVX512_VL (with 256-bit wide registers) ISA to
keep lower power license.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14908)
(cherry picked from commit f87b4c4ea67393c9269663ed40a7ea3463cc59d3)
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This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligible.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Addional Notes
--------------
This patch is a copy of the work done by Tamas Petz in boringssl. It
contains the changes from the following commits:
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
aarch64: Improve conditional compilation
Change-Id: I14902a64e5f403c2b6a117bc9f5fb1a4f4611ebf
URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43524
aarch64: Fix name of gnu property note section
Change-Id: I6c432d1c852129e9c273f6469a8b60e3983671ec
URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44024
Change-Id: I2d95ebc5e4aeb5610d3b226f9754ee80cf74a9af
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16674)
(cherry picked from commit 19e277dd19f2897f6a7b7eb236abe46655e575bf)
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This happens rarely, but only because very few CI runs
use the exotic CPU type that is necessary to execute
anything within rsaz_exp_x2.c and enable UBSAN at the same time.
crypto/bn/rsaz_exp_x2.c:562:20: runtime error: load of misaligned address 0x612000022cc6 for type 'uint64_t' (aka 'unsigned long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x612000022cc6: note: pointer points here
84 a3 78 e0 8e 8d 4a a5 51 9c 57 d0 d6 41 f3 26 d1 4e e1 98 42 b5 3a 9f 04 f1 73 d2 1d bf 73 44
^
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior crypto/bn/rsaz_exp_x2.c:562:20 in
../../util/wrap.pl ../../fuzz/server-test ../../fuzz/corpora/server => 1
not ok 2 - Fuzzing server
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19412)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19382)
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Apple LLVM has a different version numbering scheme than upstream LLVM.
That makes for quite a bit of confusion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xcode#Toolchain_versions to the rescue,
they have collected quite a lot of useful data.
This change is concentrated around the `$avx512ifma` flag
Fixes #16670 for OpenSSL 3.0
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19352)
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BN_check_prime() is supposed to return 0 for a composite number and -1
on error. Properly translate the return value of the internal function
ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(), where 0 means an error.
The confusion prevented BN_GENCB callbacks from aborting the primality
test or key generation routines utilizing this.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19314)
(cherry picked from commit 0b3867634f74f6cb7b60b3a0adde396421207214)
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The patch enables BN_rand_range() to exit immediately
if BIGNUM *rnd is NULL.
CLA: trivial
Fixes: #18951
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18982)
(cherry picked from commit 70f589ae41928edda18470ba1c3df82af02a92b3)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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BN_one() uses the expand function which calls malloc which may fail.
All other places that reference BN_one() check the return value.
The issue is triggered by a memory allocation failure.
Detected by PR #18355
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18697)
(cherry picked from commit 7fe7cc57af3db1e497877f0329ba17609b2efc8b)
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bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18626)
(cherry picked from commit 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Inspired by BoringSSL fix by David Benjamin.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18510)
(cherry picked from commit 6d702cebfce3ffd9d8c0cb2af80a987d3288e7a3)
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This partially fixes a bug where, on x86_64, BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime
would sometimes return m, the modulus, when it should have returned
zero. Thanks to Guido Vranken for reporting it. It is only a partial fix
because the same bug also exists in the "rsaz" codepath.
The bug only affects zero outputs (with non-zero inputs), so we believe
it has no security impact on our cryptographic functions.
The fx is to delete lowercase bn_from_montgomery altogether, and have the
mont5 path use the same BN_from_montgomery ending as the non-mont5 path.
This only impacts the final step of the whole exponentiation and has no
measurable perf impact.
See the original BoringSSL commit
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/13c9d5c69d04485a7a8840c12185c832026c8315
for further analysis.
Original-author: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18510)
(cherry picked from commit 0ae365e1f80648f4c52aa3ac9bbc279b6192b23e)
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This reverts commit 0d40ca47bd86e74a95c3a2f5fb6c67cdbee93c79.
It was found that the computation produces incorrect results in some
cases.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18512)
(cherry picked from commit 712d9cc90e355b2c98a959d4e9398610d2269c9e)
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Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18429)
(cherry picked from commit d2399d8cd29f56e6614f0b3db4e7e563a745902a)
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Fixes #18321
Increase the iteration factor used when 'Computing a Probable Prime Factor Based on Auxiliary Primes' from 5 to 20.
This matches the algorithm update made in FIPS 186-5.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18429)
(cherry picked from commit ad7e0fd550a9eb2946edf38003ebc6d5b988dac7)
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Rename x86-32 assembly files from .s to .S. While processing the .S file
gcc will use the pre-processor whic will evaluate macros and ifdef. This
is turn will be used to enable the endbr32 opcode based on the __CET__
define.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18353)
(cherry picked from commit 9968c77539d6f7c5b1dcf0162fd4b57c144318c7)
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As of clang-14 the strict aliasing is causing code to magically disappear.
By explicitly inlining the code, the aliasing problem evaporates.
Fixes #18225
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18258)
(cherry picked from commit 8712db5e4e0c508de10e887aebf639384dc20710)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Fixes #18010.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18034)
(cherry picked from commit bc6bac8561ead83d6135f376ffcbbb0b657e64fe)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17890)
(cherry picked from commit a0238b7ed87998c48b1c92bad7fa82dcbba507f9)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9eafb53614bf65797db25f467946e735e1b43dc9)
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This fixes a bug whereby BN_mod_exp2_mont can dereference a NULL pointer
if BIGNUM argument m represents zero.
Regression test added. Fixes #17648.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17783)
(cherry picked from commit 43135a5d2274c24e97f50e16ce492c22eb717ab2)
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These compilers define _ARCH_PPC64 for 32 bit builds
so we cannot depend solely on this define to identify
32 bit build.
Fixes #17087
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17497)
(cherry picked from commit cfbb5fcf4424395a1a23751556ea12c56b80b57e)
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Fixes: #13765
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17427)
(cherry picked from commit fd84b9c3e94be1771d1b34ad857081f7693318aa)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17398)
(cherry picked from commit 0088ef48c3e7d9c68e5b3c75cb077da601d22f37)
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Fixes #17298
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17299)
(cherry picked from commit 7c78bd4be810ddceb8f13585a921946cc98f5fbd)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17305)
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Fixes #17296
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17297)
(cherry picked from commit f050745fe69a538952f3e12af3718d19ef2df2e2)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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